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Introduction
Turkish authority has never done anything to introduce modern progress, nor has it been 
concerned with organizing this country. ‘One must wonder,’ said a writer, ‘how Europe has 
tolerated for so long at its doors the stigma of a savage Africa ...’ while Algeria and Tunisia 
have become in civilization the equals of the countries of Europe. While France made so 
many sacrifices to bring to Morocco the lights of progress, this unfortunate Tripolitania, 
under the indifferent yoke of Turkey, remained with her defects and barbarism of former 
days.1
This short text by Ernest Laut, a journalist and writer between 1910 and 1940 
at L’Illustration and Le Petit Journal, explained in the first page of the French 
newspaper entitled “Explication de nos Gravures, Les Italiens en Tripolitaine”, 
that Ottoman Tripolitania should be colonized by Europeans. He wrote this on 
October 15, 1911 before the declaration of the so called “Italo-Turkish War” on 
September 29, 1911. Laut stated that provinces from North Africa were ready to 
be colonized, civilized and modernized by Europe. He used the term Europe. The 
Tripolitanian province was to be civilized like the other provinces of North Africa. 
These words show how the relationship between Europe and Africa is seen just 
in terms of colonization and modernization with a very ambiguous conception of 
modernity and civilization. If we already know the stakes and goals of France with 
regards to Africa and specifically North Africa, we do not know very well about 
the other European countries, specifically Germans and Germany and how they 
conceived these relationships with North Africa and the Ottoman North African 
provinces. What were their goals, their interests in this context? This book is con-
ceived as a reflection upon the relationships between Germany and the Ottoman 
province of Tripoli, Libya today, and an attempt to know more about this context 
of growing European colonialism and interests. This book is conceived as a close 
study of published and unpublished archival documents found in the Political 
Archive and the Federal Archives in Berlin (Politisches Archiv and Bundesarchiv) 
1 Our transalation in English from the original in French: “L’autorité turque n’a jamais rien fait 
pour y introduire les progrès modernes, pas plus qu’elle ne s’est préoccupée d’organiser ce pays. 
‘Il faut se demander’, disait un écrivain, ‘comment l’Europe a toléré si longtemps à ses portes 
l’opprobre d’une Afrique sauvage…’ Alors que l’Algérie, la Tunisie sont devenues en civilisation 
les égales des pays d’Europe, alors que la France fait tant de sacrifices pour porter au Maroc 
les lumières du progrès, cette malheureuse Tripolitaine, sous le joug indifférent de la Turquie 
demeurait avec ses tares et sa barbarie d’autrefois”, Laut Ernest, Le Petit Journal, Supplément du 
Dimanche, “Explication de nos Gravures, Les Italiens en Tripolitaine”, October 15, 1911, Gallica 
BNF, 10-12-2015, p. 1.
 Open Access. © 2021 Suaad Alghafal, published by De Gruy ter.  This work is licensed 




and the National Center for Documentation and Archives in Libya and the Natio-
nal archives of Tunisia. These documents were written in a variety of languages 
including German, English, Italian, and French. The archival documents found in 
the Libyan National Center for Documentation and Archives were also in different 
languages (Arabic, English, German, and Ottoman) while the archival documents 
found in Tunis were mainly in Arabic. These archival sources include govern-
ment reports and correspondents as well as reports by travelers and witnesses 
who experienced the events as they were taking place. Some German, English 
and French consuls’ reports found in the archives also contain important infor-
mation about the province of Tripoli, such as reports written by the British consul 
in the province of Tripoli. These reports include very valuable information on 
the trade exchange and volume of trade between Germany and the province of 
Tripoli in the years 1884, 1885 and 1886. For instance, the reports included statis-
tics in terms of total exports of the province of Tripoli to Germany and compared 
the volumes of trade in different years, and also compared the volume of trade 
of other European powers. Reports on Ottoman trade, such as a letter2 released 
by the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard to the German consulate 
in the province of Tripoli in 1910. Or the letter sent to confirm the approval by 
the Ottoman Empire of the new consul in 1910 could be found in these files. An 
example of the Arabic archival documents was about the slave trade.3 A number 
of boxes were at the National Center of Historical Archives in Tripoli, Libya. One 
of these files contained documents regarding the continuation of the slave trade 
in the province of Tripoli and specifically in the port of Benghazi in the eastern 
part of the province despite the universal decision to prevent it. In this book, 
many Arabic books written about the time period under study are used for under-
standing how German politics was perceived by the authors, mainly historians 
from the western and eastern part of Libya. For example, Ḥasan, al-Faqīh Ḥasan’s 
chronicle4 with his major account of the history of the Ottoman province of Tripoli 
in the first half of the 19th century is one of them. Ḥasan, al-Faqīh Ḥasan wrote 
2 Wathīqā 4288, Ṣādira ʿan wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-ʿūthmānīyyā ilā wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, 
Wathīqā ʿūthmānīyyā 1327H/1910, Dār al-māḥafūḍāt al-tārīkhiyya, al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrāʾ, Ṭarābulis.
3 Wathīqā 12, Milaf al-wathāʾiq al-ijtimāʿīyya, 1/6/1902, shuʾ bat al-wathāʾiq wa al-makhṭūṭāt, 
al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al- dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis.
4 Ḥasan, al-Faqīh Ḥasan, al-Yawmiyyāt al-lībiyyā, vol. 1, 958h–1248h (1551–1832), taḥqīq 
Moḥammad al-ʿUsṭā wa ʿAmmār Jiḥīdar, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, 
Ṭarābulis, 1984, collection of textes and archives, 7); al-Yawmiyyāt al-lībiyyā, vol 2, al-harb al-
’ahlīya wa nihāya al-‘ahd al-Kāramanlī, 1248–1251h (1832–1835), ed. by Jiḥīdar, ʿAmmār, markaz 
jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, collection textes and archives, 2-7), Ṭarābulis, 2001.
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about daily life in the province of Tripoli and the events he experienced.5 There 
was also another interesting Arab author originally from Egypt, who witnessed 
many events during the war of 1915, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAzzām.6 He witnessed the 
war between Libya and Britain in Egypt during 1915–1916 and wrote a book about 
the battles there between the British and the Libyan mujāhidīn (The resisters). 
The Ottomans and the Germans supported these mujāhidīn. In his book, ʿAzzām 
provides details about the difficulties that faced the mujāhidīn and their leader 
Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf during the battles, their withdrawal toward Libya and 
the period after their defeat. It is worth mentioning that ʿAbd al-RaḥmānʿAzzām 
accompanied the army that started from the province of Tripoli and headed to 
Egypt to fight the British there. Another contemporary Arabic writer was al-Ṭāhir 
al-Zāwī7, who wrote a book Jihād al-abṭāl (Jihad of the Heroes) addressing the 
struggle of the Libyans against the Italians. It focused on the most important 
events that al-Zāwī personally experienced. He also wrote about the last period 
of the Ottomans in Libya and described the battles of the Libyans against the 
Italian occupation up to the point of time when the local Libyan leaders were 
negotiating with the Italians. He also wrote about the Republic of Tripoli that was 
declared after the end of World War One. Books written by travelers, particularly 
from Germany, containing a wealth of information about the economic, cultural 
and social life and the importance of the province of Tripoli for Germany were 
used as sources as well. These travelers began to reach the province of Tripoli 
during the 1840s. Moreover, the German travelers, in particular, provided a lot 
of scattered information about various aspects of life in the province of Tripoli. 
To give an example, one of the most influential German travelers was Gerhard 
Rohlfs, who wrote extensively about his trips to the province of Tripoli and North 
Africa and provided a lot of information about the province and its significance 
to Germany. One of his notable titles was Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā.8 Another significant 
5 This chronicle was edited and published by the famous Libyan historian ʾAmmār Jiḥīdar and 
provides valuable information on travellers in this region.
6 ʿAzzām, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, “kifāḥ al-shaʿb al-lībī fī sabīl al-ḥurrīyya”, translated by ʿImād al-
Dīn Ghānim, Majallat al-wathāʾiq wa al-makhṭūṭāt 2, 2, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū 
al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1987.
7 See Krais,  Jakob, Geschichte als Widerstand, Geschichtsschreibung und „nation-building“ in 
Qaḏḏāfīs Libyen, Ergon, Würzburg, 2016.
8 Rohlfs, Gerhard, Reise durch Marokko, Bremen, Kühtmann‘s, 1868. Arabic translation: Riḥla ilā 
al-Kufrā: taqārīr al-raḥāla al-ʿalmānī Ghīrhārd Rulfis ilā Ṭarābulis ʿabr Bani-Walid wa Sūknā wa 
Hūn wa Waddān wa Zallā wa Awjilah wa Jālū wa Binghāzī, translated by ʿImād al-Dīn Ghānim, 
markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2006.
4   Introduction
book was written by Gustav Nachtigal under the title of Sahara und Sudan.9 He 
passed through the province of Tripoli in 1870. Italian literature on the history of 
Libya including the seminal works of Salvatore Bono10 was used as well. Bono 
collected western sources on the history of Libya (1510–1911). Orhan Koloğlu 
wrote about the history of Turkish-Libyan relations.11 In addition, the works of 
ʿImād al-Dīn Ghānim, who wrote many articles and books about the German 
travelers who visited Tripoli or other places in North Africa, is considered here as 
a major work on the analysis of German consuls who worked in Tripoli.12 He also 
translated some of their books. Amongst the German researchers whose work on 
colonialism has been of relevance to this study is Sebastian Conrad; a promi-
nent historian who has written extensively about German imperialism and colo-
nialism. In his book German Colonialism: A Short History13, he discusses German 
colonial expansion and its most important causes and consequences.  Another 
German historian of particular relevance for this work is Jürgen Osterhammel.14 
He is the co-author of Globalization: A Short History.15 He wrote about the concept 
of imperialism and colonialism and provided a comprehensive definition of the 
two concepts discussing their many dimensions and attributes.16 Conrad and 
Osterhammel wrote an important book together about the position of the German 
transnational Empire in the World, 1871–1914.17
This book comprises five chapters which are arranged in chronological order. 
9 Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan: Ergebnisse sechsjähriger Reisen in Afrika, Erster Band, Graz, 
Austria, 1967.
10 Bono, Salvatore, Storiografia e fonti occidentali sulla storia della Libia (1510–1911), Rome, 
1982; See also Wright, John, Libya: A Modern History, Croom Helm, London and Canberra, 1981.
11 Koloğlu, Orhan, 500 Years in Turkish-Libyan Relations, Ankara, 2007, pp. 10–11; see also 
Koloğlu, Orhan, “Libya from the Ottoman perspective (1835–1918)”, Africa: Rivista Trimestrale 
Di Studi e Documentazione Dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, 63-2, 2008, pp. 275–282.
12 Ghānim, ʿImād al-Dīn,“al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā khilāl al-ʿaqd al-ʾawal min al-qarn 
al-ʿaishrīn kamā tuṣawiruhā wathāʾiq al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī al-ʿalmānī”, Majallat al-buḥūth al-
tārīkhiyya, 5, 1, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1983.
13 Conrad, Sebastian, German Colonialism: A Short History, translated by Sorcha O’Hagan, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012.
14 Osterhammel, Jürgen, Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen, C.H.Beck, Munich, 1995.
15 Osterhammel, Jürgen, Globalization: A Short History (with Niels P. Petersson, Princeton 2005) 
Max Weber and His Contemporaries, ed. with Wolfgang J. Mommsen, London 1987.
16 Osterhammel, Jürgen, “The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth 
Century”, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014; Osterhammel, Jürgen, Colonialism: A 
Theo re ti cal Overview, 2nd ed., Princeton 2005. 
17 Conrad, Sebastian and Jürgen Osterhammel, Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in 
der Welt 1871–1914, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2004.
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The first chapter consists of discussions and discourses on European and 
German colonialism and imperialism and their definitions as used in this book 
and found suitable for the case of the province of Tripoli.
The second chapter examines the geopolitical importance of the province 
of Tripoli and how this lent the province a geographic, strategic and economic 
significance that attracted the attention of the countries seeking control over 
areas in North Africa. The next part of this chapter presents the general situa-
tion in the province of Tripoli between 1870 and 1884 and includes the political 
situation when the province was under Ottoman rule. Tripoli’s administrative 
divisions were set by the Ottomans to facilitate their control. Examples of some 
Ottomans governors are given, particularly those who had a prominent role at 
that time. The economic situation between 1870 and 1884 is also discussed, with 
reference to key indicators such as taxes, industry and commerce. The society of 
the province of Tripoli is discussed in the context of different social conditions 
and characteristics presented relating tothe origin of the province’s residents and 
an analysis of their origin. Other social aspects, such as culture and education, 
from the beginning of establishing schools to the era of publishing newspapers 
and magazines in the province of Tripoli, are also included in the analysis of the 
social circumstances of the region.
The third chapter begins by discussing the relations between the province 
of Tripoli and Germany following the Berlin Conference in 1884. It ends with 
the year 1909, and includes several aspects concerning the German interest in 
the province of Tripoli and when the topic began to be clearly and officially dis-
cussed. The second subchapter discusses the second Berlin Conference in 1884 
and its impact on the Maghreb region. This conference was held because of the 
intersection of European interests in Africa. The question here is about the con-
sequences for the African continent? What were the regulations and laws at the 
European level that were adopted to prevent conflicts and wars, including those 
relating to political and economic interests in the future? This chapter also explo-
res the role of the German travelers in Tripoli and Fezzan at the end of the 19th 
century and how it granted them access to Central Africa with the consent of the 
Ottomans in Tripoli. Moreover, what was their role in supporting the country’s 
policy toward the province via the reports that they sent to Germany? The ques-
tion that arises in this context is whether the activities of the travelers impacted 
the development of the relations between the province of Tripoli and Germany 
through 1895, especially with a focus on economic and trade exchanges? This 
chapter concludes by discussing the opening of the German consulate in Tripoli 
in 1909, and raises the question of why Germany was relatively late, in compari-
son to the other European countries, in establishing diplomatic representation 
in the province of Tripoli.  It also tries to find an answer to the question of why 
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Germany decided to open a consular agency in 1884, and why it was only in 1909 
that the consulate was developed into an embassy?
The fourth chapter focuses on investigating economic developments and 
German policy toward the province of Tripoli during the period between 1909 and 
1914. It also takes the major events that occurred during this phase into account. 
The chapter tries to answer the question of whether and to what extent the esta-
blishment of the German diplomatic representation impacted relations between 
the two countries. The chapter goes on to discuss the international conventions 
and the occupation of the province of Tripoli by Italy in 1911. The main conven-
tions between the European countries are presented and the chapter considers 
the extent to which these conventions shaped and reshaped the interests of Euro-
pean countries outside Europe. Within the same political context, the subject of 
Ottoman-German relations and the alliance between these powers before the First 
World War, and the evolution of this relationship, are discussed. It concludes with 
the declaration of German neutrality toward the province of Tripoli after Italian 
occupation, a move that entailed open hostilities with the Ottoman Empire, given 
that the province of Tripoli was administratively and politically managed by the 
Ottomans. The next subchapter discusses how the German presence in Libya con-
tinued after the Italian occupation in the form of sending health missions to the 
province of Tripoli, which was providing assistance to Libyans wounded in their 
war against Italy.
The fifth chapter discusses the relationship between Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire and its impact on the situation in the province of Tripoli during 
the First World War. It reveals the German position toward the Libyan jihad 
movement, discussing the motives, goals and gains. Then it refers to the German 
support to the Ottoman state through the German presence in Libya, where 
German politicians decided to provide military and financial aid to the Ottomans 
and the Libyan mujāhidīn. The last part focuses on how the Germans and Otto-
mans managed to convince the leadership of the mujāhidīn in Libya to develop 
their war from a war against the Italians in Libya into a war against the British in 
Egypt in 1915. Finally, the chapter presents the German policy toward the province 
of Tripoli at the end of the First World War in 1918, the negative impacts on the 
German presence in Libya and how the defeat of Germany at the end of the First 
World War resulted in the end of German influence in Libya during this phase.
1  European Colonial Ambitions and Economic 
Expansion of the Reich (1884–1914)
1.1  Behind Colonialism and Imperialism
This book investigates a rare topic in German imperial history: German engage-
ment in the Ottoman province of Tripoli. It thus fills the important gap in the exten-
sive literature on German imperialism with a specific focus: relations between 
Germany and the Ottoman provinces of Tripoli (Wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-Ghārb) from 
1884 to 1918. It also considers the political, economic, and institutional factors 
that influenced the relationships between Germany and Tripoli. This province 
was one of the North African provinces under the rule of the Ottoman Empire 
from 1551 to 1911. This book will also analyze as well the relationship between 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the light of events of more 
international significance that were taking place around the same time and influ-
encing this relationship. 
The time period focused on in this book is from 1884 to 1918. This period 
has been selected for its essential relevance to the history of the relationship 
between the East and the West. The 18th and 19th centuries were characterized 
by an extension of European control outside the European continent;1 an enter-
prise that included what came to be known as the “scramble for Africa”.2 This 
period was also marked by the Industrial Revolution in Europe. The mechaniza-
tion of the industrial sector that it brought about, as well as mass production of 
different products, led to enormous economic developments.3 Following these 
developments European powers began to search for markets for their products 
and for regions that would supply the raw materials required for the growing 
industries.4 In order to secure their access to these markets and raw materials, 
it was necessary to have the routes and the political control over these areas, 
either by entering into treaties with the original landowners or by the imposi-
tion of direct political and military control. The expansion outside Europe was 
rooted in these specific needs, which took on both a political and economic char-
1 Conrad, German Colonialism.
2 Pakenham, Thomas, The Scramble for Africa: The White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent 
from 1876 to 1912, Harper Perennial, 1992.
3 Giordani, Paolo, The German Colonial Empire – Its Beginning and Ending, translated by Mrs. 
Gustavus W. Hamilton, G. Bell and Sons, London, 1916. https://archive.org/stream/germancolo-
nialem00gioruoft/germancolonialem00gioruoft_djvu.txt (05.05.2016), p. vi
4 Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 27.
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acter. Many European countries sought to obtain control over territories outside 
their borders. Alongside more internationally powerful countries such as Britain, 
France, Spain and Portugal, Germany also had ambitions of this nature. Britain 
had succeeded in extending its influence into many areas including India in Asia, 
Egypt and Sudan in North Africa as well as some other areas in Central and West 
Africa. France had control of some areas in North Africa like the Ottoman prov-
ince of Algeria since 1830 and Tunis from 1881, while Spain and Portugal had 
managed to control some of the areas bordering the Indian Ocean. Germany did 
not participate in the earlier colonial competition of the European countries in 
these regions. Only after the political and administrative unification in 1871 did 
Germany start to develop a policy of expansion toward territories outside Europe, 
and Africa more specifically. Thus, Germany had acquired some areas in Central 
and Western Africa, albeit later than other European countries such as Britain 
and France. The German expansion started in practice with Otto von Bismarck 
(1815-1895),5 the German Chancellor of the Reich (1871–1890). He decided to have 
colonies outside Germany in 1884, a move which he viewed as crucial to protect 
his country from other powers. The German minister Bernhard von Bülow (1849–
1929) who was the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1897–1900) and later the 
Chancellor of the German Empire (1900–1909) expressed the necessity for expan-
sion explicitly in his speech before the house of the Imperial Diet of the German 
Empire (Reichstag) on December 11, 1899:
In our nineteenth century, England has continually expanded its colonial empire – the 
largest the world has seen since the days of the Romans. The French have gained a firmer 
and firmer foothold in North Africa and Africa and created for themselves a new empire in 
the Far East. In Asia, Russia has embarked on a series of victories that has taken it to the 
Pamir Plateau and the coasts of the Pacific Ocean….6
In these words, he stressed the position of England as the first colonial empire 
in the world, as well as the gains of the other major powers, mainly France and 
Russia. In a speech comparing these powers, he mentioned the main interest of 
each and the German interest specifically, as well as the main reasons behind the 
expansion, in the following words: 
5 For more information on the Prussian statesman and the German Chancellor (1815–1898) see 
Pflanze, Otto, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, vol. 3: “The Period of Fortification, 
1880–1898”, 2nd ed., 1990.
6 Bernhard von Bülow, speech given: “Dynamic Foreign Policy” (December 11, 1899), German 
History in Documents and Images (GHDI): http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.
cfm?document_id=779 (05.03.2016).
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It is out of the question for the simple reason that we now have interests in all parts of the 
world. [...] The rapid growth of our population, the Unprecedented expansion of our indus-
try, the industriousness of our merchants, in short, the phenomenal vitality of the German 
people have integrated us into the world economy and drawn us into international politics. 
If the British speak of Greater Britain, if the French speak of Nouvelle France, if the Russians 
move into Asia, we too have the right to a Greater Germany.7
Another important event which took place during the period in question was the 
Second Berlin Conference, also known as Congo Conference, in 1884. This confe-
rence was a very influential political event that shaped the relationship between 
the major European powers as well as their respective expansions in Africa. The 
conference was held in response to the emerging conflict among the European 
powers about their colonies in Africa, especially in the Congo Basin. It discussed 
questions such as how to colonize, what to colonize and how to implement free 
trade and freedom of navigation in the Congo Basin, and came out with new regu-
lations with regard to their colonies in the area.8 The main regulations included 
the supervision of colonies to prevent any single country abusing the rights of 
another. These were stated in articles 34 and 35 of the conference agreement.9 The 
countries participating also agreed to prevent the slave trade in article 9. Article 6 
specified the regulations to deal with the local populations in the colonies.10 The 
year 1918 has been selected as the cut-off point of this book because it represents 
the end of World War I and the decline of German influence over the province of 
Tripoli, which was named “Libya” in 1911 after the Italian occupation.11 However, 
this period will also be examined in this book in order to see if and how German 
interest in Libya changed during this time and whether or not it was affected by 
Italian occupation of this region. In 1918, the Tripolitanian Republic was estab-
lished under Italian rule (al-Jumhūriyya al-Ṭarābulisiyya – Republic of Tripolitania).12 
The political and economic conditions in which the declaration took place were 
7 Bernhard von Bülow, speech given: “Dynamic Foreign Policy” (December 11, 1899).
8 On the topic see for example Craven, Matthew, “Between Law and History: The Berlin Confe-
rence of 1884–1885 and the Logic of Free Trade”, London Review of International Law, 3-1, 2015, 
pp. 31–59.
9 Stoecker, Helmuth, German Imperialism in Africa from the Beginning until the Second World, 
Translated from German by Bernd Zöllner Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1986, p. 37.
10 Ibid.
11 Nagy, Làszlo J., “Le guerre italo-turque en Tripolitaine (1911–1912) et la Hongrie”, Africa: Rivis-
ta Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell‘Istituto Italiano per l‘Africa e l‘Oriente, 63-2, 2008, 
pp. 325–331.
12 This “Tripolitanian Republic” started on November 16, 1918 and ended on July 1, 1919; see 
al-Zāwī, al-Ṭāhir Aḥmed, Jihād al-abṭāl, Dār al-madār al-islāmī, Bayrūt, 2004, pp. 322–323,353.
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difficult, owing to the recent defeat of the Ottoman forces (supported by Germany) 
and their withdrawal from the region, including Libya. Even at the beginning of 
1919 the Ottoman forces were asked to leave the country, the representative of the 
Ottoman Empire and the German commander Paul Freiherr Wolff von Toden-
warth stayed to help build the new republic that expected to rule the country.13 
The geographical scope of this book is limited to the area belonging to the last 
North African Ottoman province of Tripoli at the end of the 19th century and 
within its boundaries defined in that period by Britain and France. The province 
of Tripoli shared its eastern borders with the former Ottoman province of Egypt. 
The British army had occupied Egypt since 1882 but it was not declared a British 
colony, making its status unclear. The western border of the province was shared 
with the former Ottoman province of Tunisia and the former Ottoman province of 
Algeria that had been colonized by France since 1830. The northern borders of 
Tripoli were constituted by the Mediterranean Sea, and to the south lay the 
middle, eastern and western regions of Sudan, which are now divided into Chad 
(colonized by France 1900-1960),14 Niger (colonized by France 1922–1960) and 
Sudan (colonized by Britain 1899–1956). These geographical borders had been 
defined differently under the administration of the Ottoman Empire, and they 
were changed when the European countries colonized the area and redefined the 
borders according to their interests and influence. The province of Tripoli was 
considered important for different European powers. Historical literature showed 
that in 1899 the province of Tripoli was an issue of dispute between England and 
France, since it was viewed as the easiest intermediary passage between the basin 
of Chad, English Nigeria and French Senegal and the Mediterranean. In Giordani’s 
words “Tripoli, for evident geographical reasons has always been the shortest 
way to the sea”.15 The importance of the province of Tripoli also resulted from the 
coastline stretching north to the Mediterranean with a distance exceeding 1.900 
km. Tripoli was an important commercial center with many ‘Libyan’ cities estab-
lished since the period of the Phoenicians, and then under Carthage and the 
Roman Empire. It was also the meeting point of the African trade routes that 
gathered both Eastern and European trade.16 With regard to Germany, this impor-
tance was stressed in the German media at the time supported by businessmen, 
13 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, pp. 310–311
14 See Zeltner, Jean-Claude, Tripoli, carrefour de l’Europe et des pays du Tchad (1500–1795), 
Paris, 1992.
15 Giordani, The German Colonial Empire – Its Beginning and Ending, p. 131.
16 See “Les annales Tripolitaines de Charles Féraud”, with an introduction by Nora Lafi, 
Bouchène, Paris, 2005, 437p; see also Dewière, Rémi and Işıksel, Güneş, “Tripoli, port de mer, 
port de desert”, Hypothèses. Revue de l’école doctorale d’histoire de Paris 1.
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travelers and investors to prompt the German politicians and decision makers to 
seek a space in North Africa building on the good relations they had with the 
Ottoman Empire. In addition to that, they tried to find an entrance to reach their 
colonies in East and West Africa easily.17 This province was the best place to 
realize this objective and it is argued clearly in different documents from the The 
Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen 
Amts) that the German presence in this Tripolitanian region was subjected to the 
international policies, but the intention was different from the colonial intentions 
of Italy.18 Germany’s interests in the province were more specifically economic 
and strategic in contrast to Italy, which wanted to fully occupy the province. The 
Italian interest was based on the concern to have a colony in the province of 
Tripoli, the coast of which it regarded as its fourth border (Quarta sponda).19 The 
province of Tripoli also attracted many travelers who played a major role in high-
lighting its strategic importance. A large number of travelers of differing Euro-
pean nationalities visited this place. They came also with different intentions. 
Most of them came under the aegis of the Association for Promoting the Discovery 
of Interior Parts of Africa, also known as the African Association, which was esta-
blished in London in 1788.20 This association was used by Britain to collect as 
much information as possible on the areas that were not yet under the control of 
any European countries. The association financed scouting trips and other activi-
ties that helped in collecting the needed information. Many European travelers 
were financed through this association, such as the German traveler Heinrich 
Barth (born 1821) who wrote extensively on Tripolitania and on Africa more gene-
rally.21 However, other travelers who visited the province of Tripoli came individu-
ally, driven by their desire to explore the area. They subsequently developed their 
interests and were supported by some associations that had specific missions. In 
addition to Heinrich Barth, Gerhard Rohlfs (born 1831),22 Gustav Nachtigal (born 
17 Giordani, The German Colonial Empire – Its Beginning and Ending, p. 131.
18 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kai-
serliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 1, vom Juli 1869 bis Oktober 1888, R901/52506, 19. Juni, 1899, Nr. 
A.z.14524/99/1899.
19 https://chronicle.fanack.com/libya/history-past-to-present/italys-fourth-coast/.
20 On the African Association, see Rutherford, Robert Vincent, Sir Joseph Banks and the Explora-
tion of Africa (1788–1820), Berkeley, University of California, 1952, 704p; see also: Mūrī, ʾAtīlyū, 
al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Lībiyā mundhu maṭalaʿ al-qarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashar ḥata al-iḥtilāl 
al-iṭālī, Taʿrīb Khalīfa al-Tilīsī, Dār al-Furjānī, Ṭarābulis, 1971, p. 8.
21 Barth’s journey to the province of Tripoli will be presented in chapter 3, Barth, Heinrich, 
Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa, London, 1857.
22 Friedrich Gerhard Rohlfs (1831–1896), a former consul in Zanzibar appointed by Otto von Bis-
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1834),23 Gottlob Adolf Krause (born 1834),24 and Ewald Banse (born 1883)25 
amongst others. Obviously, they all benefited from the experience of the Libyans 
in understanding the desert as well as their knowl edge about the routes and 
pathways leading to the interior of Africa. The European travelers who visited the 
province of Tripoli could be divided into two categories: The first, like Baron von 
Maltzan and Gottlob Adolf Krause, came to the province to explore and research 
historical and geographical aspects, in addition to the monuments. The second 
group tried to study the province focusing on the political, economic and social 
aspects, and they intended to collect as much information as possible. Members 
of this, group, such as Gerhard Rohlfs and Gustav Nachtigal, were serving the 
colonial objectives first. Those travelers, especially the Germans, realized econo-
mic goals. Tripoli offered them a good entry into West and East Africa. This is why 
the German consular agency (al-Wikāla al-Qunṣuliyya) opened in Tripoli in 1884 
and was later upgraded in 1909 to a consulate (Qunṣuliyya). The opening of the 
consulate is generally viewed by Libyan historians as representing the highpoint 
of German interest in the province of Tripoli.26 But it should be stressed that this 
revealed the interests of Germany, despite the reserve with which German diplo-
macy worked with the province through other channels, such as those of Cons-
tantinople, the capital of the Ottoman Empire. In shaping German policies in the 
North Africa region, the German consul does not represent as such the German 
approach to the whole region. German decision makers acting through this con-
sular agency is sometimes different from those pertaining to the consulate. The 
marck, who was before a doctor in the French colonial Legion in the Ottoman province of Algiers 
where he took part in the violent colonization of the Kabylia region. In 1878 he was commissi-
oned by the German African Society to travel to the region of Wadai in the south of the Province 
of Tripoli. As a geographer, as well, he explored Africa and dedicated very interesting pages to 
the province of Ottoman Tripoli, See Rohlfs, Gerhard, Reise durch Marokko, Uebersteigung des 
grossen Atlas, Exploration der Oasen von Tafilet, Tuat, Tidikelt und Reise durch die grosse Wüste 
über Rhadames nach Tripoli, Kühtman’s Buchhandlung, Bremen, 1868.
23 Nachtigal, Gustav, Sahara und Sudan, 3 vols., Weltgeist-Bücher Verlags-Gesellschaft m.b.h, 
Berlin – Leipzig, 1879–1889.
24 Krawzā, Ghūtlūb Adūlf, Taqārīr Ghūtlūb Adūlf Krawzā al-ṣaḥafīyya ḥawl al-ghazū al-iṭālī li-
Lībiyā, translated by ʿImād al-Dīn Ghānim, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, 
Ṭarābulis, 1993.
25 Banzā, Ifāld, Ṭarābulis maṭlaʿ al-qarn al-ʿaishrīn fī waṣf al-jughrāfī al-ʿalmānī Ifāld Banzā, 
translated and studied by ʿ Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, 
Ṭarābulis, 1998.
26 See for example Ghānim, ʿImād al-Dīn wa Hānis Shlūtir, “al-Qunṣuliyya al-ʿālāmīyyā 
fī Ṭarābulis wa makanātuha fī al-ʿālāqāt al-lībīyyā al-ʿalmānīyya ḥattā nihāyat al-ḥarab al-
ʿalāmīyyā al-ʾūlā”, unpublished, p. 3. 
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consulate served the Germans who resided in the province, including the trave-
lers and investors.27 The international context in the 19th century was just about 
control over the territories of the Ottoman by the European countries. In 1882 an 
agreement between France and Britain and then in 1899 made possible the 
sharing of Sudan between them. An 1887 German-Italian agreement was secretly 
signed by the Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. By signing this agreement Germany 
stated the eligibility of Italy to occupy the province of Tripoli.28 There was also an 
Entente cordiale signed between France and Britain in 1904.29 It is to be noted 
here that the signing of this agreement resulted in the first Morocco crisis, which 
was solved via the Algeciras conference.30 This highlights the argument that Italy 
had entered into many agreements and used other agreements to pave its way to 
occupy the province of Tripoli. An analysis of Germany’s relationship with the 
Ottoman Empire is needed, particularly a study of German influence and support 
provided to the leadership of the Libyan mujāhidīn31 (those who fought against 
the invasion in 1914 in moving their troops to fight in a war outside their province, 
specifically against the British in Egypt instead of supporting them in the internal 
war against the Italians).
This book argues that Germany was trying to emulate the major European 
countries, particularly Britain and France, in the process of extending its control 
beyond Europe. Germany had political, strategic and economic interests in North 
Africa, particularly the province of Tripoli, but never had colonial intentions like 
the other European countries although the terms and concepts “colonialism” and 
“imperialism” are differentiated by historians in other contexts. To realize these 
goals, Germany started to strengthen its relations with the Ottoman Empire in the 
second half of the 19th century. They also developed the military forces of the Otto-
27 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 
bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. 16857, 19. Juni 1899.
28 On the agreement of 1887: Medlicott, W.N., “The Mediterranean Agreement of 1887”, The 
Slavonic Review, 5-13, 1926, pp. 66-88; Ismāʿīl, Ḥilmi Maḥrūs, Tārīkh al-ʿarab al-ḥadīth min al-
ghazū alʿūthmānī ilā nihāyat al-ḥarab al-ʿālāmīyyā al-ʾūlā, vol. 1, muʾssasat shabāb al-jamiʾa, 
al-Iskandarīyya, 1977, p. 263.
29 On the Entente cordiale see Bell, P.M.H., France and Britain 1900–1940, Routledge, Lon-
don, 2014, 288p; see also Mīkhāʾīl, Hinrī ʾAnīs, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-Injīlīzīyya al-lībiyyā maʿa taḥlīl 
li-lmuʿāhadā al-Injīlīzīyya al-lībiyyā, al-haiʾa al-maṣrīyya al-ʾāmmā li-l-taʾlīf wa al-nashir, al-
Qāhira, 1973, p. 13. 
30 Jones, Heather, “Algeciras Revisited: European Crisis and Conference Diplomacy 1906”, EUI 
Working Papers, European University Institute, Max Weber Program MWP 2009/01; see also An-
derson, Eugene, The First Moroccan Crisis (1904–1906), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
Press, 1930.
31 People who are involved in jihad (Islamic war against the enemies of Islam).
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mans and established economic projects like building the Baghdad railway. This 
book also argues that Germany already had a political and military presence in 
other parts of central Africa; the province of Tripoli was thus viewed by Germany 
as the gate to the German colonies in Africa. This study considers an episode of 
what has been called the “scramble for Africa”. The events are analyzed as part 
of the wider context of colonialism and imperialism. It is relatively common that 
the terms “colonialism” and “imperialism” are used interchangeably in literature 
discussing the subject, although they refer to different phenomena. Coloniza-
tion as a phenomenon had spread drastically in the period following the geo-
graphical discoveries at the beginning of the 15th and 16th centuries, and became 
stronger in the 18th and 19th centuries. Jürgen Osterhammel’s definition of coloni-
alism explains the process. Osterhammel defines colonialism as a relationship 
of domination between two culturally different powers, in the context of which 
one party controls the decisions of the other, who is forced to deal with these 
external pressures and serve the interests of the dominant party.32 The interests of 
the colonized countries were not considered subordinated to those of the coloniz-
ers. Moreover, colonialism is the ideological orientation of the colonizer.33 Timo 
Särkkä supported the argument and definition provided by Osterhammel that 
colonialism is an unequal economic, political and cultural relationship between 
the colonial powers and the colonized countries.34 It is noted that imperialism 
as a concept emerged later than the concept of colonialism. According to the 
same writer, the term imperialism means the collection of all the actors and all 
forces that contribute to the establishment and maintenance of colonial empires. 
Imperialism was not only a colonial policy of one power but it was shaped and 
reshaped by the influence of the international polices and powers of countries 
who seek to take part of the process and actions.35 The main factors behind the 
development of colonialism tend to be divided into four groups in the literature 
on the subject.36 The first of these is the economic factor, including the rise of the 
Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution was also taking place in the 18th 
and 19th centuries in Europe and was accompanied by the mechanization of the 
industrial sector as well as mass production of different products that led to enor-
32 Osterhammel, Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen, p. 21.
33 Ibid.
34 Särkkä, Timo, Hobson’s Imperialism A Study in Late-Victorian Political Thought, University of 
Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, 2009, p. 13.
35 Osterhammel, Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen, p. 21.
36 Aybar, Juan Carlos Ocaña, Colonialism and Imperialism, Geography and History, Bilingual 
Studies – IES Parque de Lisboa, Alcorcón, Madrid.
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mous economic developments.37 These developments were the reason behind 
the attempts of the European powers to search for markets to sell their products, 
as well as to find new regions to get the required raw materials for the growing 
industries.38 In order to secure their access to these markets and raw materials, it 
was necessary to have political control over these new regions, either by entering 
into treaty relations with the original rulers or by imposing direct political and 
military control. The expansion outside Europe came from these specific needs, 
which took on both political and economic characters. It is also important to note 
that imperialism was not limited to the actual establishment of colonies but could 
also included penetration by economic and financial means. This corresponds 
to Germany’s relations with the Ottoman Empire. The idea of examining the eco-
nomic motives of imperialism was originally developed by J.A. Hobson (1858–
1940),39 who argued that imperialism was driven by economic motives during the 
Industrial Revolution when the European powers tried to find new markets and 
sources of raw materials. Hobson’s main argument is that after the industrial and 
capitalist countries achieved production surplus they began to search for new 
markets to sell their products, invest their capital and acquire raw material for the 
growing industries and found their target in the developing countries. As part of 
this process, the pressure that businessmen and venture capitalists put on their 
governments to protect their money and projects led to political intervention in 
the internal affairs of colonized countries.40 Jules Ferry (1832–1893) justified the 
French motivations behind colonial expansion in his speech before the French 
National Assembly that: 
... which justify a policy of colonial expansion from the point of view of that need, felt more 
and more strongly by the industrial populations of Europe and particularly those of our own 
rich and hard working country: the need for export markets. Is this some kind of chimera? Is 
this a view of the future or is it not rather a pressing need and, we could say, the cry of our 
industrial population? I will formulate only in a general way what each of you, in the different 
parts of France, is in a position to confirm. Yes, what is lacking for our great industry, drawn 
irrevocably on to the path of exportation by the (free trade) treaties of 1860, what it lacks 
more and more is export markets. Why? Because next door to us Germany is surrounded by 
barriers, because beyond the ocean, the United States of America has become protectionist, 
37 Giordani, The German Colonial Empire – Its Beginning and Ending, https://archive.org/
stream/germancolonialem00gioruoft/germancolonialem00gioruoft_djvu.txt (05.05.2016), p. vi
38 Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 27.
39 Särkkä provided a comprehensive analysis of Hobson’s theory from his own perspective as 
well as the perspectives of other writers.
40 Evans, Richard J., “Empire: The Scramble for Africa”, Gresham College, London, 2001, (http:// 
www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/the-scramble-for-africa).
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protectionist in the most extreme sense, because not only have these great markets … there is 
a second point, a second order of ideas to which I have to give equal attention, but as quickly 
as possible, believe me; it is the humanitarian and civilizing side of the question.41
The second factor was political, including the expansion of political power and 
influence that was supported by specific lobby groups and political prestige. The 
third includes geostrategic factors such as the acquisition of geographically priv-
ileged provinces and their transformation into colonies of the European powers. 
The larger the colonial empire, the more powerful were the colonizers. This can 
also be seen as linked to the first two factors. The fourth factor can be related 
to cultural and scientific goals, including the expansion of European cultures 
and civilizations in the new colonies. This included using colonies to locate the 
growing European population to ease population pressures in Europe. It is argued 
also in literature that42 political rivalries, anticipated economic gains, national-
ism, and humanitarianism all contributed to the psychological atmosphere that 
led to this final chapter of Western expansion.43
Consequently, many European countries sought to obtain new territories or 
intensified their control over territories outside their borders, especially power-
ful countries like Britain, France, Spain and Portugal, in addition to Germany. 
Britain had succeeded in extending its influence into many areas including India, 
Egypt and Sudan as well as some other areas in Central and West Africa. France 
controlled some areas in North Africa like Algeria and Tunis. Spain and Portu-
gal had also managed to control some of the areas bordering the Indian Ocean. 
Considering all these issues, it can be argued that both economic and political 
factors played a significant role in prompting the Europeans to look for new areas 
outside the European continent. However, since this book focuses on Germany, 
the question that arises here is whether the German colonial empire was different 
from the other European colonial empires? 
41 Jules Ferry (1832–1893) was a French politician who twice served as premier during the Third 
Republic from 1871 until 1940.
42 Jules Ferry, Speech before the French National assembly, see Power, Thomas, Jules Ferry and 
the Renaissance of French Imperialism, Whitefish, Literary Licensing, 2013, Pakenham, Thomas, 
The Scramble for Africa, 1876–1912, Random House, New York, 1991.
43 Wesseling, Hendrik L., Imperialism and Colonialism: Essays on the History of European Ex-
pansion, Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press, 1997.
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1.2  German Colonial Ambitions
Germany did not participate in the earlier colonial competition of the European 
powers outside Europe because the German states were not united at that time. 
It was only after German unity in 1871 that the policy of expansion toward terri-
tories outside Europe and specifically in Africa developed. Germany had succee-
ded in achieving its political unity – modelled on Italy which had preceded it 
in 1860 – as a result of the great efforts of the German Chancellor Otto von Bis-
marck, who decided to engage in war with Austria, France and Denmark to prove 
his country’s military strength and power and for Germany to take a remark able 
position among the major powers represented by Britain and France at that time. 
The German expansion began when the German Chancellor of the Reich Otto von 
Bismarck decided to have colonies outside Europe in 1884. These were viewed 
as crucial to protecting his country from other powers. Germany had acquired 
some areas in Central and Western Africa, albeit later than the European coun-
tries like Britain and France. Germany’s unity, which took place during the period 
of industrial revolution in Europe, reinforced its economic activities and led to 
significant growth in the chemical industry, heavy industry, construction of the 
fleet and the army and so on, factors which formed the basis for its expansio-
nary interests in the 1890s and after. Sebastian Conrad argued that there were 
pressure groups and agents behind the German colonial expansion,44 referred 
to by Dirk Göttsche45 as the colonialist movement in Germany. These included 
the geographical societies and projects that helped to provide academic insight 
into Africa by exploring uncharted territories. Sebastian Conrad mentions Hein-
rich Barth, Gerhard Rohlfs and Gustave Nachtigal as the main travelers whose 
trips to different parts of Africa were influential in German colonial expansion. 
As mentioned before, these three German travelers visited the province of Tripoli, 
which led to the province becoming part of their ambitions. Sebastian Conrad 
also refers to a second group, the colonial immigrants and missionaries including 
the Catholic missionaries sent by the French and Belgian churches. A third group 
included merchant networks, such as the Hanseatic merchant families, who set 
up trade linkages throughout the world. They fought for the principles of free 
trade and played an important role in preparing the ground for colonial activi-
ties. A fourth pressure group mentioned by Sebastian Conrad was the educated, 
liberal and nationalist members of the bourgeoisie who were backed by some 
44 Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 23–27.
45 Göttsche, Dirk, Remembering Africa: The Discovery of Colonialism in Contemporary German 
Literature, Camden House, USA, 2013, p. 44.
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nobility, missionaries and merchants and played a crucial role in setting policy. 
Sebastian Conrad mentions Friedrich Farbi (1824–1891), an adviser to Bismarck 
and Adolph Woermann, a merchant and national liberal member of the Reichstag 
as a pioneer of the German expansion46. He wrote a book on colonialism and how 
Germany should build a colonial empire like the other European countries. In 
addition to the pressure groups, Sebastian Conrad also discusses the factors and 
motivations behind German colonial expansion and argues that trade interest 
was the first motive. As he shows, colonies played an important role in solving 
the problem of over-production. A second motive was related to migration. This 
had been ongoing since 1880, when politicians became motivated to find a place 
for new German settlements abroad, beyond those that had hitherto represented 
the focus for German migration. There was a fear that Germany would be the “fer-
tilizer of people” and North America was considered as a “melting pot”. Colonies 
were to play the role of the “New Germany”, meaning that Germans would remain 
German even when settling overseas.47 A third motive were the internal conflicts 
and tension prompting unrest within Germany. In Sebastian Conrad’s words:
Historians have termed this the strategy of social imperialism: it meant declaring colonial 
expansion to be a task for the nation as a whole, thus pushing material needs and social 
tensions into the background.48
A fourth motive was the idea of colonizing that was found in German culture and 
ideology.  Sebastian Conrad portrays a German concept of a ‘civilizing mission’ as 
an idea that brought different people together.49 Göttsche50 supports this with a 
quotation from Osterhammel.51  He agrees with Sebastian Conrad to a great extent 
that these factors and actors influenced German colonial expansion and mentions 
the main factors as “the interplay of colonial expansion, Eurocentric capitalist 
trade, industrialization, the development of a world-wide modern infrastructure, 
and the increasing global movement of individuals, goods and ideas.”52
The German Empire also continued after Otto von Bismarck, as Bernhard 
von Bülow, who was the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1897–1900) and 




50 Göttsche, Remembering Africa, p. 45.
51 Osterhammel, Jürgen, Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, C.H. 
Beck, Munich, 2009.
52 Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt, p. 44.
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later the Chancellor of the German Empire (1900–1909), explicitly expressed the 
necessity of expansion in his speech before the Reichstag on December 11, 1899:
In our nineteenth century, England has continually expanded its colonial empire – the 
largest the world has seen since the days of the Romans. The French have gained a firmer 
and firmer foothold in North Africa and Africa and created for themselves a new empire in 
the Far East. In Asia, Russia has embarked on a series of victories that has taken it to the 
Pamir Plateau and the coasts of the Pacific Ocean….53
His speech viewed the position of England as the first colonial empire in the 
world, as well the other gains of the other major powers, particularly France and 
Russia. In a comparison between these powers, he mentioned the main interest 
of each and the German interest specifically, as well as the main reasons behind 
the expansion, in his words: 
It is out of the question for the simple reason that we now have interests in all parts of the 
world. [ . . .] The rapid growth of our population, the unprecedented expansion of our indus-
try, the industriousness of our merchants, in short, the phenomenal vitality of the German 
people have integrated us into the world economy and drawn us into international politics. 
If the British speak of Greater Britain, if the French speak of Nouvelle France, if the Russians 
move into Asia, we too have the right to a Greater Germany.54
Coming to the question of the period under research (1884–1918) and the reasons 
for its importance, it can be argued that many events took place during this period 
of time that contributed to its significance in the development of colonialism in 
Africa and in German colonial expansion. The most important event of the period 
was the Second Berlin Conference in 1884, which has therefore been chosen as 
a starting year in this book because of the significance of this conference to the 
relationships between the East and the West. This conference was organized by 
Germany, which sought to develop a role for itself in mediating between the Euro-
pean powers, which were beginning to have conflicting interests in Africa. The 
conference was a significant political event that shaped the relationship between 
the major European powers as well as their expansion in Africa. It was held to 
deal with the emerging conflict among the European powers about their colonies 
in Africa, especially in the Congo Basin. It discussed very crucial points including 
how to colonize, what to colonize and how to implement free trade and freedom 
of navigation in the Congo Basin. Its results also included new regulations regard-
53 Bernhard von Bülow, Dynamic Foreign Policy (speech given December 11, 1899).
54 Ibid.
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ing their colonies in the area.55 The main regulations included strong supervi-
sion of colonies to prevent any abuse by any country against the others. These 
were stated in Article 34 and 35 of the conference agreements.56 The countries 
participating in the conference also agreed to prevent the slave trade in Article 9. 
Article 6 specified the regulations to deal with the local populations in the colo-
nies.57 World War I was a turning point because the major powers, mainly Russia, 
Germany, France, and Britain joined the hostilities that transformed it into a world 
war.58 In 1918, the Tripolitanian Republic was established in very difficult polit-
ical and economic conditions. The Republic was declared after the defeat of the 
Ottoman forces (which had been supported by Germany) and their withdrawal 
from the entire region, including Libya. However, even after the official depar-
ture of the Ottoman forces, the representative of the Ottoman Empire and the 
German commander von Todenwarth stayed to help build the new republican 
government that was expected to rule the country.59 A consideration of the factors 
that distinguished the German colonial expansion would point to the argument, 
well-known in the relevant literature,60 that the German colonial empire was one 
of the shortest-lived colonial empires in modern history, particularly when com-
pared with the British and French empires. However, it is also argued that even 
if it was short, it was still a significant and integral part of the period in which 
it took place and that it played a major role in the political events of that time, 
such as the First World War. Germany only started acquiring colonies after its 
unification in 1871 and in 1884–1885 acquired large territories in Africa in what 
is now Togo, Cameroon, Namibia and Tanzania, in addition to small territories 
in East Asia and the Pacific.61 That made the German empire the fourth largest 
in the world after Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. The characteristic 
features of German colonialism included the concept of transporting the German 
civilization to their colonies. It is argued in the literature that Germany aimed at a 
more thorough penetration of the colonized territories and population than other 
colonial powers and that this ambition was linked to the idea of modernism and 
efficient forms of rule that were developed and invested into infrastructure and 
human capital. Sebastian Conrad questions whether these ideas were carried out 
55 On the topic see e.g. Craven, “Between Law and History”, pp. 31–59
56 Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa, p. 37.
57 Ibid.
58 Hamilton, Richard, F. and Herwig, Holger H. (eds.), The Origins of World War I, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 10.
59 See al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, pp. 310–311.
60 Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 1.
61 Ibid., p. 3.
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in reality.62 He emphasizes that the German empire tried to apply the same Euro-
pean state system in its colonies but, in reality, this could not take place, thus 
“the colonial state was not simply an extension of the western European model, 
but as Jürgen Osterhammel suggests, ‘a political form in itself’”.63
Different writers describe German imperialism in different ways. Pro-Ger-
man imperialism argued that Germany penetrated the Ottoman Empire specifi-
cally inspired by the idea of the “Orient”.64 Malte Fuhrmann65 argued that this 
is how the German Orient was constructed. They did not use heavy weapons, 
or ride high with waving banners, but instead came carrying all kinds of tools 
and machines. An army of industrious workers followed in their wake, const-
ructing new buildings and transforming caravan trade paths into railways lines. 
The Germans wanted to liberate the Orient and spread the German version of 
civilization through railway construction, German schools and trade. The main 
theoretical argument about German colonial expansion supported by Sebastian 
Conrad66 and Jürgen Osterhammel67 is that the dynamic of German colonialism 
extended not only to its protectorates and overseas possessions, which he called 
the formally acquired territorial colonial empire, but also included places that 
were informally penetrated. Sebastian Conrad calls this “informal colonialism”,68 
and Jürgen Osterhammel called it the “informal empire” or quasi-colonial control 
(quasi-koloniale Kontrolle).69 He uses this term to refer to the spheres of influence 
of German colonialism outside its formal territories, arguing that the German 
empire, like other colonial empires, built a colonial policy that operated not only 
in the colonies but also in other parts of the world like in China, Latin America 
and the Ottoman Empire. For Osterhammel, the role of the informal colonies was 
to support the center and particularly to enhance the German trade and invest-
ments. One example provided by Sebastian Conrad is the German economic 
62 Ibid., p. 37.
63 Osterhammel, Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen, p. 62, quoted in Conrad, German 
Colonialism, p. 66.
64 Means the East in comparison to the West including Europe and America, see Said, Edward, 
Orientalism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978.
65 Fuhrmann, Malte, “Visions of Germany in Turkey: Legitimizing German Imperialist Penetra-
tion of the Ottoman Empire”; in The Contours of Legitimacy in Central Europe: New Approaches 
in Graduate Studies, European Studies Centre, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Great Britain, 2002, 
quoting from Paul Lindenberg in Fuhrmann, p. 9.
66 Conrad, German Colonialism, pp. 169–170.
67 Osterhammel, Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen, pp. 23–26
68 Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 170.
69 Osterhammel, Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen, p. 25.
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projects in the Ottoman Empire such as the Baghdad railway. Others include the 
German travelers, health missions, the German consulate, the German export to 
the province and the military help provided from German to the Ottomans in their 
war against Italy in 1911 and to the Libyan mujāhidīn; all are conducted within 
the friendship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Quoting from Grüner, 
Sebastian Conrad refers to the German belief.
We help the Turks to build railways and ports. We seek to awaken their industry. We support 
them with our credit. We supply ships and cannons....70
1.3  Jihad in Libya as a Resistance Movement against Colonialism
As mentioned above, during the time in which Germany was searching for eco-
nomic and political influence outside Europe, its attention was directed toward 
the Ottoman Empire, which had extended its influence into large areas in the 
Balkans and the Arab world. The Ottomans also succeeded in obtaining economic 
concessions, which helped them to establish colonies in the center and east of 
the region. The African continent attracted the Europeans, particularly during 
the time of the European colonial competition, to invest and settle in new loca-
tions outside Europe. Not surprisingly, imperialism and colonialism faced strong 
local opposition. In the Muslim world this opposition became known as jihad. 
The Libyan jihad and its historical foundations give the term a different meaning 
to that found in theology. Jihad meant anticolonial resistance. But not all anti-
colonial resistance meant jihad, as many journalists wrote. Jihad as a general 
term includes many aspects, including the individual’s struggle to live accord-
ing to his or her interpretation of the commandments of Islam, to contribute to a 
society that accords with the requirements of the religion, and to bring others to 
the religion of Islam.71 In its political sense the term refers to the armed struggle 
to defend Islam, whether in a territorial or ideological sense.72 This last usage 
70 Die Welt am Montag, November 21, 1989, quoted from Grüner (ed.), Rassismus, Kolonien und 
kolonialer Gedanke, p. 210, in Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 170.
71 Lüdke, Tilman, “(Not), Using Political Islam: The German Empire and its failed propaganda 
campaign in the Near and Middle East 1914–1918 and beyond”, in Jihad and Islam in World War I: 
Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje’s “Holy War Made in Germany”, 
ed. by Erik-Jan Zürcher, Leiden University Press, 2016, p. 83.
72 McAuliffe, Jane D. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Quran, vol. 3, 2003, pp. 35–42.
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tends to be known as defensive jihad.73 It is probably this term that is the most 
accurate description of the form of jihad developed in reaction to the Italian occu-
pation and colonization of Libya and other parts of the Muslim world. According 
to Imam Qurtubi (1214–1273)74 this type of jihad is obligatory upon all Muslims:
If the situation becomes such that the enemy has occupied the Islamic state [...], it 
becomes an individual obligation according toall those belonging to that city to go out in 
the way of Jihad, lightly and heavily, young and old, all upon their individual capability 
and vigor; those with fathers even without their permission and those without; no one 
who is able and has the capability to fight, whether they are fighters or non-fighters can 
remain behind.75
Imam al-Qurtubi also explained that the concept of jihad also includes helping 
neighboring localities or states in their fight against the enemies’ invasion: 
If despite all this that locality is unable to repel the enemies’ invasion, the duty falls upon 
those closest in geographical locality […]. They must send whatever is necessary to help 
the occupied locality so that the enemy can see that the Muslims have sufficient energy 
and resources to drive them back. Any Muslim who comes to learn that the Muslims in 
that area are weak and need help against their enemy, and also knows that he has the 
ability to help and assist them is obliged to go out to them. The Muslims are one hand 
against their enemy.76
When does the duty of jihad end? According to Imam al-Qurtubi, it is only over 
when the occupying enemies are repelled:
If the Muslims in the area of occupation were successful in repelling their enemy, only 
then would the obligation of Jihad fall from the necks of the Muslims elsewhere. Even if 
the enemies of Islam were to come close to the borders of the Islamic state, but not enter, 
it is still obligatory to come out in Jihad to establish Islam and protect the honour and to 
humiliate the enemy and there is no disagreement about this.77
73 al-Uyari, Shaykh Yusuf, “The Ruling on Jihad and Its Divisions”, translated by Abu Osama, 
Series of researches and studies in Shari’ah 2, 2014, p. 9.
74 Imam Qurtubi was a famous mufassir, muhaddith and faqih scholar from Cordoba of Maliki 
origin, the Maliki legal school. He is most famous for his commentary of the Quran, Tafsir al-Qur-
tubi. Bosworth, C.E.; van Donzel, E.; Lewis, B.; Pellat, Ch., Encyclopaedia of Islam (New Edition), 
vol. V (Khe-Mahi), Leiden, Brill, 1986, p. 512.
75 Tafsir al-Qurtubi vol. 8/151.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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The Libyan Islamic jihad began with the announcement of Italy’s war on the 
Ottoman Empire in Tripoli in September 1911. Most Libyans registered themsel-
ves in groups under the guidance of the Libyan tribal leaders and used what-
ever weapons available to attack the Italian soldiers and their army centers in the 
cities and regions. These Libyans were referred to as mujāhidīn. Most of them did 
not have military training and did not participate in the struggle as professionals; 
rather, they were motivated by the concern to defend their land against Italian 
colonization. As such, the mujāhidīn included all social classes.78
78 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, pp. 66–91.
2   The Province of Tripoli and its Significance for 
German Interests (1870–1884)
This chapter highlights the geographical, strategic and economic significance 
of the province of Tripoli to Germany from 1870 to 1884. Like many other parts 
of the Arab world the province of Tripoli was under the rule of the Ottoman 
Empire during this period. Tripoli integrated Ottoman Empire when Suleiman I 
(1494–1566) was the sultan and Sinan Pasha (1506–1596) ruled this new region 
of the Empire in 1551,1 expelling the Spanish from Tripoli.2 The period from 
1551 to 1711 is known as a ‘direct Ottoman rule’3 and was followed by a dynasty 
called al-Kāramanlī between 1711 and 1835.4 This time is seen as independent 
or more autonomous from the central power in Istanbul.5 The Ottomans elimi-
nated this dynasty and restored their direct control over the province in 1835. 
The following period, known as “the second Ottoman period”6 lasted until 1911, 
when the province was occupied by Italy. As the 19th century approached its 
final quarter, rule in Libya was increasingly determined by world powers such 
as Britain, France and after 1871, Germany, meaning it was probably determined 
1 Pasha is a Turkish title given to honor some governors with military ranks in the Ottoman 
Empire and it was given to the governors of the Ottoman provinces, Ṣabān, Suhail, al-Muʿjam 
al-mausuʿi li-l-mṣṭalahat al-ʿūthmānīyyā al-tārīkhiyya, al-Riyyad, 2000, p. 52.
2 Ibn Ghalbūn al-Ṭarābulsī, Abū ʿAbd al-llāh Moḥammad bin Khalīl, al-Tadhkār fī man malak 
Ṭarābulis wa mā kān bihā min Akhbār, ṣaḥḥaḥahu al-Ṭāhir Aḥmed al-Zāwī, Dār al-madār al-
islāmī, Bayrūt, 2004, p. 160; see also Brogini, Anne and Maria Ghazali, “Un enjeu espagnol en 
Méditerranée: les présides de Tripoli et de La Goulette au XVIème siècle”, Cahiers de la Méditer-
ranée, 70-1, 2005, pp. 9–43 and for a larger discussion on the debate see also Özbaran, Salih, The 
Ottoman Response to European Expansion, Isis, Istanbul, 1994; Inalcik, Halil, An Economic and 
Social History of the Ottoman Empire, CUP, Cambridge, 1994.
 3 See for example the work of Mütevelli, el-Feth, Aḥmed Fuad, al-Osmani li el-Şam ve Mısır ve 
mukaddimat min vaka el-vasaik, dar el-nahda el-mısriyya, Cairo, 1976, For the debate on the au-
tonomy of Ottoman provinces see Lafi, Nora, Rattachement et autonomie locale: réflexions sur 
la ville Ottomane, in Villes rattachées, ed. by Denise Turrel et al., Presses universitaires François 
Rabelais, Tours, 2003, pp. 99–112.
4 The name comes from the Karman region in southern Anatolia. This was the origin of their 
grandfather and they belong to the class called al-Kuarglah. Ibn Ghalbūn, al-Tadhkār fī man malak 
Ṭarābulis, p. 275; see also Micacchi, Rodolfo, La Tripolitania sotto il dominio dei Caramanli, A. Ai-
roldi, Intra, 1936.
5 al-Kīb, Najm al-Dīn Ghālib, Madīnat Ṭarābulis ʿabr al-tārīkh, al-Dār al-ʿarabiyya li-alkitāb, 
Ṭarābulis – Tūnis, 1978, p. 74.
6 Bruce St. John, Ronald, Libya: Continuity and Change, Routledge, 2011, p. 11; Ibn Mūsā, al-
Mujtamaʿ alʿarabī al-lībī fī al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī, al-Dār al-ʿarabiyya li-l-kitāb, Ṭarābulis, 1988, p. 26.
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by changing relationships between the Ottoman administration in Istanbul and 
the African provinces like the province of Tripoli.7
It is noteworthy that the significance of the province of Tripoli to the Euro-
peans, including Germany, did not begin in the period under study (1870–1884), 
but can be seen going back to the Middle Ages, when North Africa was under the 
continuous threats of Islamic-Christian disputes and wars started in or ended by 
Spain.8 Other authors state that the importance of the province was linked to the 
establishment of the three cities on the coast, which are Oya (Tripoli), Sabratha 
and Leptis, in the late 6th century BC, and which thus go back even further in time.9 
However, I argue that it was specifically the Industrial Revolution in Europe and the 
spread of colonialism and imperialism in North Africa that caused Tripoli to acquire 
a key relevance for the access that it offered to different parts of Africa. The ideal 
location and its ports played a major role in the history of the province in enhan-
cing trade both internally and externally, as it represented a secure and practical 
port for trade. Tripoli also played a significant role in the wars and conflicts in the 
Mediterranean. The province of Tripoli was active in most of the political events 
that took place in the Mediterranean since the 16th century.10 This is mainly because 
Tripoli and its ports were located in the middle of the Mediterranean and any power 
seeking to dominate the eastern, western, or internal parts of Africa would take 
Tripoli as its starting point. Thus, Tripoli’s strategic importance based on the access 
to different parts of Africa and the connection of these regions to the European 
continent and to North America. The province of Tripoli was therefore important 
for the Ottoman administration and was a crucial place to defend.11 In addition, 
caravan trade routes existed in the province. Increasing ly it attracted the attention 
of many European powers as they competed with the Ottomans at the time of the 
Ottoman reforms called Tanẓīmāt, starting in 1839.12 The Europeans viewed the 
whole region as important for enhancing their trade with Africa. 
7 Deringil, Selim, “‘They live in a State of nomadism and savagery’: The late Ottoman Empire 
and the post-colonial debate”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 45-2, 2003, pp. 311–
342; and his book The Well-Protected Domains. Ideology and the Limitation of the Power in the 
Ottoman Empire 1876–1909, London and Oxford, 1998.
8 See for example: Koloğlu, 500 Years in Turkish-Libyan Relations, pp. 11–15.
9 al-Kīb, Madīnat Ṭarābulis ʿabr al-tārīkh, p. 14.
10 Alghafal, Suaad, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-lībiyyā al-tūnīsīyya khilāl al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī (1835–
1911), markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2006, p. 10.
11 Lafi, Nora, “L’empire Ottoman en Afrique, perspectives d’histoire critique”, Cahiers d’Histoire. 
Revue d’Histoire Critique, 2015, 128, pp. 59–70.
12 On this previous trade, see numerous studies like Wright, John, “Sequins, slaves and Senna: 
Tripoli’s international trade in 1767”, Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione 
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2.1  The Province of Tripoli: A Colonial Bridgehead to Africa?
Tripoli was referred to by a number of names over the centuries.13 The Greeks had 
dubbed it “Libyas”, a name which referred to the area on the western border of 
Egypt.14 This name appears to be derived from the word Lippo, which was the 
name of the tribes living in the region. The Romans referred to it as Africa, and 
this term was used for the region of North Africa as a whole.15 It began to be called 
Tripoli in the third century.16 Then it came to be known as Tripolitania, which 
then was changed to Tribols. Under Ottoman rule, this province was first called 
Eyālet Ṭarābulis al-Ghārb in 1835, and then changed to Wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-Ghārb, 
which means province of Tripoli, in 1865.17 The city of Tripoli became the capital 
of the province.18 It is worth mentioning that in the German documents it is refer-
ring to as Tripolitania. The name Libya was first used after the Italian occupation 
in 1911.19 Herodotus mentioned the names of some tribes who lived in Tripoli 
during the 15th century BC, including the Nasamoin, Garamanti, Macae and 
Paylli.20 Most of them were concentrated in coastal areas, which provided them 
with different livelihood options. They were also concentrated around internal 
Dell‘Istituto Italiano per l‘Africa e l‘Oriente, 63-2, 2008, pp. 249–260; J.C. Zeltner, Tripoli, carrefour 
de l’Europe et des pays du Tchad, 1500–1795, L’Hamattan, Paris, 1992; Fisher, Allan G. B. and 
Humphrey J. Fisher, Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa: The Institution in Saharan and Sudanic 
Africa and the Trans-Saharan Trade, C. Hurstand Co., London, 1970; and Panzac, Daniel, “Le 
commerce maritime de Tripoli de Barbarie dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIème siècle”, Revue 
d’Histoire Maghrebine, 69-70, 1993, pp. 141–167; and Panzac, Daniel, “Une activité en trompe-
l’oeil: la guerre de course à Tripoli de Barbarie dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIème siècle”, 
R.E.M.M.M, 47-1 1988, pp. 126–141; Gemery, Henry A., Jan S. Hogendorn, The Uncommon Market: 
Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, Academic Press, New York, 1979.
13 See Riemer, Michael J., Colonial Bridgehead 1807–1882, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 
1997, p. 251.
14 See Zimmermann, Klaus, Libyen: das Land südlich des Mittelmeers im Weltbild der Griechen, 
C.H. Beck, Munich, 1999.
15 For a discussion on the Roman period, see Jerary, M. Tahar, “Septimius Severus the Roman 
emperor, 193-211 AD”, Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell‘Istituto Italiano 
per l‘Africa e l‘Oriente, 63-2, 2008, pp. 173–185.
16 See for this point the studies of Salvatore Bono, op.cit. and Cresti, Federico, La Libya tra Me-
diterraneo e mondo islamico, Giuffrè, Milano, 2006.
17 For this point see Günes, Isiksel, La diplomatie Ottomane sous le règne de Selim II: paramètres 
et périmètres de l’Empire Ottoman dans le troisième quart du XVIème siècle, Peeters, Paris, 2016.
18 Rūsi, Itūri (E. Rossi), Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī ḥatā sanat 1911, translated with an intro-
duction by Khalīfa Moḥammad al-Tilīsī, Dār al-thaqāfā, Bayrūt, 1974, pp. 23–25.
19 “Libya” will be used when discussing the period starting with the Italian occupation in 1911.
20 Fage, John D., “The Libyans”, The Cambridge History of Africa: From c. 500 BC to AD 1050, 
vol. II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978.
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oases with wells and springs. The most important of these oases were Jalu and 
al-Kufra, Ghat and Awjilah that connected the northern part of Libya and the 
African greatest Sahara. A third center of population concentration were the 
cities in the south of the province, which represented a north-south axis. These 
cities were marked as centers of trade and represented meeting points for the 
groups of traders en route to Africa, or coming from Africa toward the city of 
Tripoli, the province of Tunisia or elsewhere. Tripoli shared an eastern border 
with Egypt and a western border with Tunisia and Algeria21 (see Appendix 3). The 
southern border, with sub-Saharan Africa (the region now known as Sudan-
Chad-Niger) also made the province a good entry point into the rest of the conti-
nent.22 In addition to its land borders, the coastal borders of Tripoli were also of 
strategic relevance. Its coastline, which stretches north along the Mediterranean 
for over 1.900 km, attracted the attention of both the Ottomans and Europeans.23 
It was considered the starting point to different directions. In the south of the 
province, the border with Africa is almost 2.000 km.24 The province of Tripoli can 
thus be seen to occupy a large geographical area, containing varied geographical 
and climatic differences within it.25 However, the province of Tripoli is dominated 
by a Mediterranean climate, with cool winters and hot summers.26 Moreover, the 
province of Tripoli is divided into plain areas, mountainous areas and coastal 
areas, and other desert and semi-desert areas.27 There are no natural rivers but 
there are many valleys including Wadi al-Shati and al-Sayal and a large number 
of oases. Its geographical location led the province of Tripoli to play a major regi-
onal role in a number of different historical periods. The importance of Tripoli is 
21 al-Jawharī, Yusrī ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Shamāl Afrīqiyā dirāsā fī al-jughrāfīyya al-Tārīkhiyya, Dār 
al-Maʿārif, al-Qāhira, 1978, p.15.
22 al-Sāqizlī, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Sulaymān, Lībiyā al-thawrā, vol. 1, Dār Mimfīs li-l-ṭibāʿa wa al-nashr, 
al-Qāhira, 1398 H, p. 9.
23 Tūllī, Rītshārd (Richard Tully), ʿAshar sanawāt fī bilāṭ Ṭarābulis, translated by ʿUmar al-
Dīrāwī Abūḥijla, maktabat al-Furjānī, Ṭarābulis, n.d., p. 8.
24 See for example Zimmermann, Libyen: das Land südlich des Mittelmeers im Weltbild der Grie-
chen, Munich, 1999. See as well Abū Shārib, MoḥammadʿAlī, “Tijārat al-qawāfil wa ʿalāqatuhā 
bi-wāḥat Awjilah”, Awjilah baina al-māḍī wa al-ḥāḍir (1950–1951), aʿmāl al-nadwā al-ʿilmiyya al-
sābiʿa allatī ʿuqidat bī-madīnat Awjilah (17-20/9/2009), ed. by Moḥammad Bashīr Suwīsī, markaz 
jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2007, p. 131.
25 Nājī, Maḥmūd, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, translated by ʿ Abd al-Salām Adham wa Moḥammad 
al-ʿUsṭā, al-jāmiʿa al-lībiyyā, kulīyyāt al-ʿādāb, Ṭarābulis, n.d., p. 13.
26 Dardano, Achille and Riccardo Riccardi, Atlante D’Africa, Ulrico Hoepli Editore, Milano 1936, xiv.
27 Brūshīn, N.A., Tārīkh Lībiyā min nihāyāt al-qarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashar, ḥata ʿam 1969, translated 
by ʿImād Ḥātim, revised by Mīlād al-Magraḥi, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, 
Ṭarābulis, 1988, pp. 25–26.
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evident since the establishment of the three cities of Oea (Tripoli), Sabratha and 
Leptis along the coast in the late 6th century BC.28 The focus was initially on the 
city of Tripoli, which later became the capital of the province. However, other 
cities were also significant, including Benghazi, located in the eastern coastal 
region, and Murzuq, located in the southof the province,29 while Sawkanh and 
Ghadames were centrally located, so the different directions were connected to 
each other (see map 1). Over a long period, the province of Tripoli had attracted 
the attention of the Phoenicians and Romans, Spanish, Greek, Arab and Islamic 
cultures and the Ottoman Turks specifically, who selected Tripoli as their military 
base in North Africa when they ruled the region. Its location also attracted the 
attention of the European powers for the access that it offered to many important 
areas. The province of Tripoli was thus incorporated into their strategic plans and 
actions.30 Tripoli thus clearly functioned as a bridge between the Mediterranean 
and sub-Saharan countries such as western and central Sudan and the rest of the 
African kingdoms, which increased the geographical significance of the province. 
This is due to its open frontiers with the desert. There were no natural obstacles 
that impeded contact between these countries. Ottoman Tripoli was one of the 
most important naval bases in the Mediterranean.31 It was used by the Ottoman 
naval service to attack Malta in 1565,32 1703, 1705 and 170933 and to control the 
Mediterranean Sea. Tripoli also contributed to the restoration of the Tunisian ter-
ritory that was under Spanish rule. The war with the Spanish began in 155934 and 
continued until the end of their colonial rule. In 1581, the Spanish signed an 
agreement35 acknowledging Ottoman sovereignty over Tunisia. Moreover, it is not 
possible to ignore the role played by the Tripolitanian marines, especially in the 
aftermath of the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, when the Ottomans reasserted their 
28 al-Kīb, Madīnat Ṭarābulis ʿabr al-tārīkh, p. 14.
29 Sharaf al-Dīn, Inʾām Moḥammad, Madkhal ilā tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ijtimāʿī wa al-iqtiṣādī: 
dirāsa fī muʾassāt al-mādīna al-tijāriyya, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, 
Ṭarābulis, 1998, p. 23.
30 On this point see Orhan Koloğlu, op.cit.
31 Panzac, Daniel, La marine Ottomane, de l’apogée à la chute de l’Empire (1572–1923), CNRS 
Editions, Paris, 2009.
32 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 167.
33 Rūsi, Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī ḥatā sanat 1911; see also Panzac, Daniel, Commerce et 
navigation dans l’Empire ottoman au XVIIIe siècle, Isis: Istanbul, 1996.
34 al-Zāwī, al-Ṭāhir Aḥmed, Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb min al-fatḥ al-ʿarabī ilā nihāyat al-ʿahd al-
turkī, Dār al-fatḥ li-l-ṭibāʿa wa al-nashr, Bayrūt, wa al-Sayyid Moḥammad al-Ramāḥ Bashīna, 
Ṭarābulis, 1970, p. 265.
35 Rāfiq, ʿAbd al-Karīm, al-ʿArab wa al-ʿūthmānīyyūn, 1516–1916, Dimashq, 1974, p. 79.
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sovereignty – after their defeat at Lepanto – in the Eastern Mediterranean.36 In 
1667, the Tripolitanian naval forces were under the direct authority of the Ottoman 
Pasha as they were part of the Ottoman military forces in Tripoli. It is noteworthy 
that the Europeans in general possessed relatively little information about the 
importance and size of interior and central Africa in the first half of the 18th 
century compared with the extent of their information about the African coasts. 
They were therefore eager to get information about these areas. Tripoli, in their 
view, was the appropriate port for exploring the internal parts of Africa. It also 
seems that the ease of communication between the ports of the south and the 
northern Mediterranean, especially Sicily and the Italian ports, with the ports of 
the province of Tripoli, such as the city of Tripoli, Zuwarah, Misurata and Beng-
hazi, boosted the province’s strategic importance.37 Moreover, it is obvious that 
the strategic importance of the province of Tripoli was one of the main reasons 
that prompted the Italians to seek control of the province, a goal that they at tained 
in 1911. However, the realization of this goal took place after thorough political, 
economic and cultural preparation of the ground during of Ottoman rule.38 France 
also focused on the city of Tripoli and began to work in the south of the province, 
specifically in the city of Ghadames on the border with the Ottoman province of 
Algeria in 1826.39 France convinced the Ottoman authority to establish a consular 
agency in Ghadames, after they had already obtained a consular agency in the 
city of Tripoli. The French had essentially begun to negotiate with tribal leaders to 
convince them to sign an agreement. The main terms of the agreement were about 
trade and taxes to be paid by the caravan convoys that passed through Ghadames. 
The agreement was signed in the city of Ghadames in 1860.40 This struggle of the 
French to find a foothold in the province of Tripoli was due to its geo-political and 
36 al-Tilīsī, Khalīfa Moḥammad, Ḥikāyāt madīnat Ṭarābulis ladā al-raḥḥāla al-ʿarab wa al-
ajānib, al-Dār al-ʿarabiyya li-lkitāb, Lībiyā-Tūnis, n.d., p. 70.
37 See for example Hoefer, Ferdinand, “Etats Tripolitains: régence de Tripoli”, in L’Univers Pit-
toresques, 1856; see as well F. Coro translated in Arabic: Kūrū, Frānshiskū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd 
alʿūthmānī al-thānī, translated by Khalīfa al-Tilīsī, al-munshaʾa al-ʾāmmā li-l- nashir wa al-tawziʿ 
wa al-iʿlān, Ṭarābulis, 1984, pp. 59, 139.
38 Ruḥūmā, Muṣṭafa Ḥāmid, al-Muqāwama al-lībiyyā al-turkīyya ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī Uktūbar 
1911-Uktūbar 1912, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1988, p. 24.
39 Lafi, Nora, “Ghadames cite-oasis entre empire ottoman et colonialisme”, in Libia tra Mediter-
raneo e mondo islamico, ed. by Frederico Cresti et al., 2006, pp. 55–70.
40 al-Ḥindīrī, Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, “Taṭawwur tijārat al-qawāfil fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-
ghārb(1835–1911)”, al-Mujtamaʿ al-lībī (1835–1950), aʿmāl al-nadwa al-ʿilmiyya al-thāmina allatī 
ʿuqidat bi-l-markaz fī al-fatra min 6-27/9/2002, ed. by Moḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Jarārī, markaz jihād 
al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, p. 969.
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military importance and to the economic benefits that arose from this.41 The 
French recognized the great services that could be provided by the city of Gha-
dames if it was under their authority. They saw Ghadames as a connection to 
their colonies in Tunisia and Algeria, using the trade routes on which the city 
was situated. They also realized its considerable economic significance, 
which will be explained later in this chapter when discussing the role of cities 
in boosting trade in the province. France obtained official permission from 
the Ottoman Government in 1842 and 1843 to open the consulates in Murzuq 
and Ghadames.42 These consulates were used to directly supervise trade 
heading to or coming from sub-Saharan Africa.43 The candidate for the posi-
tion of consul was Eugene Ricard, the French consul in Malta. What distingu-
ished him from the other candidates was that he knew the customs and tradi-
tions of the place, since he had previously lived in Benghazi, as well as the 
fact that he was fluent in Arabic.44 Through this, the French had significantly 
strengthened their position by 1894. France was not the only country to esta-
blish a consulate in Ghadames; other European countries such as Britain also 
maintained a representative office in this region. Furthermore, Tobruk repre-
sented an important city for the Germans because it could be used as a port to 
inner Africa and to reach the southern Nile bank. From there, they could move 
freely between their colonies in West and East Africa, at the same time avoid-
ing direct contact with Britain, which was already in Egypt, Sudan, and cont-
roled the main ports, land and sea lanes there. Britain also had the strongest 
European fleet. The British felt the increasing presence of German influence 
in the region as the Germans were persistently strengthening their relations 
with the Sultan of the Arab Maghreb, as well as augmenting their trade activi-
ties and projects. The German efforts resulted in gaining the privilege of buil-
ding the port of Tangier in Morocco, and their economic activities extended to 
both Algeria and Tunisia despite the fact that these regions were under the 
41 For an overview of the economy and Ottoman empire see e.g. İslamoğlu-İnan, Huri (ed.), The 
Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, and see 
also the seminal work of Halil İnalcik and particularly İnalcik, Halil and Donald Quataert (eds.) 
An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1914, Cambridge University Press, 
1994.
42 The British consul had also been represented in Tripoli since the 17th century. See Baker, Tho-
mas and C.R. Pennell, Piracy and Diplomacy in Seventeenth Century North Africa, The Journal of 
Thomas Baker, English Consul in Tripoli, 1677–1685, Golden Cockerel Press, London, 1989.
43 al-Ḥindīrī, “Taṭawwur tijārat al-qawāfil fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis”, p. 969.
44 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kai-
serliche Konsulat in Tripoli Bd. 1, 1895 bis 1899, R16111.
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control of France.45 A report compiled by Friedrich Gerhard Rohlfs (April 14, 
1831 – June 2, 1896) highlighted the strategic importance of Tripoli.46 The study 
provided evidence that whoever controlled Tripoli could also rule Sudan.47 The 
same sentiments can be found in the discourse of European political actors 
around the same time, in addition to the reports of individual travelers. 
Before being mentioned in reports, texts and studies conducted by the 
Germans, Tripoli was mentioned in different European accounts, such as the 
studies conducted by the French and the British. Separately, and in the context 
of international competition (given that the Tanẓīmāt reforms of the Ottoman 
Empire were largely introduced to respond to the challenges of European 
imperialism),48 they all emphasized the strategic importance of the province 
of Tripoli for their economic and colonial goals first of all.49 There were also 
projects planned by some Europeans which reveal their interests in the region. 
For instance, the British envisaged integrating all the valleys in Tripoli and sup-
plying them with water from the Mediterranean.50 They hoped that this would 
create a new maritime route toward sub-Saharan Africa. The project was not 
implemented because it was very expensive and believed to be unrealistic. 
France had also offered to build a canal to link the city of Gabès in Tunisia with 
Tripoli, but they retreated from this proposal as well.51 Nevertheless, France did 
not abandon its economic relations with Tripoli and continued to take advan-
tage of the vital trade routes in Tripoli in the hope of connecting the south of 
45 Muḥāfaẓa, ʿAlī, Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya (1): mauqaf Faransā wa 
ʾAlmāniya wa Iṭalīya min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya 1919–1945, markaz dirāsāt al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya, 
Bayrūt, n.d., pp. 23–24.
46 On Rohlfs’ occupation and work see the introduction to this study.
47 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 78.
48 For this Tanẓīmāt (reforms) there is a very important historiography, for an overview on the 
Ottoman empire see for example Findley, Carter Vaughn, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social 
History, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989; and Davison, Roderic H., Reform in the 
Ottoman Empire 1856–1876, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1905; for an very interesting 
view on this period see also Fuhrmann, Malte, Der Traum vom deutschen Orient: Zwei Deutsche 
Kolonien im Osmanischen Reich 1851–1918, Campus, Frankfurt-New York, 2006 and Fuhrmann, 
Malte, Den Orient deutsch machen: Imperiale Diskurse des Kaiserreiches über das Osmanische 
Reich, 2002, For Tripoli see for example the study of Lafi, Nora, “Entre ottomanité, colonialis-
me et orientalisme: les racines ambiguës de la modernité urbaine dans les villes du Maghreb 
(1830–1960)”, in Frankreich und Frankophonie: Kultur – Sprache – Medien, ed. by Sabine Bastian 
and Franck Trouilloud, Meidenbauer, Munich, 2009, pp. 143–162.
49 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 78.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
Political Situation and Administrative Structures   33
the former Ottoman Algiers, colonized by France, and the region between pre-
sent-day Mali and Chad, competing with the British in the south of the former 
Ottoman provinces of today’s Sudan.
The natural climate of the province of Tripoli had a decisive effect on its 
economic options and opportunities. Harsh natural conditions like severe 
droughts, for example, limited agricultural potential. In addition, the pro-
vince mainly depended on rainfall for the production of crops such as wheat 
and barley, as well as the cultivation of olive trees.52 This played a major role 
in guiding the population toward internal and foreign trade as an alternative 
to agriculture. Moreover, local people were taking advantage of the cities that 
represented trading focal points. The local people and the Ottoman governors 
were fully aware of the importance of trade for developing the economy of the 
province, as well as of the fact that its importance was increasing over time. This 
was apparent through the establishment of many trade centers and road net-
works used by convoys with significant economic uses; the result was a boom 
in internal trade.53 Cities like Tripoli, Benghazi, Sawkanh and Ghadames cons-
tituted the center of the economic activities. Routes like Tripoli-Kano (Nigeria), 
Tripoli-Borno, Tripoli-Benghazi, the middle route to Sudan and others played 
a significant role in enhancing trade between Tripoli, east, west and central 
Africa. Consequently, these routes enhanced the importance of the province 
to many internal and external powers including the Ottomans and the Euro-
peans.54
2.2   Political Situation and Administrative Structures between 
Natural Resources and Slave Trade
From the restoration of direct Ottoman rule in 1835, prior to the period under 
study, the Ottoman Empire undertook a new approach in dealing with people of 
the province of Tripoli within the context of the administrative reforms referred to 
as Tanẓīmāt. This was manifested in stricter control over Tripoli and more careful 
selection of its governors. The province came under the direct control of Istanbul, 
capital of the Ottoman Empire, and power was increasingly centralized, despite 
52 Ḥamīda, ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, al-Mujtamaʿ wa al-dawlā wa al-istiʿmār fī Lībiyā dirāsa fī al-uṣūl 
al-ijtimāʿīyya wa al-iqtiṣādīyyā wa al-thaqāfiyya li-ḥarakāt wa siyāsāt al-tawāṭuʾ wa muqāwamat 
al-istiʿmār 1830–1932, markaz dirāsāt al-waḥda al-ʿarabiyya, Bayrūt, 1998, p. 78.
53 Ibid.
54 See Baker, Thomas and C.R. Pennell, Piracy and Diplomacy in Seventeenth Century North Africa.
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the attempts of local notables from cities and the hinterland to maintain control 
over their regions. In addition, some local leaders chose to work with France or 
Great Britain to strengthen their own influence, thereby also supporting the inte-
rests of these European powers through unrests or rebellions against the Ottoman 
Empire.55 This could, from a local perspective, have been seen as the rallying of 
external (European) support against imperial Ottoman rule. It was often the case 
at the time, at the cost of increased European influence, when more emphasis on 
local perspectives would have been useful. This context also helps to explain why 
the city of Tripoli remained the latest Ottoman provincial capital in North Africa, 
the residence of the Ottoman governor and the center of its administration.
The administrative structure was changed by the Ottomans repeatedly 
during this time under the frame of the Tanẓīmāt, or reform period. In 1835, 
Tripoli was an Eyālet (meaning large province)56 and the governor received the 
title of pasha. This Eyālet was later divided into administrative units called 
qāʾim maqāmiyya or sanjaks, with each of which governed by qāʾim maqām (a 
governor). In 1865, this system was changed and the divisions of the Ottoman 
Empire were called provinces (wilāyāt). The internal administration in the pro-
vince of Tripoli was structured as follows:
The province was divided into four sanjaks (sometimes called liwāʾ), each 
of which contained a number of aqḍīya (singular qaḍāʾ) with their own admi-
nistrative center. A governor was selected for each sanjak.57 The qaḍāʾ of Tripoli 
included the city of Tripoli and all the areas surrounding it, particularly in the 
west. The regions that it included were Tajura, Zanzur, and Jifarah. Other examp-
les of aqḍīya are Ujaylat, Zuwarah, Tarhuna, Warfalla, Gharyan, al-Aziziyah and 
al-Gosh.58 Qaḍāʾ al-Khums included Sahel al-ʿAhaamed, Taworgha, Meslata, 
Zlitan, Misurata and Sirte.59 Qaḍāʾ al-Jabal included Nawāḥī like al-Haoud, 
Mizdah, al-Zintan, Kikla, and qaḍāʾ like Ghadames, Nalut and Fassato.60 Qaḍāʾ 
Fezzan, which was in the south of the province, included Murzuq, which was the 
capital of liwāʾ Sebha, and also included al-Wady al-Shargee, Jufrah, al-Shargya, 
al-Gatrun, Houn, Zillah, Sawkanh, al-Shati, Ghat, Taborshadh, and al-Ghayra.61 
The status of the area of Barqa was unstable. It remained a qāʾim maqāmiyya 
under the control of the Ottoman government in the province of Tripoli from 
55 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 18.
56 Rūsi, Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī, p. 384.
57 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 26.
58 Rūsi, Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī, p. 385; Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 85.
59 Rūsi, Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī, p. 385.
60 See Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 85.
61 Rūsi, Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī, p. 385.
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the beginning of Ottoman rule mainly because it was far from the center and 
lay in the region bordering Egypt.62 In 1836, Barqa was then transformed into a 
mutaṣarrīfīyya under direct control of Istanbul; this lasted until 1871, when it was 
returned to the control of the province of Tripoli.63 This only lasted for one year, 
when it again became a mutaṣarrīfīyya under the control of the Ottoman capital 
until 1888. Barqa was then divided into three qāʾim maqāmiyya: Derna, Jalu and 
al-Marj and every sanjak was divided into Nawaḥī like the city of Tripoli.64
The structure of the society in the province of Tripoli was predominantly 
tribal. Each tribe was headed by a person called shaykh al-maḥallah in small 
villages or in cities with a chief of the city (shaykh al-balad).65 This position was 
initiated at the time of the reforms in the province of Tripoli after the establish-
ment of the new type of Ottoman municipality, al-baladiyya, in 1868 (the muni-
cipality of Tripoli).66 This position of shaykh al-maḥallah or mukhtar with a chief 
of the municipality (raʿīs al-baladiyya) and a council of the municipality (majlis 
al-baladiyya) was initiated in 1871. It was conceived as a new and modern muni-
cipality following the administrative system of the Ottomans.67 It represented an 
62 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, pp. 29–30; see also Lafi, Nora, L’Empire Otto-
man en Afrique: perspectives d’histoire critique, 2015, 128, pp. 59–70.
63 Osmanli Belgelerinde: Trablusgarb (Ṭarābulis al-ghārb fī al-wathāʾiq al-ʿūthmāniyyā), Kemal 
Gurulkan, et.al, ed. by Salih Sadawi, Istanbul, 2013, p. 253
64 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, pp. 29–30.
65 For the quesion of shaykh al-balad in Ottoman cities and specifically Tripoli see the publica-
tions of Nora Lafi, op.cit., and those of Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 48–53. 
In other context and specifically tribe societies the cheikha existed as well and even with a very 
interesting gender aspect: “Si une femme est offensée par en homme qui lui aurait dit, par ex-
emple qu’elle est laide, malpropre ou dévergondée, celle-ci se rend auprès de la cheikha du clan 
dont elle dépend, et porte une plainte contre qui a proféré ces offenses. La cheikha, après avoir 
consulté d’autres cheikhas de la tribu, détermine la peine à infliger à l’insultateur... Après la pro-
nonciation du verdict la cheikha accompagnée de 30 à 40 femmes se rendent devant le portail de 
l’accusé et au cours de toute la journée, parfois même la nuit, tapent du tambour pour l’obliger 
à s’exécuter...”, see the account of Pavel Chatev (1882–1953), a Bulgarian exiled in the region 
as a prisoner after his participation in the bombardment of the building of the Ottoman bank, 
symbol of European capitalism and the bombardment of the railway line of Salonika-Istanbul. 
This account was studied and published in Peev, Yordan, “Un exilé bulgare en Libye au début 
du XXème siècle”, Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell‘Istituto Italiano per 
l‘Africa e l‘Oriente, 63-2, 2008, pp. 283–295.
66 On the institutionalization of the new munipality in Tripoli see the work of Lafi, Nora, Une 
ville du Maghreb entre ancien régime et réformes ottomanes: genèse des institutions municipales à 
Tripoli (1795–1911), L’Harmattan, Paris, 2002.
67 See Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī māʾat ʿām 1286/1391H-1870/1970M, Dār al-ṭibaʿa al-ḥadīthā, al-
maṭbaʿa al-lībiyyā Ṭarābulis, 1972, pp. 164–165 and Lafi, Nora, Municipalités méditerranéennes. 
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institution between the population and the government in Tripoli and between 
the population and the central government in Istanbul. In villages, the person 
appointed had to have suitable qualifications and his authority was limited to the 
specific area (maḥallah). A shaykh al-maḥallah can be elected when the settle-
ment had no fewer than 50 houses. The main responsibilities of the shaykh 
al-maḥallah were mainly informing the population about orders (awamir), laws 
issued by the government. He also informed the government about events that 
took place in al-maḥallah.68 Nonetheless, the Ottoman reform did not end the role 
of the shaykh al-maḥallha, who continued to exercise local control after several 
conflicts.69 This was also the case in the central and southern parts of the pro-
vince. Obviously, not all the governors who were sent to the province of Tripoli 
were of the same caliber. In addition to the varying levels of efficiency and politi-
cal competence, some governors were also motivated by personal interests con-
flicting with those of the Empire.70 This was aggravated by the fact that governors 
were aware of the limited time for which they would hold their position, owing to 
the Ottoman policy of circumscribing the time that any individual governor spent 
in a single place. In addition, governors could also be removed or transferred at 
any point throughout their term in power.71 Transfers could result from comp-
laints about the governor made by residents or cases of civil unrest. This became 
particularly clear in the latter half of the 19th century.72 Local revolts challenged 
the new order and the Ottomans governors such as Moḥammad Halit Pasha 
(1870–1871) or the shaykh al-balad73 of Tripoli, ʿAlī al-Qarqānī.74 ʿAlī al-Qarqānī 
was assisted by two soldiers viewed as violators of the local traditions.75 The resi-
Les réformes urbaines Ottomanes au miroir d’une histoire comparée (Moyen-Orient, Maghreb, Eu-
rope méridionale), Klaus Schwarz, Berlin, 2005.
68 On this point see Lafi, Nora (ed.), Municipalités méditerranéennes.
69 Lafi, Nora, “L’affaire Ali al-Qarqânî, Tripoli 1872”, in  Etre notable au Maghreb: Dynamique 
des configurations notabiliaires, ed. by Abdelhamid Hénia and Ma’had al-Buhuth al-Maghribiyah 
al-Mu’asirah, Maisonneuve et Larose, Paris, 2006, pp. 201–214.
70 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 26.
71 Lafi, “L’affaire ‘Alî al-Qarqânî, Tripoli 1872”, pp. 201–214.
72 See Lafi, Nora, “Petitions and accomodating urban change in the Ottoman Empire”, in Istanbul 
as Seen from a Distance: Centre and Provinces in the Ottoman Empire, ed. by Elisabeth Özdalga, 
Saït Özervarli and Feryal Tansug, Istanbul, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 2011, pp. 73–82.
73 Shaykh al-balad was a position given by the Ottomans to some of the original residents of 
Tripoli and had the tasks of communicating dirtectly with the local people. See Lafi, “L’affaire 
Ali al-Qarqani, Tripoli 1872”.
74 Lafi, Nora, Une ville du Maghreb entre ancien régime et réformes ottomanes, op. cit, 2002, p. 146;
75 Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī māʾat ʿ ām 1286/1391H – 1870/1970M, p. 161; Lafi, “L’affaire Ali al-
Qarqani, Tripoli 1872”, op.cit.
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dents of Tripoli made many complaints to the governor against al-Qarqānī76 and 
the negative effects of his policies on them, especially because he controlled 
every thing in Tripoli including the industry. A revolt also broke out in the eastern 
part of the province,77 which prompted civil unrest throughout the province. The 
administrator equipped a military campaign to put the unrest down, although 
this was disbanded shortly afterwards as the unrest decreased. Moḥammad Halit 
Pasha did not stay in power long. He was dismissed and replaced by Moḥammad 
Rashid Pasha in 1871 in the context of growing European pressure in the region to 
control all Ottoman provinces. Moḥammad Rashid Pasha implemented a mode-
rate policy in Tripoli, balancing the demands of the Ottoman central government 
and a local Ottoman society in the face of European pressure. Therefore, they 
worked together to build good relations with many foreign consuls, including 
those of Britain, France, the United States, Tuscany (until 1866), Spain and others, 
which were competing for control over the Ottoman regions. Moḥammad Rashid 
Pasha also introduced new reforms to different sectors in the province. However, 
this did not prevent the inhabitants of Fezzan in the south of the province from 
revolting and rejecting the authority of the Ottoman Empire. Laurent Charles 
Féraud (1829–1888), consul, spy and erudite who conducted research on this, 
indicated that the unrest was instigated by the Tuareg population in the far south 
of the province in 1871. At the same time, the tribes of Awlād Sulaymān in the 
central region also rejected Ottoman rule and their participation in the Tuareg 
revolution.78 The governor Moḥammad Rashid Pasha tried to put this revolution 
down,79 particularly because it started to adversely affect trade convoys destined 
for the south of the province. It is noticeable that these disorders abated gradu-
ally with the outbreak of internal conflict between two Tuareg tribes, namely the 
al-Hāqar and ʿ Azqār tribes, on who had the authority over the southern part of the 
province. The conflict ended with the defeat of the ʿAzqār tribe. This prompted 
Moḥammad ʿAkhnūkhan, one leader of theʿAzqār tribe in the southern part of 
76 Lafi, Nora, Une ville du Maghreb entre ancien régime et réformes ottomane, op.cit, pp. 283–291.
77 Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī māʾat ʿ ām 1286/1391H - 1870/1970M, p. 163.
78 Fīru, Shāril (Féraud Charles), al-Ḥawlīyyāt al-lībiyyā mundhu al-fatḥ al-ʿarabī ḥattā al-ghazū 
al-iṭālī, translated by Moḥammad ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Wāfi, jāmiʿāt Qāryūnis, Binghāzī, 1994, p. 504–
507. See also the introduction and the biography of this personnage by Lafi, Nora, Les annales tripo-
litaines de Charles Féraud, Paris, 2005, 437p; and Lafi, Nora, “Biographie: Laurent Charles Féraud, 
une passion coloniale”, in Laurent Charles Féraud: Peintre et témoin de la conquête de l’Algérie, ed. 
by Bernard Merlin, Editions Monelle Hayot, Saint-Remy-en-l’Eau, 2010; 112p., pp. 103–106.
79 Govenor or in Arabic Wāli is an administrative title that was used during the Caliphate and 
Otto man Empire to designate governors of administrative divisions.
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Tripoli80 to contact the Ottoman Government in Tripoli to seek protection in return 
for his submission to it. He later asked the Ottoman government to train and 
recruit new soldiers from among the local people to strengthen his power there. 
In the city of Ghat, also located in the south of the province of Tripoli, the situa-
tion was unstable until Muṣṭafa Asim Pasha was appointed governor for nine 
months before leaving for the Yemenit Ottoman province in 1875. He decided 
that Ghat should be given the administrative status of a sanjak. He was able to 
regain control as part of his efforts to extend Ottoman authority of the province 
across the entire desert. He sent soldiers armed with cannons to strengthen the 
Ottoman presence and make it a district under the control of Fezzan. As part of 
these efforts Taborshada, which was located on the border with Chad, was also 
made a district of the province in 1881.81 Muṣṭafa Asim Pasha gained an advan-
tage over the other Ottoman governors in the province of Tripoli through his 
practice of travelling to see the conditions of the people in person, trying to 
address their problems before they become uncontrollable.82 Such outbreaks of 
civil unrest were frequently instrumentalized by British and French consuls and 
military interventions. The Berlin Conference in 1878 discussed and negotiated 
the distribution of political influence among European countries in the Ottoman 
world, whether in the Balkans or lands belonging to the Ottoman Empire in 
other regions.83 It should be noted that the Ottoman Empire was aware of Euro-
pean ambitions in Tripoli, especially when France colonized Algeria and decla-
red Tunisia a protectorate. The Ottoman Empire then considered the need to 
preserve its remaining Arab provinces. This was mainly done by preventing 
Tripoli from coming under the control of any European country. As a result, 
Aḥmed Ezzat Pasha (1879–1881) was sent to Tripoli in 1879, where he at tempt ed 
to introduce reforms to protect the province. His main work was to repair the 
forts and walls.84 This work was completed after him by Moḥammad Nazif 
Pasha (1880–1881) who also focused on the defensive aspect by building many 
fortifications in the major centers around the city. They were equipped with 
cannons that were brought especially from the central government in Istanbul 
80 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 212.
81 Sāmiḥ, ʿAzīz, al-ʿAtrāk al-ʿūthmānīyyūn, fī Afrīqiyā al-shamāliyya, translated by ʿAbd al-
Sālām Adham, Dār al-Furjānī, al-Qāhira, 1991, pp. 211–212.
82 al-Zāwī, Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, pp. 508, 523.
83 al-Jamal, Shawqī ʿAṭallāh, ʿAbd al-llāh Ibrāhīm and Rabāb Salām, Tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā al-ḥadīth 
wa al-muʿāṣir min muʾtamar Fīyinna ḥatā alʾān, vol. 2, Dār al-thaqāfā li-l-nashr wa al-tawzīʿ, 
al-Qāhira, n.d., p. 38; see also Porter, Andrew, European Imperialism, 1860–1914, Macmillan, 
Houndmills, 1994.
84 al-Zāwī, Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 270.
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(Astana) to defend the city in case of any attack.85  These efforts were accompa-
nied by the appointment of Aḥmed Rasim Pasha as a governor of the province 
in 1881. This was a critical period because it coincided with France’s declara-
tion of Tunisia as a French protectorate and with British preparations to occupy 
Egypt.86 Aḥmed Rasim Pasha lived up to the expectations entrusted to him by 
the Ottoman Empire in this regard, as his political stance was defiantly anti-
colonialist. Aḥmed Rasim Pasha (1881–1898) attended first to the political stabi-
lity of the province. He lifted the European protection from some Arab nationals 
and brought them back under the authority of the Ottoman Empire. During his 
rule the province was affected by a number of conflicts, particularly between 
tribes inhabiting the border region between Tripoli and Tunisia. Although 
Rasim Pasha succeeded in reducing the frequency of these disputes, he was not 
able to end them entirely.87 He was then faced by a new problem, namely Italian 
ambitions over Tripoli, which led to some direct conflicts with the Italian 
consul, particularly after the Italian government began focusing its activities 
and economic interests in the province by encouraging immigration and other 
efforts to control Tripoli.88 As a result of these developments and the desire of 
Italy to control Tripoli, the local people began to feel the gravity of the situation 
and feared the advent of European colonization. This changed the whole situa-
tion in the province as it motivat ed the local people to support the governors; 
for instance, Moḥammad Nazif Pasha’s ruled in 1880.89 He succeeded in 
strengthening the fortifications of the center of Tripoli, specifically in the nor-
thwest of the city, such as the towers of al-Hamedia, al-Frarh, Sidi Mansour, and 
Gargarsh. He also set up canons on the left and the right side of the city.90 He was 
assisted by the local inhabitants in all of this. Their fear of European occupation 
led them to support him, despite their opposition in other instances, and even to 
offer financial assistance for the construction of material defences. Moḥammad 
Nazif Pasha also focused on the central and eastern regions and established a 
new political administration under the control of Sirte. His successor, Aḥmed 
Rasim Pasha, remain ed in office for a long period that lasted until 1898, when he 
was replaced by Namik Pasha.91 To highlight the economic situation in the pro-
85 al-Tilīsī, Ḥikāyat madīnat, p. 170.
86 See Ganiage, Jean, Les origines du protectorat français en Tunisie (1861–1881), Maison Tuni-
sienne de l’Edition, 1961.
87 al-Zāwī, Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, pp. 273–274.
88 al-Tilīsī, Ḥikāyat  madīnat, p. 174.
89 Rūsi, Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī ḥatā sanat 1911, p. 384.
90 al-Zāwī, Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 274.
91 Ibid., p. 276.
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vince of Tripoli in the context of revolt and European imperialism between 1870 
and 1884, the following tables offer detailed information on natural resources 
such as the different types of agricultural products and the quantity of produce 
with regard to most aspects of the economy in Tripoli. This is to understand how 
this economy was so important for local and external actors competing for control 
over the region. The figures have mainly been drawn from documents found in a 
report in the Political Archive (Politisches Archiv) in Berlin, Germany.
Table 1: The number of fruit trees in the province of Tripoli in 1869









The information in this table92 dates to the period between July 1869 and October 
1888, and included the number of trees in the province of Tripoli. The table shows 
that the number of olive and palm trees was higher than that of other trees, a 
point which reveals their significance to the economy of the province. Given the 
large numbers of olive trees in Tripoli, olive oil was also produced in large quan-
tities, as stated in the report.
In the same report, the quantities of crops and cereal in the same period are 
presented in table 2 below.93 
92 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das 
Kaiser liche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 1, vom Juli 1869 bis Oktober 1888, R901/52506.
93 Ibid.
Political Situation and Administrative Structures   41
Table 2: Quantities of crops and cereal produced in 1869





The following table94 presents the production of fruits and vegetables in the pro-
vince of Tripoli in the same period (1870–1884).
Table 3: Production of fruits and vegetables (1870–1884)
Quality Quantity in Kilogram
Orange and Lemon 40.000.000
Date 28.500.000














It was not only statistics on agricultural products that were presented in the 
report, the species and numbers of animals and livestock in the province of 
Tripoli were as well, and are illustrated in table 4 below.95 
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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As land constituted a significant issue in the economic life of Tripoli, the same 
report indicated the different types of soil and their uses, including agricultural 
land and gardens, the land used by pastures for animals, uncultivated land in 
the desert, and residential areas.96 The main industries in Tripoli were metal and 
leather industries, textiles, and straw mats. The metal and leather indus tries had 
received the special encouragement of Samih Pasha97 who ruled the province in 
1874 and 1875.98 These industries were represented in certain markets in various 
parts of the province. Each craft had its special market. The markets were not 
limited to the industries of silk, gold, silver, jewelry, and copper, which were 
known as Sūq al-qāṣdarha. There was also some manufacturing of iron and other 
metals. The inhabitants of Tripoli were interested in the textile industry. It repre-
sented one of the most important and largest industries in the province. Wool was 
produced by men and women equally. Production varied between silk gowns, 
robes made of wool, and carpets mainly produced in Misurata.99 These products 
were sold in the local markets and locally consumed as traditional dresses. Some-
96 Ibid.
97 al-Zāwī, Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 264.
98 Ibrāhīm, ʿAbd al-llāh ʿAlī, “Anmāṭ al-tijārā al-dakhīliyya fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb wa 
Barqa fī al-niṣf al-thānī min al-qarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashr”, Majallat al-buḥūth al-tārīkhiyya, 6-2, markaz 
jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, jāmiʿat al-Fātiḥ, Ṭarābulis, 1984, p. 402.
99 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 65; Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, 
p. 148.
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times, they were exported to Tunis. Straw mats called ḥaṣīr (or kalīm) were con-
centrated in two main areas: Taworgha and Tajura.100 They were produced and 
used locally in huge quantities. Like the other Ottoman provinces, the Arabic 
provinces ruled by the Ottoman Empire were organized under a very complex 
system of taxation. The Ottoman taxation system in Tripoli included taxes called 
werko,101 the oppressive property tax implemented by an 1858 Ottoman law. Other 
taxes included the tithe, taxes on inheritances and on commercial transactions, 
in addition to the real estate tax and taxes on precious metals. The werko was 
a tribute annual tax known as mīrī, which was imposed on the population of 
Tripoli. It was considered one of the most important taxes in the province. It was 
taken from every adult male and was used by the Ottomans to cover administra-
tive expenses.102 In addition, there were taxes on livestock that varied depending 
on type. For a camel, for example, the owner should pay 35 Ottoman Qirsh,103 
whilst the sum for each cow was 17.5 Ottoman Qirsh. Taxes were also imposed 
on trees and wells.104 A new tax was introduced in 1897 to pay for the exemp-
tion from military service. The tax was known as al-Jihādiyya and the main goal 
behind was to cover the expenses of the Greek-Turkish war. It is noteworthy that 
the government in Istanbul imposed this tax for only one year, but the governors 
in Tripoli made it permanent, and included it within the werko tax.105 The tithe 
was paid on agricultural products. Farmers had to pay one tenth of their agri-
culture production such as wheat, barley and olives to the government. Because 
this tax was linked mainly with the quantity and quality of production it differed 
from one year to another.106 In addition, other taxes and revenues included the 
property tax, stamps tax, and taxes paid in ports, which were imposed in 1886.107 
It should be noted that the families of the aristocracy were exempted from these 
100 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, pp. 65–67.
101 Brūshīn, Tārīkh Lībiyā min nihāyāt al-qarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashar, pp. 64–65.
102 Ibid.
103 There is different currencies mentioned in this book as it was mentioned in the literature, I 
could not find any document that helps me to unify the different currencies.
104 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, pp. 37, 38, 46.
105 Kākiyā, Antūnī, Lībiyā fī al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī 1835–1911, translated by Yūsuf Afandī 
al-ʿAsalī, Ṭarābulis, 1946, p. 91, an Arabic translation of Cachia, A.J., Libya under the Second 
Ottoman Occupation (1835–1911), Tripoli, 1945.
106 al-Wībā, Kāmil ʿAlī, al-Idārā al-ʿūthmānīyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, revised by Ṭāhir Khalf al-
Bakaʾ, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, p. 135.
107 al-Sūrī, Ṣālāḥ al-Dīn Ḥasan, “al-ḍarāʾib al-ʿūthmānīyyā fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb wa 
Mutaṣarrīfīyya Binghāzī fī al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī mashākil al-ḍaghṭ wa al-tawattur”, Ma-
jallat al-buḥūth al-tārīkhiyya, 6-2, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, jāmiʿat al-Fātiḥ, 
Ṭarābulis, 1984, p. 394.
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taxes.108 Exempted groups included the al-Kuwārighliyya,109 the Ashrāf, and the 
shyūkh (singular: shaykh). Despite these exemptions they could still be harassed 
to pay taxes. For example, the sons of Shaykh ʿAbd al-Sālām al-ʿAsmār in Zlitan 
were harassed for years by the tax collectors and the judiciary, who asked them 
to provide supplies, including food, for free. For this reason, they wrote to the 
Ottoman sultan in Istanbul to inform him of these harassments. They asked the 
sultan to provide them with protection and to send an order to inform the local 
authorities that they were exempted from paying taxes. The sultan then reacted 
positively and strengthened their situation.110 All the non-Muslims and particu-
larly the Jews who lived in the province of Tripoli were exempted from military 
service. For this exemption, they had to pay 30 penny/piaster.111 Customs were 
also paid in ports. These were equivalent to 1 % on exported goods and 8 % on 
imported goods, in addition to the taxes required at ports. In the case of taxes 
paid at ports, the Ottomans only imposed taxes on Arab ships; ships of other 
countries were exempted. Furthermore, there were also taxes on post and tele-
graph. The revenues from the taxes were sent to Istanbul.112
108 al-Wībā, al-Idāra al-ʿūthmānīyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 150; Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-
ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 232.
109 This is a Turkish name given to a group of people in the province of Tripoli. It is said that 
they were born to the Turkish soldiers who were married to women from the local population. 
The families tended to concentrate in the cities of Tripoli, al-Zawiya, Misurata and Zeltin and 
other cities in the coast, see also Kamālī, Ismāʿīl, Sukkān Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, translated by Ḥasan 
al-Hādī bin Yūnis, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1997, p. 60.
110 Wathīqā 40/30, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.
111 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 39; Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-
lībī, p. 246.
112 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 246.
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2.3  Cities as Centers of Trade Networks
Map 1: Cities of the province of Tripoli
Tripoli and Benghazi
The natural consequence of the development of trade at various levels was the 
success and reputation the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi gained in North Africa. 
They became the most important commercial centers of the coastal region and 
formed a link between north and south, and east and west. The city of Tripoli was 
considered the departure and arrival point for commercial convoys between north 
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and south of the Sahara.113 The port played a very important role in the revitali-
zation of commercial maritime traffic. This increased markedly at the end of the 
19th century, both in terms of the value of exports and imports, and in the steady 
increase in the number of ships that frequently passed by Tripoli. There was a 
particularly marked increase in the number of Italian private vessels as a result of 
the increasing interest of the Italian government, which resulted in intensifying 
their economic activities in Tripoli and in turn boosted maritime commercial traf-
fic.114 This maritime activity reached a highpoint in the period 1872–1881.115 The 
reason behind the development and recovery of the caravan trade was the pro-
gressing political situation in Tripoli and the keenness and commitment of some 
governors to develop this trade. The elimination of the rebels who worked against 
the Ottoman authority was the first task that in creased the sense of security and 
ensured the safety of the trade caravans. Moreover, the authorities reinforced their 
influence in the interior areas, especially in the province (liwāʾ) of Fezzan and in 
the city of Ghadames, which were considered the main centers along the caravan 
trade route with the kingdoms of Sudan.116 In addition, the Ottoman authorities 
rebuilt their relations with the kingdoms of Sudan, especially the kingdom of 
Kanem and Borno in the south in the second half of the 19th century. These rela-
tions had deteriorated during the rule of the al-Kāramanlī dynasty. Furthermore, 
the Ottomans tried to restore their relations with the Kingdom of Wadai (in Chad) 
and maintain this region within their empire.117 The Ottoman authorities had 
also taken other measures, including allowing the British government to open 
113 For more information see the work of Martel, André, Les confins Saharo-Tripolitains de la 
Tunisie, 1881–1911, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1965 and Lafi, Nora, “Tripoli de Bar-
barie, port de mer, port du désert (1795–1835)”, in Méditerranée, mer ouverte: actes du colloque de 
Marseille (21–23 Septembre 1995)/Tome 2, XIXe et XXe siècles, ed. by Christiane Villain-Gandossi, 
Louis Durteste and Salvino Bussutil, International Foundation, Malta, 1997, pp. 657–666.
114 Hūwīdi, MuṣṭafaʿAlī, “al-Ẓurūf al-iqtiṣādīyyā, fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb qubail al-ghazū 
al-iṭālī”, al-dawr al-iqtiṣādī li-madīnat Ṭarābulis ka-ḥalaqat wasl baina ʿ Aūrūbbā wa Afrīqiyā (1835–
1950), ed. by Khalīfa Moḥammad al-Duwaybi, aʿmāl al-nadwā al-ʿilmiyya al-thālitha allatī ʿuqidat 
bi-l-markaz fī 3/10/1998, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2008, p. 204.
115 Anderson, Lisa, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton, 1987.
116 Lafi, Nora, Ghadamès, cité oasis entre empire Ottoman et colonialisme, in Libya tra Mediter-
raneo e mondo islamico, ed. by Federico Cresti, A. Giuffrè, Milano, 2006, pp. 55–70.
117 Concerning the Ottoman Empire and Sahara, see Minawi, Mostafa, “A New Start? Libyan His-
tory and Historiography at a Time of Historical Transition” a post-workshop report on the interna-
tional workshop “Libyan History and Historiography at a Time of Historical Transition”, held at 
Zentrum Moderner Orient in Berlin (2012), report consulted on September 3, 2020, https://www.
eume-berlin.de/fileadmin/eume/pdf/arbeitsgespraeche/Minawi-Libyan_History-Report.pdf.
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two branches of their consulate in Tripoli in Murzuq and Ghadames and permitting 
the French to open a branch of their consulate. All of these efforts contributed to 
stimulating the caravan trade with the Sudanese kingdoms and this finally had a 
significant positive impact. The number of caravans from the province of Tripoli 
increased.118 At the time, Benghazi was as important as Tripoli with the number 
of trades conveys which were passing through. The port of Benghazi received 
goods from Wadai, and Timbuktu (in Mali). To give just one example, in the 
second half of the 19th century, large quantities of ostrich feathers were imported 
from Wadai by caravan to Benghazi, where they were exchanged for cotton tex-
tiles from Europe. The historical literature indicates that the number of convoys 
from Benghazi to sub-Saharan Africa was relatively large in 1893, employing a 
total of 1.111 camels to transport the goods. The number of camels carrying the 
goods also increased to 1.232 and reached 2.238 by 1899.119 This clearly demonst-
rates active trade between the north and the south. It also demonstrates how the 
authorities of Sudan’s sub-Saharan kingdoms were keen to continue this trade 
that enriched the local markets, while at the same time representing a connection 
with the north. The sultans of the Sudanese kingdoms were collecting the tithe 
(or öşür, meaning “tenth” in English) imposed on goods transported to and from 
Tripoli, as well as different amounts of money to facilitate the slave trade that 
was conducted across the land.120 This played an important role in enriching the 
market in these kingdoms.121
Sawkanh
This city is located in the southeast of the province of Tripoli and was considered 
a center of trade toward the interior cities and regions of south-central Africa. The 
118 See for example: the thesis of al-Ḥindīrī, Saʿīd, Université de Provence, Aix, Marseille, 1992, 
and other publications such as al-Ḥindīrī, “Taṭawwur tijārat al-qawāfil fī Wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-
ghārb”, p. 696.
119 al-Maʿlūl, Sālim Moḥammad, “Daūr Awjilah fī tawthīq al-ʿālāqāt maʿ mamālik bilād al-
Sūdān mindhu al-qarn al-ʿāshir ḥatā maṭlaʿ al-qarn al-ʿaishrīn”, Awjilah baina al-māḍi wa al-
ḥāḍir (1950–1951), aʿmāl al-nadwā al-ʿilmiyya al-sābiʿā allatī ʿuqidat bī- madīnat Awjilah (17-
20/9/2009), ed. by Moḥammad Bashīr Suwīsī, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhīyyā, 
Ṭarābulis, 2009, pp. 103–104.
120 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 121.
121 See the work of Panzac, Daniel, Les corsaires barbaresques. La fin d’une épopée, 1800–1820, 
CNRS Editions, Paris, 1999 and the English translation, Corsairs, Barbary, The End of a Legend 
1800–1820, Brill, London, Boston, 2005, p. 353.
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city gained its significance from its strategic geographical location on the route 
that runs between Tripoli and Borno in (Nigeria) and on the pil grimage route 
between east and west.122 It is on a plane extending toward the east. Sawkanh 
was also considered the south gate to the oases in the Jofra region in the province 
(liwāʾ) of Fezzan. Its climate is famous for hot summers and cold winters. It was 
mentioned by the German traveller Gustav Nachtigal,123 who esti mated the popu-
lation to be about 3.000 in 1869.124 The city had been active in transit trade. The 
merchants of the city were able to amass considerable wealth, seen as business 
agents (wukalāʾ) in the north and south because they had established linkages with 
the sultans of Borno, the Hijaz, and the city of Istanbul. Sawkanh was also a resting 
station for trade convoys headed toward both north and south.  The city provided 
the trade convoys with food such as dates, meat, bread and so forth. Another factor 
that boosted the importance of the city was that the local people rented their camels 
for trade and some inhabitants volunteered to serve as escorts to the convoys.125
Ghadames
Ghadames had a special significance. First, it is an ancient city with a privile-
ged geographic location. It is located to the northwest of the city of Tripoli in a 
mountainous area known as al-Ḥamada al-Ḥamraʿ (640 km from the center of the 
province of Tripoli), on the borders with Tunisia and Algeria. These borders were 
important because Algeria was under French occupation in 1880, at the same 
time as the French were trying to extend their influence to Tunisia. Ghadames 
was an important trade center between Algeria and Tunis. France then tried to 
take control of parts of Ghadames and to change the trade routes to pass through 
Tunisia. The city center is also only 9 km from the Algerian border, whilst the 
122 al-ʿAfīf, Mukhtār ʿŪthmān, “Namādhij min al-ṣilāt al-tijāriyya bain Sawkanh wa Ṭarābulis 
khilāl al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī 1835–1911”, Majallat al-buḥūth al-tārīkhiyya, 21-2, markaz 
jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1999, pp. 123, 125.
123 See Nachtigal, Gustav, Sahara und Sudan; on his biography see also Priesner, Claus, “Nachti-
gal, Gustav” in Neue Deutsche Biographie, vol. 18, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1997, pp. 682–684.
124 Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, p. 148; Ghānim, ʿImād al-Dīn, “al-Mujtamaʿ al-lībī ladā al-
raḥḥāla al-ʿaūrūbbīyyīn”, al-Mujtamʿ al-lībī 1835–1950, aʿmāl al-nadwā al-ʿilmiyya al-thāmina 
allatī ʿuqidat bi-l-markaz fī al-fatra min 26-27/9/2000, ed. by Moḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Jarārī, mar-
kaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, p. 330; see also Panzac, Daniel, 
La population de l’Empire Ottoman, Cinquante ans (1941–1990) de publications et de recherches, 
CNRS-IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence, 1993.
125 al-ʿAfīf, “Namādhij min al-ṣilāt al-tijāriyya bain Sawkanh wa Ṭarābulis”, p. 125.
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city of Ghat is about 800 km away.126 Another feature that increased Ghadames’ 
importance is the existence of many water sources or springs called ʿauyūn (sin-
gular: ‘ayn); the most famous being ‘Ayn al-Faras.127 Most of the residents of the 
area drew water for their animals and irrigated their farms from ‘Ayn al-Faras.128 
The city was of great importance for the trade convoys. It represented the main 
place where they exchanged their tired camels for rested animals to continue 
their journey to Ghat, where the camels were replaced again. This was the estab-
lished pattern of all convoys from Tripoli to Kanem in 1897.129 Economically, the 
city was a center of trade and a meeting place for convoys (see Picture 1), which 
contributed to its status an important commercial city. It was also a large oasis in 
the desert in its own right, rich in palm trees, gardens, and wells.
Ghadames’ traders assumed a privileged position both within the province and 
beyond. They had permanent trade agents in different places, like Tunis,130 Tim-
buktu and many other cities of the region of Sudan, Sokoto (in Nigeria), Kanem 
and Wadai. It is noted that these agents were from the same city and often the sons 
of the merchants themselves.131 Ghadames also represented an important point of 
cultural interchange between the Islamic culture and society that dominated in the 
north and the less Islamically oriented culture of the sub-Saharan regions.132 The 
trade that was taking place between north and south of the Sahara reveals how the 
two parts of Africa were complementing each other economically.133
126 al-Maʿlūl, Fātima Moḥammad, madīnat Ghadāmis dirāsa fi jughrāfiyat al-mudun, al-Qāhira, 
2006, p. 12. 
127 al-ʿAḥwal, Khalīfa Moḥammad, “al-Jāliyāt al-ajnabīyya fī Lībiyā (1835–1950)”, al-Mujtamaʿ 
al-lībī (1835–1950), aʿmāl al-nadwā al-ʿilmiyya al-thāmina allatī ʿuqidat bi-l-markaz fī al-fatra 
min 26-27/9/2000, ed. by Moḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Jarārī, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-
tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, p. 456.
128 Abū Shārib, “Tijārat al-qawāfil”, p. 135.
129 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 63.
130 Yūshaʿ, Bashīr Qāsim, Wathīqā 142, 1884, Wathāʾiq Ghadāmis wathāʾiq tijāriyya tārīkhiyya 
ijtimāʾiyya 949H/1542M-1343H/1924M, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, 
Ṭarābulis, 1995.
131 Martel, Les Confins Saharao Tripoltains de la Tunisie (1881–1911), p. 93; see also al-Ṭawīl, 
Imḥimmad Saʿīd, “al-Ṣirāʿ al-duwalī ʿalā madīnat Ghadāmis khilāl al-niṣf al-thānī min al-qarn 
al-tāsiʿa ʿashar wa inʿikāsātuh ʿalā tijāratihā”, aʿmāl al-nadwā al-ʿilamiyya al-tārīkhiyya ḥawla 
tārīkh Ghadāmis min khilāl kitābāt al-raḥḥāla wa al-mūʾarrrikhīn, introduced by Nūr al-Dīn al-
Thinī, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2003, p. 199.
132 See Marmol y Carvajal, Louis, L’Afrique de Marmol, ed. by Richelet Pierre, 3 vols., Paris, 
1667, p. 58.
133 al-Sāqizlī, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf  Sulaymān, Lībiyā al-thawrā, vol. 1, Dār mimfīs li-l-ṭibāʿa wa al-
nashr, al-Qāhira, 1398H; Sālim al-Maʿlūl, “Daūr Awjilah fī tawthīq al-ʿālāqāt maʿ mamālik bilād 
al-Sūdān”, p. 93.
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Picture 1: Example of a convoy in Ghadames in 1884
Network of Caravan Trade Routes
The other factor contributing to the economic importance of the province of 
Tripoli was the network of routes used by convoys to travel back and forth. These 
routes had two characteristics (see Map 4). Firstly, they had been in use for a long 
time and were therefore well known to all who were involved in trade in Africa. 
Secondly, they constituted a network that extended outward to connect different 
parts of Africa to the rest of the Ottoman provinces. There were several important 
routes.
The route of Tripoli to Kano passed through a series of small towns and villa-
ges and some tribal groupings until it reached south to Chad, and went through 
the southwest passing areas like al-Aairr and Zander to Kano.134 This route passed 
through Ghadames.
134 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, pp. 161–162.
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The Tripoli-Borno (Nigeria)135 route ended at Coca on the shores of Lake 
Chad. It was the most direct route toward the Central of Africa. The duration of a 
round-trip was six months.136
The Tripoli-Benghazi route was used by convoys from Tripoli traveling to 
Benghazi and became a rallying point for many convoys. In Benghazi there were 
representatives responsible for monitoring the convoys, which belonged to Tripoli 
until they left. On the way to Tripoli they passed through such places as Wadai, 
al-Kufra, Tebsti, Anwaja and Enski. 
Map 2: Ottoman African provinces
The middle route to Sudan was a longer but safer, starting from the city of Tripoli, 
passing through Ghadames and reaching Kano. It is notable that most of the users 
and the supervisors of this route were traders from Ghadames. The advantage of 
this route was that it generated large profits for the province.137 In addition, the 
135 ʿĀmir, Maḥmūd ʿAlī, Tārīkh al-maghrib al-ʿarabī al-ḥadīth, Lībiyā, Jāmiʿat Dimashq, Di-
mashq, 1987, p. 157.
136 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, pp. 86–87.
137 Ibid., p. 84–85.
52   The Province of Tripoli  and its Significance (1870–1884)
traders from Ghadames were known for their intelligence and were very active. 
This was because they had grown up in trading families and were always sur-
rounded by traders coming to their city, besides their good knowl edge of several 
African languages and dialects in addition to Arabic. This helped them in turn 
to extend their trade outside their city, with some of them were very famous in 
Kano, Nubi and Zander in Africa and some cities in Tunis. The estimated total 
number of merchants from Ghadames during the second half of the 19th century 
was estimated to be 129.138
The desert route linked Tripoli with the oases through Sawkanh, Zawilah, 
Awjilah, al-Jaghbub to Siwa, and Kradash in the west of Cairo. This route also 
linked Tripoli to the Tunisian and Algerian commercial centers.139 There was 
more trade with Tunisia than with the other two provinces. These exchanges 
were supervised by the Tunisian agents in Tripoli, and the same in Tunisia. The 
exchange of goods included both domestic goods and those coming from Europe 
and Africa.140 Trade with Algeria was limited to Tar (al-tronh) and Hina (ḥinnah) 
also known as Lawsonia inermis. 
The coastal route: This route was divided into two main legs, one heading 
toward the east, starting from Tripoli and passing through the major coastal cities 
and continuing through the border with Egypt until reaching both Alexandria and 
Cairo. Trade with Egypt included trade in rice and sugar and imported livestock, 
ḥinnah, mats, and other manufactured goods. These were transported by convoys 
or ships of the Italian and Maltese companies.141 The second route headed west 
toward the Tunisian cities such as Sfax, Kairouan and Tunis, which were involved 
in trade and economic exchange. The main difference between these routes in 
trading terms is that the transport of goods was more expensive on the coastal 
route trade the land routes.
138 al-Ṭawīl, “al-Ṣirāʿ al-duwalī ʿalā madīnat Ghadāmis”, p. 64.
139 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 64.
140 Alghafal, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-lībiyyā al-tūnīsīyya, p. 144.
141 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 77–78
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Map 3: Caravan trade routes in the province of Tripoli in the 19th century
These routes facilitated trade between the regions and were used to transport 
different goods such as grains (barley, wheat, corn), gold and silver jewelry, 
glass, dates, spices, horse saddles, livestock and carpets,142 in addition to goods 
coming from Europe, including silk imported from Lyon in France, cotton fabrics 
from Britain, and handicraft tissues that were made in India, perfumes of various 
kinds, weapons and other goods.143 These routes also helped transport African 
products and goods such as ostriches, gold, ivory and slaves. Some convoys also 
carried goat skins and leather goods.144 To sum up, the preceding overview has 
presented the geographic, strategic and economic importance of Tripoli and has 
indicated why the province was so important to control. The situation in the pro-
vince of Tripoli played a major role in shaping the relationship between Tripoli 
and the other Ottoman provinces as well as with the European powers. 
142 ʿĀmir, Tārīkh al-maghrib alʿarabī, p. 158.
143 al-Ḥindīrī, “Taṭawwur tijārat al-qawāfil fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis”, p. 703.
144 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, pp. 88-89; al-Ḥindīrī, “Taṭawwur tijārat 
al-qawāfil fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis”, p. 703.
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Internal and Foreign Trade
Trade in the province of Tripoli was directly supervised by the Ottoman governors 
and main families of the region. Some of the Ottoman governors of Tripoli were 
known for their work in developing the economic sector in general and trade, 
in particular. They focused their efforts on developing the trade sector that they 
viewed as important for developing the province’s economy. Examples of such 
governors were Ali Rida Pasha145 (first term 1867–1870, second term 1872–1873), 
Muṣṭafa Asim (acting as governor 1870, second term 1874–1875), and Aḥmed 
Rasim Pasha (1881–1896). However, trade was sometimes disturbed when con-
flicts arose or groups rebelled against the ruling political authority. This inclu-
des the slave trade, which was taking place at that time both internally and 
externally. The region enjoyed great economic importance during the dynasty of 
al-Kāramanlī (1711–1835). Tripoli's economic importance at that time was mainly 
due to the large activity of trade convoys, which enjoyed the support of the ruling 
power, which in turn provided full protection to convoys coming to or departing 
the state. At the end of the rule of the al-Kāramanlī dynasty, trade declined due to 
the political situation. During this time, the province was politically unstable and 
witnessed a series of revolts by the local population. Internal conflicts broke out 
among al-Kāramanlī dynasty members about who was eligible to rule. The family 
was divided into two groups: a group led by Moḥammad Pasha, and the other led 
by Ali Pasha, the legitimate heir of the family.146 The Ottoman Empire resolved 
this conflict by sending a naval fleet to Tripoli. It con sisted of 32 ships and was 
led by Najib Pasha who announced that he was coming to calm the situation and 
restore security in the province. Within a few days of his arrival, he managed to 
restore direct Ottoman rule and ended the rule of the al-Kāramanlī dynasty,147 
and everything reverted to its previous state, including trade.148 Najib Pasha was 
then appointed as governer in 1835. Another period of decrease in trade was that 
after 1881. This time, the deterioration of trade was due to the decrease in demand 
for some material goods brought from Africa. For instance, Britain had been able 
to raise ostriches to produce feathers, which lowered the demand for feathers 
imported from Africa and directly contributed to the marked decline in prices.149 
145 Concerning the implementation of the reforms with this governor see the study of Lafi, 
Nora, Une ville du Maghreb entre ancien régime et réformes ottomanes, op.cit.
146 Rūsi, Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī, p. 570.
147 Ziyāda, Niqūlā, Lībiyā fī al-ʿuṣūr al-ḥadīthā, maʿhad al-buḥūth wa al-dirāsāt al-ʿarabiyya, 
Jamiʿat al-duwal al-ʿarabiyya, al-Qāhira, 1966, p. 52.
148 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 189.
149 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 84; Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 68.
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This mode of trade focused on local products as well as imported products at 
other times. The province’s wealth of livestock and agricultural production were 
the main source of livelihood for the locals; the transactions took place in markets 
held daily or weekly. There were permanent markets in the city of Tripoli, such 
as the al-Rubaa old market established by Osman Pasha al-Saqzle, who ruled 
between 1649 and 1672. It was distinctive in that it was completely covered by 
a ceiling.150 There were also weekly markets in most regions, such as the Friday 
market151 (see Picture 2),152 and the Sunday market for selling the sparto and ḥalfa 
plants (Cortaderia selloana).153 These markets also existed in other coastal cities 
such as Zuwarah, Misurata and Benghazi, as well as southern cities including 
Murzuq, Ghadames and Ghat.
Picture 2: Friday market in Tripoli city in 1900
150 Jūbran, Mofīdā, al-ʾAswāq bī-al-madīna al-qadīmah Iṭrābulis dirāsā tārīkhiyya iqtiṣādīyya, 
mashrūʿ tanẓīm wa idārat al-madīna al-qadīmah Iṭrābulis, Ṭarābulis, 2001, p. 53.
151 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 78.
152 Wathāʾiq Dār al-māḥafūḍāt al-tārīkhiyya al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrāʾ, Ṭarābulis.
153 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 193.
56   The Province of Tripoli  and its Significance (1870–1884)
The goods sold were mainly food and the daily necessities, as well as agricultural 
products such as cereals like wheat, as well as the sparto or ḥalfa plant, dates, 
olive oil, fruits and other products. There was also a trade in livestock such as 
sheep, cattle, goats, camels and horses.154 The most important livestock markets 
in the city of Tripoli were al-Ḥalfa and al-Khubuz. Both were weekly markets 
held on Mondays. The most important livestock markets not in the city of Tripoli 
were in the western part of the province, which were dedicated to the buying and 
selling of cattle. For instance, the market in the city of Gradates was located in 
the city center in an open area. There were 33 shops for selling different types of 
goods as well as other service shops. In the 19th century, this market had deve-
loped and become a big market that included smaller specialized markets such 
as the livestock market, the artisan market and the market of the goldsmiths 
and other goods.155 In addition, famous markets were also held in al-Zawiya and 
Zuwarah in the western part of the province. In the central area of the province 
of Tripoli, markets were held in Ghadames, Ghat, Nalut and Murzuq in the south. 
Specifically, there was a larger market in Murzuq.156 In the eastern part of the 
province, Benghazi was able to take a privileged position after it became the 
capital of Cyrenaica mutaṣarrīfīyya, and it became the center of trade. In Ben-
ghazi, markets were divided into two types. In the first, shops had ceilings and 
traded in goods like grain, food, silk and cotton clothes, along with weapons and 
several other minor commodities. The second type was open and consisted of 
standing stalls. The livestock trade took place daily, and was described as the 
most important trade in the state.157 The best-known livestock markets were 
found in Ajdabiyah, Suluq, and al-Marj.158 Foreign trade was significant for the 
economy of the province. This trade derived its wealth from two main sources: 
Caravan trade with sub-Saharan Africa and Arab and Ottoman provinces on one 
hand, and trade with European countries on the other. The Ottoman Empire had 
a high share in these exchanges as it imported tobacco, household tools, alcohol, 
rice, flour, textiles, mats, ḥinnah, ghee, oil, dates, and sponges.159
154 Ibrāhīm, “Anmāṭ al-tijārā al-dakhīliyya fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb”, pp. 401–402.
155 Fātima al-Maʿlūl, madīnat Ghadāmis, pp. 41, 60.
156 al-Ḥashāʾishī, Moḥammad bin ʿUthmān, Riḥlat al-Ḥashāʾishī ilā Lībiyā 1895 (Jalāʾ al-Karab 
ʿan Ṭarābulis al-ghārb), ed. by ʿAlī Muṣṭafa al-Miṣrātī, Dār Lubnān li-l-ṭibāʿa wa al-nashr, Bayrūt, 
1965, pp. 85, 112.
157 Kākiyā, Lībiyā fī al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 125.
158 Kūrū, Lībiyā fī al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, pp. 79–80; Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-
lībī, p. 171.
159 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 59; Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 77; 
Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 12.
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Many governors of the province of Tripoli focused on trading with countries 
located on the Mediterranean Sea according to the diversity of goods and finan-
cial return generated. The exchanges or transactions, especially with European 
countries, took place in Tripoli; they had to be approved by the Ottoman govern-
ment. To facilitate these exchanges, the Ottoman government in the province of 
Tripoli opened transportation lines subjected to specific laws and regulations 
benefiting Ottoman trade and the economy. There was maritime commercial acti-
vity between Tripolia and some European countries. The German line (Deutsche 
Levante-Linie), for example, was one of the most important shipping companies 
transporting materials and products from and to both Germany and Belgium.160 
Goods were transferred from the ports of Tripoli to others, such as Beirut and 
ports in Egypt. This was in addition to the Italian public navigation lines that 
were supervised by the Bank of Rome, which had taken the port of Genoa as its 
center of operations. This choice was mainly because Genoa was one of the main 
Italian ports and the one with the best connections to Tripoli and Benghazi. Its 
importance is also reflected by the fact that Genoa was the main port used for 
transit trade, specifically for those goods coming from Spain and Switzerland and 
sometimes from Germany. Maltese ships also contributed to this trade; the main 
operations took place between Marseille and the ports of Tripoli. Trade links with 
the ports of Tunisia were also established.161
As for Britain, the state benefited from the services of the Italian ships, in 
addition to using its own ships. At the same time, Great Britain sought conces-
sions from state authorities to facilitate its trade with Tripoli, and succeeded in 
doing so in the 18th century.  As a result, they signed an agreement to ensure their 
export against in exchange for a few paid annually to the government in Tripoli. 
They were followed in this by Venice, while Russia failed to achieve the same 
end.162
160 See for example the archive of the Chambre de Commerce Marseille and see also the seminal 
work of Martel, André, Les confins Saharo-Tripolitains de la Tunisie, op.cit; see also Kūrū, Lībiyā 
athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 76.
161 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, pp. 74–75, 78.
162 Qaddūrā, Zāhiyyā, Tārīkh al-ʿarab al-ḥadīth, Dār al-nāhaḍa al-ʿarabiyya, Bayrūt, 1985, p. 
417.
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Map 4: Port city of Tripoli
France had sought to take advantage of this important convoy trade, actively 
working to extend its control over the most vital routes, especially in the border 
region between Tripoli and Tunisia163 and used these routes to serve their inter-
ests. They tried to change the routes to pass through Tunisia and Algeria instead 
of the province of Tripoli. They offered some privileges to traders to attract their 
attention and entice them to take these new trade lines. Their actions affected 
business in Tripoli, and resulted in the clear decline in operations at the end 
of the 19th century.164 The attempt by France in 1880 to control the border area 
between Tripoli and Tunisia is also relevant to this discussion.165 The French 
ambitions were based on the strategic importance of this area and their own 
desire to take advantage of the caravan routes there. Some French officers and 
experts were thus sent to this region secretly.166 The Tuareg tribes in the southern 
part of the province of Tripoli, and in the context of conflict with other tribes such 
as the Hagar in 1898, were suspicious of all these movements in the border area. 
Their suspicion led them to oppose the judge (the document does not mention 
163 Martel, Les confins Saharo-Tripolitains de la Tunisie, p. 180.
164 Ḥamīda, al-Mujtamaʿ wa al-dawlā wa al-istiʿmār fī Lībiyā, p. 93.
165 See for example Pervinquière, Léon, Tripolitaine interdite Ghadamès, Nabu Press, 2011, p. 336.
166 Martel, Les confins Saharo-Tripolitains de la Tunisie, p. 180.
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his name) of Tataouine city (in the province of Tunis), which was located near 
the western border with Tripoli. The judge was almost killed by the Tuareg when 
he arrived in Ghadames in 1898, as part of a publicity campaign to support the 
French at the expense of the Ottomans.167 But the mayor of Ghadames was able to 
stop them and informed them of the serious consequences of such an act on the 
relationship between Tripoli and France. When this news reached the governor 
of Tripoli, Namik Pasha ordered the release of the judge and sent ten guards to 
protect him until he arrived in Tataouine.168 In 1898, a small group of French sol-
diers crossed the provisional Libyan-Tunisian border that had been established 
by the colonial powers and traveled 20 miles into Libyan territory. The unit estab-
lished a military camp within the French colonial borders of the province.169 The 
Ottoman state did not accept this and demanded the appointment of a committee 
to determine the zones of influence and to mark the borders accurately.170
The province of Tripoli had benefited greatly from the sparto (ḥalfa) trade, 
as one of the main sources of revenue, especially in the 19th century. It boomed 
in 1896171 and the largest importer was Britain. The price per quintal amoun-
ted to seven pounds. The sparto was cultivated in different areas such as Jifarah, 
Tarhuna, the mountain area, al-Aeaiat, Warshefana, Meslata, al-Amamra and 
others.172 The province’s authorities were concerned with this production; in the 
mid-19th  century, machines were used to compress the sparto into bundles or bales 
ready for storage or transportation in the center of the province and in cities like al-
Khums173 and Benghazi. Later, the cities producing this product were increasing ly 
located between al-Aziziyah and al-Khums.174 The supervisors of the machines 
were under the direct control of the government who seriously controlled for any 
manipulation in the production process. For instance, a manuscript referred to an 
act of embezzlement in al-Khums. It mentions that a director was involved. This 
167 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten, Bd. 6-7, vom 1. Mai 
1895 bis 31. Januar 1899, R16111, .
168 Ibid.
169 On this issue see the colonial borders of the region (see map in the annex).
170 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten, Bd. 1, 1895 bis 1899, 
Nr. A12804, R16111.
171 ʿUghlī, Khalīl Sāḥlī, “al-Maṣādir al-mutaʿaliqa bi-lībiyā fī maktabat jāmiʿat Isṭanbūl”, Ma-
jallat al-buḥūth al-tārīkhiyya, 2-2, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 
1980, p. 250.
172 Mangano, G., L’Alfa in Tripolitania, Firenze, Milano, pp. 5–6.
173 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 32.
174 Ibid., p. 73; Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 70.
60   The Province of Tripoli  and its Significance (1870–1884)
forced the administrator to write to the governor immediately.175 Even the process 
of collecting the plant from the fields and transporting it to the city of Tripoli 
was controlled and supervised by the Tripolitan authorities. Nevertheless, the 
accumulation of the crop in front of stores resulted in an obstruction of traffic in 
some streets, prompting the city council to address the ruling authorities about 
three crucial issues: the blocking of the traffic, the threat of fire that might lead 
to serious consequences, and the camels used to bring the crop and which stayed 
there for some time, which had its own disadvantages. The main request of the 
city council was to locate the market for the crop outside of Tripoli.176 There were 
many companies involved in exporting the sparto, for example Arbeeb, the Bank 
of Rome, Perry Puri, H.B. Nahum, and M.J. Hassan. Each of these companies had 
compressing laboratories and storage facilities, especially, Arbeeb and Nahum 
in the cities of Tripoli and al-Khums, al-Tabya and Zlitan. Puri and Hassan only 
stored the plant in Tripoli and al-Khums. The main crop markets were in the cities 
of Tripoli, al-Khums and Zlitan.177 The revenues from exporting the sparto varied 
from year to year. For instance, it was 4.000 Francs in 1870, but it increased in 
the subsequent years to reach 3.750.000 Francs.178 The Ottoman documents show 
that the amounts exported in 1895 were equivalent to 53.855 Ottoman qirsh and 
in the next year the value was only 49.318 Ottoman Qirsh.179 The authorities in 
Tripoli started to focus their efforts on increasing production and they decided 
to form a committee composed of the mayor of Tripoli, engineers, the head of the 
port, the head of the sailors and some traders. The main mission of this commit-
tee was to select a suitable place for establishing a new port dedicated specifically 
to the export of this plant.180 This was an important step taken by the Ottoman 
government and indicated the economic significance of this plant for the pro-
vince of Tripoli. Sponge was the second main export of the province of Tripoli 
due to the demand for this product in European countries. Greek sailors were the 
main traders of this product. There were some Greeks living in Tripoli, and some 
of them were traders. The sponge that was found alone the coast of Cyrenaica 
175 Wathīqā 4/2/1052, 1896, Milaf buḥūth wa maqālāt (nabāt al-ḥalfa), al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-
māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.
176 Wathīqā 105/2/4 Māyū 1871, Milaf buḥūth wa maqālāt (nabāt al-ḥalfa), al-markaz al-waṭanī 
li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.
177 Mangano, L’Alfa in Tripolitania, 1913, p. 38.
178 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 33.
179 Wathīqā 1051/2/4, 1318, Milaf buḥūth wa maqālāt (nabāt al-ḥalfa), al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-
māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.
180 Wathīqā 2011, 1875, Milaf buḥūth wa maqālāt (nabāt al-ḥalfa), al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-
māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.
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was of the highest quality.181 Ostrich feathers and ivory were imported from sub-
Saharan Africa and were also very significant exports that played an important 
role in the economy of the province of Tripoli. These products also attracted the 
attention of the European traders, which led them to travel to the province to 
bring goods in high local demand, which they would then exchange for the dome-
stic goods and other goods coming from Africa.182 The province used several ports 
to export and import ostrich including the port of Tripoli, which was where most 
of the trade with Europe took place. This was in addition to the other five ports 
of al-Khums, Zlitan, and Misurata, Derna and Tobruk and other smaller anchors. 
Trade with Germany was carried out by the German shipping line (Deutsche 
Levante-Line). Various categories of goods were imported from Germany inclu-
ding haberdashery, blankets, tea, sugar, iron, glass, perfumes, chemicals and 
medical materials, textile yarns, ropes, cotton, wool textiles, porcelain, gold and 
silver ornaments, and alcohol.183 Exports to Germany focused on leather, ivory, 
ostrich feathers, barley, salt and dates. Goods imported from Germany tended to 
be transported to Malta first and then to Tripoli and Benghazi by the Italian ship-
ping lines.184 The reports of the English consul contain important information 
about the volume of trade exchange between the province of Tripoli and different 
European countries focusing on Germany. For instance, one report states that the 
year 1884 could be considered the actual beginning of commercial traffic from 
Germany. In terms of trade, Germany was ranked 6th on the list of countries for 
both import and export to and from the province of Tripoli. This rank increased 
or decreased depending on the quantity and quality of the products. In 1888 and 
1889, for example, Germany was ranked in the seventh place and in 1893 in the 
eighth place, when the German imports from Tripoli were estimated to consti-
tute a value of £ 7.000. In 1894, German imports were valued more modestly at 
£ 4.000. German exports from Tripoli amounted to £ 16.000 in 1893 and increa-
sed to £ 27.500 in 1894.185 The amount was the same in 1895 despite the decrease 
in the quantity of imported goods. In 1895, the quantity of the imported goods 
181 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 71–72; ʿĀmir, Tārīkh al-maghrib alʿarabī, 
p. 156.
182 ʿĀmir, Tārīkh al-maghrib alʿarabī, p. 157. 
183 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 
bis Oktober 1904, 901/11936; Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 77; Nājī, Tārīkh 
Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, pp. 55–56.
184 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 77; ʿUghlī, “al-Maṣādir al-mutaʿaliqa bi 
Lībiyā”, p. 254.
185 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 
bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. II 11590.
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was £ 4.000 while the exported goods reached a value of £ 29.000.186 Generally, in 
these reports Britain was at the top of the list of European countries involved in 
trade with the province of Tripoli. The most important product exported to Britain 
was the sparto (ḥalfa). The earnings from export of this plant reached 2.500.000 
French francs, in addition to the earnings from exporting ostrich feathers and 
ivory.187 On the other hand, merchants brought tea, aromatic and medicinal che-
micals and paints, ropes, cotton textiles, woolens, iron, and some minerals and 
other miscellaneous goods from Britain.188 France and Italy came next in rank, 
with almost the same goods. The differences are in those goods imported from the 
European countries.189 There was also significant trade with other countries such 
as Malta, Greece, Spain, the United States and Austria.190
Picture 3: Goods in the port city of Tripoli and customs
186 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 
bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. 27611/96.
187 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, pp. 59–72.
188 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
189 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 75.
190 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 59; Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 191; the 
trade with Germany will be discussed in more details in chapter 3 of this study.
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Concerning the slave trade, an important one reached its peak during the 
second half of the 19th century. The slaves were used locally as domestic workers 
and in farms where (ḥalfa) was planted and cultivated. Slaves were also moved 
from Borno to Fezzan, from there to Tripoli, and from there they were sent abroad, 
particularly toward Anatolia.191 As for the trade line, it was as follows: Tripoli–
Benghazi, Alexandria, then to the Ottoman cities like Romelia, Anatolia, Istanbul 
and Salonik and other places.192 This was before the decision to ban the slave 
trade (see Map 5).
Map 5: Slave trade lines and routes in 1850
Ghadames was also a place for buying slaves coming from West Africa. Some 
Ottoman slave traders would travel directly to Ghadames to sell their slaves there. 
Meanwhile, the traders in Benghazi tended to go to Murzuq to buy slaves. These 
traders also went to the center of Tripoli. 
The province of Tripoli made a huge economic boom in the slave trade. 
However, Europe began to fight the slave trade after the second half of the 
century and held several conferences to intensify their efforts to stop it. Britain, 
with ambiguity led efforts to stop the slave trade completely, especially in the 
provinces controlled by the Ottoman Empire in North Africa and other regions. It 
191 Rāfiq, al-ʿArab wa al-ʿūthmānīyyūn, 1516–1916, p. 161; Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 67.
192 Toledano, Ehud R., The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression: 1840–1890, Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey, 1982, pp. 41, 47.
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succeeded in convincing the Ottoman Empire to declare the permanent cessation 
of the slave trade in 1857.193 Tunis was one of the first regions to abolish it in 1846. 
The Ottoman Empire then sent orders to the province of Tripoli stating the need to 
stop the slave trade. These orders were circulated among traders especially, those 
who used to trade between Tripoli and the city of Kano, where the slave trade 
was directly affected by these orders. Severe penalties were issued for violating 
those orders, and historical documents refer to the punishment of seven years’ 
imprison ment for the sale of slaves and fourteen years for their purchase.194
The slave trade was among the important trade activites in the North African 
states; this means that this policy and the British efforts to stop slave trade more 
widely caused significant damage to the structure of the economy, and led to 
the decline in annual revenues and a clear lack of financial resources. However, 
Britain was aware that the prohibition of the slave trade allowed British authori-
ties to impose restrictions on the leaders of the African tribes and the governors 
of the provinces there.195 Despite all these efforts, the slave trade did not stop 
at once, rather, it continued for some time. This is revealed in some European 
correspondence on this subject,196 for instance, the messages sent by the German 
explorer Gerhard Rohlfs, who was in Murzuq in 1865197 and the Italian agents 
working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Italian ambassador in Constan-
tinople to inform him that the slave trade continued in the port of Benghazi, and 
was under the protection of senior Turkish officials there.198 It is argued in the 
literature that the slave traders circumvented the authorities in order to continue 
their trade.199 They would work in secret, anchoring their ships a short distance 
outside Istanbul to avoid discovery and bring the slaves into the city during the 
night. The transactions were carried out quickly and sometimes the traders would 
sell the slaves on board for fear of being discovered.200 To distract the attention 
193 On this trade see the work of Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade.
194 Yūshaʿ, Wathāʾiq Ghadāmis, Wathīqā 12 risālā min Moḥammad al-Ṣaghīr bin Moḥammad al-
Ṭhinī ilā Moḥammad al-Ṣaghīr Ḥīdāh fī Kānū, 1856.
195 al-ʿAbīdī, Jāsim Moḥammad Shaṭab, “al-Nufūdh al-birīṭānī wa tijārat al-raqīq fī al-khalīj 
alʿarabī fī al-qarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashr”, Majallat al-buḥūth al-tārīkhiyya, 26-2, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn 
ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, jāmiʿat al-Fātiḥ, Ṭarābulis, 2004.
196 Boubaker, Sadok, “Considérations sur le rachat des �esclaves’ de la course à Tunis à l’époque 
moderne, in Corsari, schiavi, riscatti tra Liguria e Nord Africa nei secoli XVI e XVII, Comune di 
Ceriale, 2005, pp. 159–167.
197 Rulfis, Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā, p. 204.
198 Wathīqā 879, Mursala min wizārat al-shuʾūn al-khārijīyyā ilā safīr Iṭalī bi-l-Qusṭanṭīniyya, 18 
Uktūbar 1907, milaf tijārat al-raqīq, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.
199 Rūsi, Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī, p. 379.
200 Ibid.
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of authorities they would also move in small groups. From Istanbul, the slaves 
were sent to Egypt and Malta. A conference was held in Brussels, Belgium, in 
1890 to eliminate this trade and a committee was commissioned to stop slavery in 
1891. It worked with a group of people in secret to detect and prevent traders from 
continuing the slave trade.201 The committee assigned Carlo da Borgo to guard 
the coast of Tripoli to control the passage of any ships carrying slaves, even as 
gifts sent to the Ottoman sultan in Constantinople.202 In the same context, stric-
ter control measurements were also discussed at the conference. A report from 
Carlod da Borgo, who was then living in Tripoli, was presented to the committee. 
This report shows the number of convoys carrying slaves from June 1907 through 
June 1908.203 According to the statistics, the number of slaves who entered the 
province reached about 550. One convoy carried 80 slaves; this convoy arrived 
in Tripoli on March 18, 1908.204 As a result of this report, the activities to liberate 
slaves were intensified and manumitted slaves were hosted in certain places until 
they were able to manage their own lives.205 Examples of these activities were 
conducted by the English consul in Benghazi and the Italian consul in the city of 
Tripoli, especially at the end of 1878, when help was offered to liberate slaves to 
improve their situation. It is stated that, from 1878 to 1879, 12 slaves were liberated 
by the Italian consulate.206
Ettore Rossi indicates that the first identification of the population of Tripoli 
was in the 10th century BC.207
The inhabitants of the province of Tripoli can be divided via geography into 
urban, rural, desert nomad populations. Some scholars indicate that the popula-
201 Ibid., p. 381.
202 Wathīqā 36, Mursala min masʾūl murāqabat murūr al-ʿabīd bi al-sawāḥil ilā wazīr al-shuʾūn 
al-khārijīyyā bi Rūmā 19 Māyū 1907, Milaf tijārat al-raqīq, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt, 
Ṭarābulis; see also Boubaker, Sadok, Réseaux et techniques de rachat des captifs de la course à 
Tunis au XVII e siècle, in Le commerce des captifs. Les intermédiaires dans l’échange et le rachat 
des prisonniers en Méditerranée, XVe–XVIIIe siècle, Etudes réunies par Wolfgang Kaiser, Ecole 
Français de Rome, 2008, pp. 25–46.
203 Boubaker, Réseaux et techniques de rachat des captifs de la course à Tunis au XVIIe siècle, 
pp. 25–46, op.cit.
204 Wathīqā 8, Mursala ilā al-muʾtamar al-diblūmāsī fī Brūksil 1908, Milaf tijārat al-raqīq 
(al-istirqāq fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb wa Barqa 1907–1908), al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt, 
Ṭarābulis.
205 Wathīqā 39, 26 Dīsambir, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l- wathāʾiq wa al-makhṭūṭāt, Ṭarābulis, 2004.
206 Aḥmed, Khalīfa Ibrāhīm, Tijārat al-raqīq fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb khilāl al-qarn al-tāsiʿ 
ʿashar, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis, 2014, p. 184.
207 Rossi, Etore, Storia di Tripoli e della Tripolitania dalla conquista araba al 1911, Istituto per 
l’Oriente, Roma, 1968, p. 25.
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tion of Tripoli is descended from the Upper Nile region and belongs to the Hamitic 
group, while others point out that they arrived from the southern Arabian Pen-
insula and thus are Semites.208 A small group of historians attributes its origins 
to the Mediterranean region,209 whereas there are also references made to groups 
referred to as Libyan tribes living in the region during this period. Still, there is 
no consensus about where these tribes came from. It is revealed in the literature 
that the city of Tripoli and the rural areas of Tripoli maintained their social struc-
ture throughout the rule of the Ottomans and were not significantly influenced 
by the so-called Turkish customs or social practices.210 These were considered 
by many people as “alien” to the society.211 Another factor that contributed to 
the continuance of local social norms was that the Ottoman rulers tended to 
focus on aspects relating to political power and having the region submit to 
their administration. They did not intervene to change the local social and cul-
tural structure. Thus, the society preserved its structure, particularly in the rural 
and nomadic areas.212
Social structure was described by some historians as homogeneous in terms 
of three factors.213 The first of these was its characterization as tribal and the 
importance of tribal relations in preserving social bonds. Second, the society 
was predominantly Muslim and the majority of the population followed the 
Maliki School, with the exception of the population of the western mountain and 
Zuwarah, who belonged to the Ibadi School. Finally, Arabic was the principle 
language.214 However, beyond these three shared characteristics the population 
was also very diverse and the result of centuries of mixing. One factor was the 
existence of different ethnic groups, including indigenous inhabitants based 
mostly in the mountains, the central part of the province, and the coast. Centu-
ries later, mixed situations were most common. A part of the population arrived 
in the province from Andalusia at the time of the reconquista and the expulsions 
that followed. Among them were both Muslims and Jews. There were also Jewish 
populations prior to the influx from Andalusia adding to the community of local 
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 25.
211 Ibid.
212 Rūsi, Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī, p. 388.
213 al-Shīkh, Raʾfat Ghunīmī, “al-Ḥayāt al-ijtimāʿīyya fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb al-ʿūth-
mānīyyā fī al-ʿaṣr al-ʿūthmānī al-akhīr (1835–1911)”, al-ḥayāt al-ijtimāʿīyya fī al-wilāyāt al-ʿarabiyya 
athnāʾal-ʿahd alʿuthmānī, vol. 1-2, intr. by ʿAbd al-Jalīl al-Timīmī, markaz al-dirāsāt wa al-buḥūth 
al-ʿūthmānīyyā wa al-mūrīsikīyya wa al-tawthīq wa al-maʿlūmāt, Zaghwān, n.d., p. 411.
214 Ibid.
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Jews from Tripolitania. Later, more Jews came from other regions in the Ottoman 
Empire and the Mediterranean. The Berber population included both Muslims 
and Jews, although Muslims predominated. Many Jews in Tripoli lived in a spe-
cific part of the city referred to as ḥāra al-Yahūd (the quarter of the Jews)215 but 
other Jews lived in the mixed quarter and it was not as clearly cut as generally 
described by European travelers. Indeed, these often speak of the existence of 
separate quarters. But there were also mixed quarters where Jews and Muslims 
lived together. Statistics indicate that during the second Ottoman period (1835–
1911) the number of Jews reached a quarter of the population (14.142 persons in 
the province of Tripoli). It is said that they mainly lived in the coastal cities, but 
this was not the reality.216 Most of the population were the result of intermar-
riage between local women and men from outside the region, as in the case of 
the Kwārghlīyya. These were the sons of Ottoman officers of diverse origins who 
married women from Tripoli.217 There were also populations originating from the 
South, like the Toubou tribes.218 Diverse Saharan and sub-Saharan populations 
were also present. Representatives and officers of the Ottoman Empire were part 
of the ruling stratum in Tripoli along with local notables.219 They had very diverse 
origins: Turkish, Greek, Arab, Caucasian, Albanian, Serb, Circasian, Tatar and 
Kurd. In the harbor, there were also populations of converts (Sards, Sicilians, 
Maltese, etc.). There were also foreign merchants, prisoners and navy operatives. 
A group of Italian Jews from Livorno (Granata) were among the most active mer-
chants.220 Jewish merchants often traveled with merchant caravans221 and owned 
workshops manufacturing jewelry from gold and silver.222 In addition to all these 
groups, the presence of the Italians in Tripoli was a long-standing one. Some 
215 De Felice, Renzo, Jews in an Arab Land Libya, 1835–1970, University of Texas Press, Austin, 
1985, p. 406.
216 Zorzi Tavanelli, a Venitian captain, was taken at sea by Tripoli pirates, sold to Jewish and Mus-
lim merchants with his companions, and then ransomed through the intercession of the consuls of 
France and Sweden. He states that in 1749 Tripoli had sixteen to seventeen thousand inhabitants, 
almost half of them Jewish. This estimate is certainly too high. Another Venitian, the merchant 
Mariano Doxera, was probably closer to the mark in 1783 when he spoke of a population of about 
forteen thousand, including about three thousand Jews “who, as in the other cities of Africa, are 
employed in trade and wear distinctive dress”, De Felice, Jews in an Arab Land Libya, op.cit, p. 7.
217 Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī māʾat ʿām 1286/1391H – 1870/1970M, p. 412.
218 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 17.
219 al-Shīkh, “al-Ḥayāt al-ijtimāʿīyya fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb”, p. 416.
220 al-ʿAḥwal, “al-Jāliyāt al-ajnabīyya fī Lībiyā 1835–1950)”, p. 29.
221 Stein, Sarah Abrevaya, Falling into Feathers: Jews and the Trans-Atlantic Ostrich Feather 
Trade, Journal of Modern History, 79-4, 2007, pp. 772–812.
222 Ibid.
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historians argue that the Italian presence in Tripoli goes back to the Roman 
Empire, when they came as traders and craftsmen.223 After Italian unification in 
1870, the number of Italians in Tripoli increased. They started entering the pro-
vince as immigrants and emigration reached its highest levels between 1885 and 
1890.224 The migration of the Italians continued, and they managed to establish 
large-scale economic projects, especially after the opening of the Banco di Roma 
in 1905, and their influence obviously increased after the Italian occupation of 
the province. The Italian presence there included a significant number of Maltese. 
Their sizeable presence can be attributed to the proximity of the countries and the 
ease of travel between them.225 The Maltese started to move to the province of 
Tripoli, where they built their own neighborhood, known as the Maltese quarter, 
in the city of Tripoli. In 1882, their number was 2.000 persons and this rose in the 
following years to over 3.000. They were also successful traders and benefited by 
being under the protection of the English consulate.226 Alongside the Maltese and 
the Italians, there were other smaller communities such as the Jewish-Austrian 
community, which numbered 105 people.227 The French community consisted of 
approximately 564 people in Tripoli and 100 people in Benghazi. Approximately 
100 Dutch were registered, some of them Jews. The Spanish community numbe-
red 100 people in Tripoli and 50 people in Benghazi. The Greek community had 
236 people228 whereas only 11 Germans were counted. Most of these communities 
gained a consul or representative for their interests in the province of Tripoli as it 
increased in size and significance.229 Another factor reflecting the heterogeneity 
of the society in the province of Tripoli is the significant disparity between the 
living standards of the inhabitants of Tripoli. The social structure reflected this 
stratification. At the top of the social pyramid were the rich or the politically 
powerful, alongside the most important religious scholars, the leaders of the 
school of Sufism (ṭarīqah Sufīya), which was a common phenomenon throug-
hout the region in the 19th century) as well as the judges. This stratum was fol-
lowed by the small traders and then the craftsmen, which were in turn above the 
foreign communities. The lowest social stratum was made up by the servants and 
223 al-ʿAḥwal, “al-Jāliyāt al-ajnabīyya fī Lībiyā (1835–1950)”, pp. 160–161.
224 Ibid.
225 Lafi, Nora, Les relations entre Malte et Tripoli de Barbarie au XIXe siècle, R.E.M.M.M., 71, 
1994, pp. 127-142; Fīru, al-Ḥawlīyyāt al-lībiyyā, p. 350.
226 al-ʿAḥwal, “al-Jāliyāt al-ajnabīyya fī Lībiyā (1835–1950)”, p. 173. 
227 Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī māʾat ʿām 1286/1391H–1870/1970M, p. 422.
228 Ibid.
229 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, pp. 23–24.
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slaves.230 The basic unit of society was the family. This usually consisted of a father, 
a mother and their children living in one house, which was often composed of two 
floors. This house would be surrounded by other houses of the same size, which 
were occupied by members of the same extended family or tribe.231 With regard to 
holidays and celebrations, people in the province of Tripoli celebrated the Muslim 
festivals of Eid al-Fiṭr and Eid al-Aḍḥa just as in other Muslim countries. The birth 
of the Prophet was also an important celebration. These events were celebrated at 
both the official and the local levels. The people in the province of Tripoli also cared 
about social events such as marriage and others.232
Local people relied on the quranic education among othe knowledge provi-
ded in mosques and quranic schools for children, which focused on the memori-
zation of the Quran and Sunna as well as the main principles of reading and wri-
ting.233 This model of education continued until the Ottoman government issued 
a number of decrees on education, including two resolutions issued and adopted 
in 1869 and 1871. Some governors, such as Aḥmed Ezzat (second term 1879–1880), 
set up schools that followed modern methods of education. Following this, the 
modern form of schools spread more widely and by 1877 it covered the province 
as far as Murzuq. This was part of a policy pursued by the Ottoman Empire in 
the various Ottoman provinces. The policy was made in accordance with propo-
sals submitted to the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1869, which included the 
need to develop and organize education at various levels and to build schools 
that “corresponded” to the European model. In 1881, work on the practical imple-
mentation of the proposals seriously began. The work started by focusing on the 
elementary schools. The Ottoman government had developed a funding 1884 for 
construction and financing of the schools during the Tanẓīmāt period.234 Thus 
the number of schools was on the rise in all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, 
230 See Carr, William and Harry Hearder, The Wars of German Unification, London, Routledge, 
2014, 254p; see also Nuwār, ʿAbdul-ʿAzīz wa ʿAbd al-Majīd Naʿnaʿī,ʿAūrūbbā min al-thawrā 
al-firinsīyyā, ilā al-ḥarab al-ʿālāmīyyā al-thānīyya, Dār al-nāhaḍa al-ʿarabiyya li-l-ṭibaʿā wa al-
nashir, Bayrūt, n.d., p. 272.
231 al-Sanīnī, Miftāḥ Khalīl, al-ʿUmarāʾ min ahl Barqa wa al-ṣaḥarāʾ, Dār al-qimmah wa Dār 
al-imān, al-Qāhira 2011, p. 217
232 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 25.
233 Belḥāj, Moḥammad al-Kūni, al-Taʿlīm fī madīnat Ṭarābulis fī al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī 
1835-1911 wa atharahu ʿalā mujtamaʿ al-wilāyā, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, 
Ṭarābulis, 2006, pp. 39, 43.
234 Evered, Emine O., Empire and Education under the Ottomans: Politics, Reform and Resis-
tance from the Tanzimat to the Young Turks, London: I.B. Tauris, 2012, pp. 114, 116, 118.
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including Tripoli.235 After this, the provincial government in Tripoli established 
one industrial school in 1895. The project was supervised by the administrative 
government in Tripoli and the governor Namik Pasha. The Hamidieh Indust-
rial School was built in 1889, during the term of the governor Moḥammad Hafiz 
Pasha.236 The teachers were Ottoman.237 The main teaching languages were Arabic 
and Turkish; Turkish having been introduced to the education system in 1890.238 
The Ottomans were also concerned with agricultural education, and in 1909 the 
council of the province issued a decree for the establishment of an agricultural 
school, along with the appointment of specialized teachers for its pupils.239 There 
were also a number of developments in terms of the media; newspapers were 
introduced for the first time, with first newspaper issued in the second half of the 
19th century under the title West Tripoli. Historical sources give differing informa-
tion regarding the date of its publication. According to some, it was published 
for the first time in 1866,240 whilst others maintain that it was issued in 1871.241 It 
was a four-page official weekly newspaper in Arabic and Turkish and printed in 
the province. It was issued after the publication order of Sultan ʿAbdul-ʿAzīz. This 
first newspaper was issued mainly to publish the Sultan’s orders, directives and 
declarations and continued until the entry of the Italian colonialists in 1911, when 
the printing press was destroyed by bombs. Other newspapers were also issued 
that had a significant role in spreading culture and information to the population. 
One example of these newspapers was al-Taraqī, issued in 1897 by Moḥammad 
al-Buṣayrī. These newspapers existed before the Young Turks achieved power 
in the Ottoman Empire. The most well-known newspapers that emerged during 
the rule of this group were: al-‘Asr al-Jādīd, which was issued in 1909, al-Merṣād, 
Abugasha and al-Raqyyīb, all of which were issued in 1910, and al-Dārdānīl in 
235 Ibid., p. 124.
236 Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī māʾat ʿām 1286/1391H–1870/1970M, p. 87.
237 al-ʿĀqil, Aḥmed Moḥammad, “al-Taʿlīm al-ḥadīth fī Lībiyā khilāl al-fatra (1835–1950)”, al-
Mujtamaʿ al-lībī (1835–1950), aʿmāl al-nadwā al-ʿilmiyya al-thāmina allatī ʿuqidat bi-l-markaz 
fī al-fatra min 26-27/9/2000, ed. by Moḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Jarārī, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-
dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, pp. 523, 525.
238 Ibid.
239 al-Ṭawīr, Moḥammad Aḥmed, “al-Zirāʿa fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb athnāʾ al-ḥukm 
alʿuthmānī al-thānī al-mubāshir lahā 1835–1911”, al-Ḥayāt al-sīyāsiyya li-l-wilāyāt al-ʿarabiyya 
wa maṣādir wathāʾiquhā fī al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī, vol. 1-2, intr. by ʿAbd al-Jalīl al-Timīmī, markaz 
al-dirāsāt wa al-buḥūth ʿan al-wilāyāt al-ʿarabiyya fī al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī, Zaghwān, 1986, p. 521.
240 Āarībī, Moḥammad al-Ṭāhir, Wathāʾiq al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrāʾ, al-Dār al-ʿarabiyya li-l-kitāb, 
Lībiyā – Tūnis, 1977, p. 47.
241 Tarāzī, Fīlīb Dī, Tārīkh al-ṣaḥāfa al-ʿarabiyya, volume 2-4, al-maṭabaʿa al-adabiyya, Bayrūt, 
1967, pp. 206, 240, 314; Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī māʾat ʿām 1286/1391H–1870/1970M, p. 416.
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1911.242 In addition, an annual volume was released by the Ottomans. Entitled 
the Salname, this contained the most important information about the province 
including its history and geography.243 The Ottoman province of Tripoli between 
1870 and 1884 and its resources and raw materials made the province an explicit 
prize for the colonizing forces.  At the same time, it is important to highlight the 
social structure and the cumulative cultural heritage that aided in resisting colo-
nial and foreign invasion by the European countries.
242 Tarāzī, Tārīkh al-ṣaḥāfa al-ʿarabiyya, pp. 206, 240, 314; Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī māʾat ʿām 
1286/1391H–1870/1970M, p. 416.
243 Āarībī, Wathāʾiq al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrā, p. 47.

3  The German “Scramble for Africa” (1882–1909)
Following the unification of Germany in 1871, it had no clear political interest in 
colonizing any parts of North Africa or Asia. However, it was involved in North 
Africa through political, diplomatic influence and economic engagement. This 
was unusual, given the focus on African and Asian territories reflected in the pol-
icies of most other European countries. This differing focus in comparison with 
other European countries, why and how Germany’s intervention in the regions 
were perceived and understood as strategic or economic interests is a question for 
historical research. This chapter is dedicated to the period called the “Scramble 
for Africa”¹ and will try to answer that question with a focus on the relationships 
between the Ottoman province of Tripoli in North Africa and Germany between 
1882 and 1909.  During this time, the province of Tripoli began to play a greater 
role in German writings and in its Weltpolitik. From 1884, Germany began to 
colonize some territories in Africa. The entrance of Germany into the Scramble 
for Africa and the overlapping interests of the European powers and their colo-
nial ambitions in Africa resulted in heightened conflict between internally and 
between countries in Europe, in Africa and in the world. These conflicts led Otto 
von Bismarck, the German Chancellor, to organize the second Berlin Conference 
in 1884. Bismarck’s motivation for this conference was mainly to settle conflicts 
between European countries and Africa. The African continent was “opened” 
at this conference to give access to major river basins and resources. Access to 
Africa was also facilitated by drawing new colonial borders in the continent and 
creating new countries controlled as colonial territories. With this conference 
on November 15, 1884, Berlin put itself at the center of the European colonial 
enterprise. The letter of invitation sent to fourteen countries explained the main 
goals of this conference and included a treaty for new colonial occupations.2
The decisions and agreements signed during this conference had, of course, a 
huge violent impact on the whole region of North Africa. It has been portrayed 
as the beginning of European colonization of parts of Africa.3 Some Europeans 
powers at the time viewed Africa as a single region there to be colonized. Others 
thought of Africa in a very biased way, as composed only of tribes and ignorant 
1 For the use of this expression by famous historians like Thomas Pakenham (born in 1933) and 
Sebastian Conrad, see Pakenham, Thomas, The Scramble for Africa, 1876–1912, Random House, 
New York, 1991, 738p; see also Conrad, op.cit.
2 See, for example, Craven, “Between Law and History, pp. 31–59.
3 Conrad, German Colonialism, op.cit.
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people ready to be divided.4 This reflected European powers’ appetite and desire 
to divide Africa into different regions following only their own interests. They did 
not respect “ethnic” or “tribal” divisions, which in some cases led to areas occu-
pied by a single tribe being subjected to two different European powers.5
But what about Germany in this colonial context? One way to answer this 
question would be to present a survey of European and German travelers and 
to portray their journeys in the province of Tripoli from the end of the long 19th 
century. Some of them were driven by their interest in the geography of the 
region, for example, the mystery of the desert, and they were keen to decipher its 
symbols. Some others were more driven by political interests. German travelers 
stressed in their own reports and letters the importance of the province of Tripoli 
and they included Tripoli as one important element to consider in political deci-
sions that Germany’s government could take. German politicians estimated its 
real economic and political value and decided to open a German consulate in this 
region.
The examination of how figures like C.F. Bläser (also written Blazer) G. 
Schweinfurt, G. Nachtigal, G. Krause or G. Rohlfs presented their own vision and 
interesting developments about the vision of North Africa. Bläser, for example, 
was important for the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. He was a German 
writer who studied law and political economy. His note and report were pub-
lished in a book in 1882.6 It demonstrated explicitly the extreme strategic and 
economic importance of the province of Tripoli. The book stressed the benefits 
that could be gained if Germany managed to control it.7 Georg Schweinfurt (1826–
1925), the famous German natural scientist and traveler, presented a comprehen-
sive study of this province, especially the city of Tobruk that appeared in 1882. It 
contained important strategic and geographical information8 and provided an 
accurate description of the port of Tobruk in terms of depth and ease of move-
ment of vessels for both commercial and military reasons. Tobruk was viewed 
as an important port for Germany because it could be used as a starting point 
from which to travel further into African regions and to reach the southern Nile 
4 Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa, op.cit., p. 38.
5 Ibid.
6 C.F. Bläser, Deutschlands Interesse an der Erwerbung und Colonisation der nordafrikanischen 
Küsten Tunis und Tripolis in seiner grossen Bedeutung zumal hinsichtlich der handelspolitischen 
und gewerblichen Beziehungen, Bohne, Berlin, 1882. The title can be translated as “Germany‘s 
interests in the acquisition and colonization of North African coasts”. For more information on 
this book, see ʿImād al-Dīn Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā”, p. 38.
7 Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā”, p. 38.
8 Mūrī, al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Lībiyā, p. 100.
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bank. From there they could move freely between the central regions of Africa. 
Gerhard Rohlfs, a German scientific traveler, published many accounts of his 
African journeys.9 He participated in the French expedition in Kabiliya, where 
massacres occurred. He focused on collecting information to show the strategic 
importance of the province of Tripoli,10 arguing that German control of the city 
of Tripoli and its province would make it easier for Germany to control Sudan.11 
German politicians in the 19th century concentrated their attention on two aspects 
with regard to this place. The first was the study of its economic and geo-political 
importance. The second focused on studying the social life of the African pop-
ulation, the language, the customs and traditions of this part of Africa, seen as 
Roman and Greek territories with monuments.12 This is why many associations 
for promoting the exploration of interior parts of Africa encouraged travel to the 
continent, but the main reason behind this was the German interest in the prov-
ince of Tripoli as a potential bridgehead toward Africa. The importance of North 
Africa to individual expeditions illustrates how much the exploration of this con-
tinent was to a great extent a transnational endeavor often financed by geograph-
ical associations, but also by businessmen. Writers started to highlight the eco-
nomic and strategic importance of this Ottoman province as a gate to the interior 
parts of Africa.13 The European scramble for Africa began between 1840 and 1870. 
The Industrial Revolution in Europe might be considered the actual beginning 
of the European competition over Africa. New industries had emerged. A signif-
icant increase in production resulted in an urgent need to search for external 
markets for those products. And the competition was also on about who would 
have first access to raw materials, whether agricultural or metal, to support their 
industries.14 The competition of European powers increased. Britain occupied the 
region of East Africa and the Niger River, while France was active in North Africa, 
particularly in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco and Central Africa. France tried to 
extend its influence across the desert to western Congo and West Africa. Mean-
while, Italy occupied Ethiopia and Abyssinia and the province of Tripoli. From 
1884, Germany began to occupy parts of Africa in a political sense and estab-
lished colonies in West Africa, Cameroon and Togo (1884) and in South West 
Africa, parts of Namibia (1884), and East Africa (now Burundi, Ruanda and Tan-
9 Gerhard Rohlfs’ book (1881) was translated into Italian language in 1882; Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, 
markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2006, p. 55.
10 Rohlfs, Reise durch Marokko, Rulfis, Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā, p. 55.
11 Ibid.
12 Ghānim wa Shlūtir, “al-Qunṣuliyya al-ʿalmānīyya fī Ṭarābulis”, p. 4. 
13 Ziyāda, Lībiyā fī al-ʾuṣūr al-ḥadīthā, p. 59.  
14 Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 17.
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zania (1885). Togo and Cameroon were German colonies owing to a small group 
of investors and traders before 1884. In this year, they wanted to have ‘protection’ 
from the African tribal leaders, as they put it. They asked their government to 
work to achieve this goal. Tribal leaders themselves wanted agreements with the 
German government. This prompted the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck 
to send a delegation headed by Gustav Nachtigal. This German doctor and trav-
eler succeeded in signing an agreement with them in 1884 to ensure the rights 
and security of the German traders.15 Britain benefitted from its large military 
forces, which enabled it to stabilize its colonial territory from the 18th century 
onward.16 British power dominated East Africa including the ports, land and sea 
lanes there. It had controlled Egypt since 1882, where it also had the strongest 
European fleet. Britain at that time had already also colonized Sudan, Kenya and 
Cape of Good Hope and other parts of Africa including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and 
Ghana.17 The British recognized the challenge represented by the increasing pres-
ence of Germany in the region, since Germany was persistently strengthening 
its relations there, starting with the sultan of Morocco. It had also augmented 
their trade activities and economic projects. For instance Germany received the 
privilege of building the port of Tangier, and their trade activities extended to 
reach both Algeria and Tunisia despite the fact that they were under the control 
of France.18 The decision of Otto von Bismarck to enter the imperial competition 
in 1884 led to conflicts with European countries and Britain in particular.19 The 
competition intensified when the Belgian King Leopold started to become active 
in the Congo Basin and invited some representatives of European powers, mainly 
Britain, France, Italy and Russia, to hold an informal conference in Brussels. King 
Leopold aimed at obtaining the approval required for exploration and exploita-
tion of African regions and succeeded in establishing and gaining presidency of 
the African International Association, which was based in Brussels. All of these 
developments pushed the European powers to react, and they decided to hold 
an international conference to prevent any conflicts that may occur as a result of 
15 Hofmann, Michael, Deutsche Kolonialarchitektur und Siedlungen in Afrika, Petersberg, 2013, 
pp. 9, 33.
16 Nuwār wa Naʿnaʿī, al-Tārīkh al-ʿAūrūbbī al-ḥadīth, p. 381.
17 Abu Jābir, Fāyiz Ṣāliḥ, al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī al-ḥadīth wa al-ʿālāqāt al-dawlīyya, al-muʿāṣira, Dār 
al-bashīr li-l-nashr wa al-tawzīʿ, Amman, 1989, p. 137; al-Magraḥi, Mīlād, Tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā al-
ḥadīth wa al-muʿāṣir, al-Jāmiʿa al-Maftūḥa, Ṭarābulis, 1995, p. 232.
18 Muḥāfaẓa, Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya, pp. 23–24.
19 Scherer, Friedrich, Adler und Halbmond, Bismarck und der Orient 1878–1890, Schöning, Pa-
derborn, 2001, 571p; Ibrāhīm, al-Muslimūn wa al-istiamār al-ʿAūrūbbī li-Afrīqiyā, 1989, pp. 15, 
17–18.
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this competition in the scramble for Africa.20 To support this association, King 
Leopold established a company that worked in the same field. It succeeded in 
signing many agreements with the chiefs of the tribes in the Congo and the Bel-
gians were thus able to control the Congo Basin.21 France did not accept this pro-
gress. France had already arrived at the Congo River in 1875, but did not succeed 
in signing any agreement there until 1883, when it sought to create a road linking 
French colonies in North and Central Africa.22
With regard to the province of Tripoli, Germany enhanced its activities in this 
province because it was not under the control of any European powers. The prov-
ince was under the authority of the Ottoman Empire which had strong relations 
with Germany. It should be noted that Germany was the only European country 
that did not capture any parts of the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Addition-
ally, Germany did not initially have colonial aspirations, making it easier for them 
to be accepted and welcomed by the local population in North Africa. Germany 
then used this to strengthen relations with most of the Ottoman provinces in 
North Africa. Moreover, German military force at that time had also expand ed 
rapidly.23 The combination of these factors led to Britain’s opposition to the 
variety of German projects in Tripoli. For instance, they were behind the failure of 
the German efforts to gain control of the important port of Tobruk and to build a 
railway to link the city of Tripoli from their colonies in the eastern Africa.24 The 
Ottoman Empire was in a weak position during this period. It was going through 
a complex political process, especially in the mid-19th century, having lost many 
territories to European powers such as Britain and Russia. Hence, the Ottomans 
tried to deal cautiously with all the events and developments so as not to lose the 
new lands or to be involved in agreements that included loss of territories. Mean-
while, Germany tried to intensify its activities in Tripolitania until the Ottoman 
Ali Rida Pasha came to rule in 1876. He was reluctant to deal with the Germans. 
20 Altahir, Hamdi, Africa from Colonialism to Independence, Humanities Library, Cairo, 1998, 
p. 5; Riad, Zaher, The European Colonization of Africa in the Modern Era, Universities Office for 
Publication, Egypt, 1960, pp. 15, 19–22.
21 Abu Jābir, al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī al-ḥadīth, p.138; al-ʿAnī, Raʿd Majīd, Tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā al-ḥadīth 
wa al-muʿāṣir al-ṣirāʿ wa al-taḥalufāt 1789–1914, Dār kunūz al-maʿrifa li-l-nashr wa al-tawzīʿ, 
Amman, 2008, p. 155.
22 Ranūfān, Bīyīr, Tārīkh al-ʿālāqāt al-dawalīyya (al-qarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashar) 1815–1914, translated 
by Jalāl Yaḥya, Dār al-maʿārif, al-Qāhira, 1980, p. 109.
23 Ghānim, ʿ Imād al-Dīn, ʿ Amalīyyat al-ghūwaṣāt al-ʿalmānīyya fī al-miyāh al-lībiyyā wa ḥarakat 
al-jihād 1915-1918, dirāsa fī tārīkh al-ʿālāqāt al-lībiyyā al-ʿalmānīyya, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-
dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2003, p. 18.  
24 Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā”, p. 42.
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The German traveler Heinrich von Maltzan indicated that Ali Rida Pasha had 
treated the Germans with hostility for no apparent reason.25 It seems that the 
competition among the European consuls, specifically the British and the French, 
in the province of Tripoli and their attempts to improve relations with this Pasha 
was the reason. This situation did not last long. Ali Rida Pasha was dismissed and 
a new governor came to power. This was appreciated by the German officials, as 
they were more welcomed by the other governors after Ali Rida Pasha.26 As a 
result of this political change, the Germans began to be more influential, like the 
French and the British and other Europeans nationalities. There was a small com-
munity of Germans who lived in the province of Tripoli. Their situations were 
improved with the changing of the governor. Meanwhile, Germany began to gain 
influence in Europe and this was reflected in how the Germans were treated in the 
province of Tripoli, this in fact encouraged some Germans to migrate there, spe-
cifically to the eastern parts. Some literature indicates that their numbers 
exceeded 10.000 families settled in the area of the Green Mountain in Cyrenaica, 
with fresh air and fertile land among other advantages.27 Moreover, in 1888, 
Germany in consideration of its strong relations with the Ottoman Empire, tried 
even to settle a number of German citizens in the same area. This was mentioned 
in the correspondences between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Germany 
offered through its consulate in Istanbul to send some German inhabitants to 
Cyrenaica. The Ottomans agreed and addressed their governor in Cyrenaica to 
identify suitable areas. However, this project was not implemented for two rea-
sons.28 The first was the unwillingness of the local population, and the second 
related to the cautious policy of the Ottoman Empire itself regarding European 
settlements in the whole empire. These settlements would have burdened the 
province. Indeed, despite the close relations with the Germans, they generally 
25 Nachtigal, Gustav, Sahara und Sudan: Ergebnisse sechsjähriger Reisen in Afrika, Erster Band, 
Graz, Austria, 1967, p. 28; Māltisān, Hīnrīsh Fūn, Fī riḥāb Ṭarābulis wa Tūnis, translated by ʿImād 
al-Dīn Ghānim, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2008, p. 42.
26 Māltisān, Fī riḥāb Ṭarābulis wa Tūnis, pp. 52, 200. On Ali Rida Pasha, the son of an Algerian 
qadi who fled French colonisation and its role in Tripoli during the Ottoman reform (Tanẓīmāt) 
and the European competition see also Nora Lafi, Une ville du Maghreb, op.cit, p. 221.
27 al-ʿAẓm, Ṣādiq Muʾayyad, Riḥla fī al-ṣaḥrāʾ al-kubra bi-Afrīqiyā, translated by ʿAbd al-Karīm 
Abu-Shuwīrib, revised by Ṣālāḥ al-Dīn Ḥasan al-Sūri, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-
tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1998, p. 50.
28 Ghānim, ʿImād al-Dīn, “Mashrūʿāt al-ʾistīṭān al-ʿaūrūbbīyya fī Lībiyā ḥata sanat 1900” (ʿaraḍ 
wa dirāsa), Majallat al-shahīd, 2, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1981, 
p. 17.
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feared the presence of the Europeans in their territories.29 The English newspaper 
The Standard wrote in 1898 that the German Kaiser, during his visit to Istanbul 
that year, had again suggested the establishment of a German settlement in the 
province of Tripoli. However, another document in the same archive denies the 
veracity of this information, arguing that the Kaiser never made such a sugges-
tion.30 This was also discussed at the conference, with conflicts emerging as a 
result of the competition of the leading countries in their scramble for Africa.31 
The problem over competing claims to the Congo Basin, which was one important 
source of water in the region, was another very important point discussed at this 
conference.32 The Congo in particular was a point of conflict between Belgium, 
France, Britain and Germany.33 The Berlin Conference led by Otto von Bismarck34 
reflected the distinguished position of Germany among the other European coun-
tries and also highlights the German role in conflict mediation and resolution in 
Europe at that time.35 Von Bismarck was also planning to serve German interests 
by holding the conference in Germany. This was supposed to strengthen the posi-
tion of Germany and its policy. The conference was also supposed to institute the 
German policy at the international level and to highlight the principles of open 
economic investment adopted by Germany to become available to all partici-
pants,36 and thus benefit all European countries and end the conflict.37 Thus, the 
conference was held from November 1884 to February 1885, in the presence of 
representatives of a number of European countries, the Ottoman Empire and the 
United States.38 Historians stress the complete absence of African countries. Gen-
erally, the conference was the launch of European colonial policy and course of 
actions in Africa, even though they employed explicit goals like fighting the slave 
29 al-ʿAẓm, Riḥla fī al-ṣaḥrāʾ al-kubra, p. 50.
30 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das 
Kaiser liche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 1, 1895-1899, R16111, Nr. A12804, 4/11/1898; Nr. A12804, 
8/12/1898.
31 Qāsmiyya, Khaīrīyya, Tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-muʿāṣir, (tārīkhʿAūrūbbā al-muʿāṣir), 
Jamiʿāt Dimashq, Dimashq, 1981/1982, p. 143.
32 Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa, p. 37; Minawi, Mostafa, The Ottoman Scramble for 
Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz, Stanford University Press, Stanford 
California, 2016, p. 8.
33 al-ʿAnī, Tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-muʿāṣir, p. 155.
34 Ibrāhīm, ʿAbd al-llāhʿAbd al-Rāzzāq, Mausūʿat al-tārīkh wa al-siyāsa fī Afrīqiyā, al-maktab 
al-Maṣri li-tawzīʿ al-maṭbuʿāt, al-Qāhira, 1997, p. 5.
35 Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 36.
36 al-Magraḥi, Tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-muʿāṣir, p. 233.
37 Nuwār wa Naʿnaʿī, ʿAūrūbbā min al-thawrā  al-firinsīyyā, p. 316. 
38 Ibrāhīm, Mausūʿat al-tārīkh wa al-siyāsa, p. 5.
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trade and disseminating European civilization in these territories.39 It seems that 
this step by von Bismarck came in response to the British arrangements to keep 
everyone away from the Congo Basin and put it under Portuguese influence, 
which could be easily controlled by Britain. The German Chancellor was also 
trying to spare the considerable risks that may eventually lead to the outbreak of 
war in Europe with the cooperation of Belgium.40 It is important to note that the 
efforts of Otto von Bismarck and the rest of the leaders of Europe succeeded in 
realizing their goal and draw the map of Africa according to their political and 
economic interests.41 After three and a half months of meetings and discussion, 
they signed an agreement strengthening the neutrality of the Congo Basin and 
ensuring freedom of trade and navigation for the countries that had participated 
in the conference.42 They also made a decision to establish the State of Congo,43 
and set it under the control of the Association of Congo, which was an interna-
tional institution concerned with trade under the control of the King of Belgium. 
Moreover, Britain agreed to share Guinea with Germany.44 The province of Tripoli 
was of course mentioned at the second Congress of Berlin.45 It functioned as a 
bargaining chip and was offered by Bismarck to Italy to avoid the outbreak of any 
military conflict. This happened without the knowledge of the Ottoman Empire, 
after the latter had lost their claim to Tunisian protectorate to France with the 
French declaration of protection in 1881.46 The French were supported by both 
Germany and Britain. Thus, to satisfy Italy, the province of Tripoli and northern 
Somalia and Abyssinia were placed under Italian control in 1911.47 Recall that the 
discussion of offering Italy control of Tripoli at the second Congress of Berlin was 
a continuation of the discussion initiated at the first in 1878.  The offer was that 
Italy could exercise influence in the province of Tripoli and France be granted full 
39 Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa, p. 37.
40 al-Magraḥi, Tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-muʿāṣir, p. 233.
41 Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa, p. 37.
42 Nussbaum, Manfred, Vom “Kolonialenthusiasmus” zur Kolonialpolitik der Monopole: Zur 
deutschen Kolonialpolitik unter Bismarck, Caprivi, Hohenlohe, Akademie-Verlag Berlin, 1962, p. 
16; Drīfūs, Franswā Jūrij wa Rūlānd Mārkus wa Rīmūn Būwādūfān, Mausūʿat tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā 
al-ʾam: mīn ʾam 1789 ḥattā ayyamunā, translated by Ḥusayīn Ḥaydar, vol. 3, ʿŪwaydāt, Bayrūt-
Pārīs, 1995, p. 327.
43 Wīsīling, Hinrī, Taqsīm Afrīqiyā 1880–1914 ʾaḥdāth muʾtamar Barlīn wa tawābiʿahu al-
siyāsiyya, translated by Rīmā Ismāʿīl, al-Dār al-jamāhīriyya li-l-nashr wa al-tawzīʿ wa al-iʿlān, 
Ṭarābulis, 2001, p. 202.
44 Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 36; Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa, p. 37. 
45 Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa, p. 37.
46 Abu Jābir, al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī al-ḥadīth, p. 139.
47 Nuwār, wa Naʿnaʿī, ʿAūrūbbā min al-thawrā al-firinsīyyā, p. 320
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control over Tunisia. By agreeing to the general Act of Berlin 1884, the Ottoman 
Empire recognized the right of other participants to the Mediterranean coast of 
the province of Tripoli.48 Another major result of the second congress of Berlin 
was the explicit agreement that obliged any European country seeking to extend 
its influence in Africa in whatever form to inform and consult with the rest of the 
European powers. Moreover, any country aiming to “protect” any part of Africa 
had to physically occupy the place, and these conditions were for everyone to 
respect and comply with.49 It could be said that the second congress of Berlin had 
profound and violent impacts on the international community in general and on 
the region of North Africa, in particular. This was because the most important 
waterways such as the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar, as well as the Medi-
terranean Sea, are located in this region. This prompted many of the European 
countries to try to find a foothold in Africa, thus they tried to establish their area 
of political influence as they realized the benefits that could be gained there. The 
region thus entered a new stage and a new political and economic context of 
European policy on the African continent. 
3.1   German Travelers in the Province of Tripoli and the Second 
Congress of Berlin
Many German travelers came to or passed by the province of Tripoli. Their writ-
ings can thus shed light on German interest in the province. This writing can be 
divided into two categories: The first comprises the travelers who came to this 
place to explore and research the historical and geographical aspects, such as 
Baron von Maltzan (1826–1874) and Gottlob Adolf Krause (1850–1938). The second 
group includes those who tried to study the province focusing on the political, 
economic and social aspects with the intention of collecting as much information 
as possible. This group was first used to serve the colonial objectives and includes 
such figures as Gerhard Rohlfs (1831–1896) and Gustav Nachtigal (1834–1885). 
Their journey account included geographical information on Africa.50 The desert 
48 Minawi, The Ottoman Scramble for Africa, p. 9.
49 Nuwār, wa Naʿnaʿī, ʿAūrūbbā min al-thawrā  al-firinsīyyā, p. 318; al-Magraḥi, Tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā 
al-ḥadīth wa al-muʿāṣir, p. 224.
50 For an analysis of the Orient in German literature, see Khalīfa, Mohamed, Der Orient – Fiktion 
oder Realität? A Critical Analysis of 19th Century German Travel Reports, Gerlach-Press, Berlin, 
2015, 194p. For an overview on the European travelers in the 19th and 20th century see the work 
from a doctorate at La Sorbonne by the diplomat Missouri, Moftah, La Libye des voyageurs 1812–
1912, Lausanne, Favre, 2000.
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represented a particularly strong attraction and was frequently described in the 
travelers’ reports. They also focused on the geographic and strategic advantages 
of the province of Tripoli. This province was viewed by many travelers in their 
writings as the northern gateway to Africa.51 In 1788, the Association for Promot-
ing the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa, also known as the African Associa-
tion, was established in London.52 It played a central role in Britain’s exploration 
and dominance of this region until it was replaced by the founding of the Royal 
Geographical Society in 1830.53 Britain had become the superior power in the 
exploration of Africa during the 17th and 18th centuries and the establishment of 
the association reflected this dominance. This association was initially founded 
to study the history of the region. Later, the association became more colonial in 
its nature, focusing on finding new markets and sources of raw materials for 
industry in Britain. The aim then evolved to include preaching the Christian faith, 
which became a clear goal later on.54 The association’s activities were focused on 
providing the information needed to introduce Africa to European colonization, 
in addition to providing an accurate description of the region that was not previ-
ously known. The association was provided with all the necessary resources for 
achieving the objectives noted above. It was able to invite and support whoever 
had the ability and willingness to take risks and was aware of and agreed with the 
organization’s objectives. Consequently, it encouraged various European nation-
alities to be engaged in its services. The year 1778 is considered as the starting 
point for the long and organized journeys of Europeans heading to the province 
of Tripoli.55 The British William Lucas was one of the first travelers who came to 
the province in that year.56 He started from the city of Tripoli and ended in Misu-
rata. Lucas intended to go further to Fezzan, but the prevailing conditions, par-
ticularly the way the indigenous people perceived the Europeans, forced him to 
stop and go back. However, he succeeded in paving the way for the rest of the 
51 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 
bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. ІІ22970/02.1901.
52 Mūrī, al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Lībiyā, p. 8.
53 Appiah, Kwame Anthony, Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American 
Experience, 5 vols., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 598; see also Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., 
Records of the African Association, 1788–1831, ed. by Robin Hallett Nelson, 1964; for more infor-
mation on the association’s activities.
54 Mūrī, al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Lībiyā, p. 8.
55 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd alʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 114.
56 For more details, see el-Gaddari, Sara, “His Majesty’s Agents: The British Consul at Tripoli 
1795-1832”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 43-5, 2015, pp. 770–986.
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explorers through the information he provided.57 This journey was part of the first 
mission organized by the British Association because of the failure of a previous 
attempt to reach central Africa and the Nile.58 The association then realized that 
to achieve the most in this area it was better to start from the province of Tripoli.59 
It was not long until another man became known for carrying the aspirations of 
discovery and research. This was the German Friedrich Hornemann (1772–1801).60 
Born in Hildesheim, a city in Lower Saxony, southeast of Hanover, Hornemann 
worked for the Association for Promoting the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa 
in London. The association envisaged visiting the province of Tripoli according to 
a specific scientific research plan. Hornemann was appointed head of this mission 
and provided with all the resources necessary to ensure its success. The primary 
objective was designed as scientific research. Hornemann met different people 
who facilitated his journey. One of them was a Turkish trader who had several 
connections in the provinces of Tripoli and Tunisia. He provided Hornemann 
with valuable advice, including the sentence attributed to him that “Cities of 
Tripoli and Fezzan were the easiest and most guaranteed road to reach central 
Africa”.61 Instead of heeding this advice, Hornemann started his journey from 
Cairo in 1798, passing Siwah Oasis. After crossing the desert of the province of 
Tripoli, he succeeded in reaching both Awjilah and Murzuq, the capital of Fezzan 
in the south of the province.62 He was the first European to set foot in this area.63 
He could provide an accurate description and observations that were considered 
very valuable to the association he worked for.64 His achievement highlighted the 
many opportunities that existed for the Europeans and encouraged other travel-
ers to visit the province of Tripoli in the 19th century. Among those travelers was 
the Italian doctor Paolo Della Cella (1792–?),65 a member of the Italian Scientific 
57 His account was published in ‘Reports’, The Journal of the African Association; see also Kūrū, 
Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd alʿūthmānī  al-thānī, p. 114.
58 Mūrī, al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Lībiyā, p. 9.
59 Ibid.
60 More information about Hornemann is given in Robinson, David and Douglas Smith, Sources 
of the African Past. Case Studies of Five Nineteenth-century African Societies, New York, 1979, p. 126.
61 Mūrī, al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Lībiyā, p. 13.
62 His account was published as Hornemann, Friederich, The Journal of Frederick Horneman’s tra-
vels, from Cairo to Morzouk. The Capital of the Kingdom of Fezzan, in Africa, Bulber, London, 1802.
63 Līyūn, Jūn Frānsīs, Min Ṭarābulis ilā Fazzān mudhakarāt al-raḥḥāla al-injīlīzī Jūn Frānsīs 
Līyūn 1818, translated by Muṣṭafa Jūda, al-Dār al-ʿarabiyya li-l-kitāb, Lībiyā-Tūnis, 1976, p. 179.
64 Mūrī, al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Lībiyā, p. 13.
65 For more details on this author see Silvestri, Daniela, “Della Cella, Paolo”, in Dizionario bio-
grafico degli Italiani, vol. 36, 1988, (translated into German and English in 1822 and in 1823 into 
French).
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Academy. He arrived in Tripoli in 1817,66 followed by others such as the British 
George Francis Lyon (1795–1833) fellow of the Royal Society, and Joseph Ritchie in 
1818.67 On their first journey together into the city of Tripoli68 they were, however, 
more concerned with the central and southern parts of the province. Lyon wrote 
about the strategic and commercial importance of Ghadames.69 Their second 
journey was in the period 1821–1822.70 The British brothers Henry William Beechey 
and Fredrick William Beechey visited Cyrenaica and the central parts of the prov-
ince in 1818. They were followed by R. Pacho, who arrived in Cyrenaica from 
Egypt. In 1835, the British traveler Major Alexander Gordon Laing (1794–1835) 
arrived in Ghadames and remained there for almost two months. From there he 
headed out to the city of Ghat with the aim of reaching central Africa. He traveled 
as far as Timbuktu, but he was killed on his return journey. These travelers/
explorers and semi-spies and their achievements motivated the German officials 
and politicians to explore the province of Tripoli more and more. This also 
prompted the Scientific Academy in Berlin in 1820 to assign Baron Heinrich Menu 
von Minutoli (1772–1846) to lead a mission to Egypt. From there, he decided to 
travel to the eastern part of the province of Tripoli. The mission was well equipped 
and included a number of scientists, artists, archaeologists and others. The 
mission reached the outskirts of Cyrenaica, but the poor security conditions did 
not allow them to complete their journey and they had to return.71 With the begin-
ning of the second half of the century, there was a steady increase in the number 
of missions heading to the province. However, most of them ended in the same 
ca tas trophic way: travelers were often killed by the local people, as happened to 
German traveler Moritz von Beurmann (1835–1863), who visited Sudan and 
decided to travel to Benghazi and Wadai. He wanted to discover the area but was 
killed in Kanem in 1863.72 Other travelers fell ill with transmissible diseases, such 
66 Among his publications see Della Cella, Paolo, Viaggio da Tripoli di Barberia alle frontiere 
occidentali dell’Egito fatto nel 1817 e scritto in lettere al Sig. D. Viviani, Genova, 1819.
67 See Fulford, Tim, Debbie Lee and Peter J. Kitson, Literature, Science and Exploration in a Ro-
mantic Era: Bodies of Knowledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
68 See Lyon, George Francis, A Narrative of Travels in Northern Africa in the Years 1818, 19 and 
20, London, 1821, for Lyon’s own account of these travels.
69 Līyūn, Min Ṭarābulis ilā Fazzān, pp. 127, 129.
70 Mūrī, al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Lībiyā, p. 13.
71 Ibid., p. 32.
72 Nākhtīgāl, Gūstāf, al-Ṣaḥrāʾ wa bilād al-Sūdān, al-mujallad al-awal, al-kitāb al-awal: Ṭarābulis 
wa Fazzān, al-kitāb al-thānī: tībīst ūtū, translated from German into English by ʾ Alin J.B. Fīshr, trans-
lated with an introduction by ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Miḥīshī, rajaʿahu ʿan al-aṣil al-ʿalmānī ʿImād al-Dīn 
Ghānim, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2007, p. 79.
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as the German Leopold von Csillagh (d. 1883), who died of dysentery.73 Other trav-
elers were killed by local people for their money or because the local people did 
not want them to enter into their places, such as the traveler Alexandrine Tinné 
(1835–1869) who was killed by the Tuareg tribe. Other travelers were killed in 
some African kingdoms like Wadai, among them Eduard Vogel. Gerhard Rohlfs 
was attacked several times by local people during his journey to al-Kufra.74 This 
had of course a negative effect on the flow of the European travelers who wanted 
to visit Tripoli and led to these missions being halted for a period of time. Nachti-
gal, however, was granted financial support by the Association for Promoting the 
Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa in London as well as by the Berlin Geograph-
ical Association (Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin). The German government 
tried to get a firman75 from the Ottoman Sultan ʿ Abdul-ʿAzīz in 1878 for his benefit. 
This firman included orders to provide everything Rohlfs needed such as food, 
drinks, livestock and protection by providing a number of men to escort him on 
his journey across the desert.76 Rohlfs was called Muṣṭafa Bey77 by some Ottoman 
officials.78 The Ottoman governors also provided support to him and others like 
Nachtigal when he arrived in Tripoli. He received a recommendation to the 
mutaṣarrīfīyya of the other cities in the province. When he reached Murzuq, he 
received help from the mutaṣarrīf of Fezzan according to the recommendation he 
got from the Qāʾim maqām of the province of Tripoli.79 Quoting from Gerhard 
Rohlfs’s words in his book Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā that 
… One of the missions of the African Association80 was to reach the interior parts of Africa 
starting from North Africa … the association accepted my proposal to study the northern 
parts of the Congo Basin and the surrounding areas … the mission should start from Tripoli 
and passed through al-Kufra which are the best points to cross to these areas.81
73 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 144.
74 Rulfis, Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā, p. 458.
75 A royal decree issued by a sovereign in certain historical Islamic states, especially by the 
Sultan of Turkey (http://www.seslisozluk.net/?word=firman).
76 Rulfis, Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā, p. 42.
77 Bey is a Turkish title given to some governors in the Ottoman Empire, Ṣabān, al-Muʿjam al-
mausuʿi li-l-mṣṭalahat al-ʿūthmānīyyā al-tārīkhiyya, p. 63.
78 Rulfis, Riḥla ilā al-kufrā, pp. 91, 93, 95, 97, 99.
79 Risālā min wakīl Mutaṣarrīf Fazzān ilā Qāʾim maqām wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, 24 Septem-
ber 1885, Wathāʾiq Dār al-māḥafūḍāt al-tārīkhiyya al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrāʾ, Ṭarābulis.
80 He meant the Association for Promoting the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa, also known 
as the African Association.
81 Rulfis, Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā, p. 165; Rohlfs, Gerhard, Kufra: Reise von Tripolis nach der Oase 
Kufra, ausgeführt im Auftrage der Afrikanischen Gesellschaft in Deutschland, Leipzig, 1881.
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The main advantages of starting from the North of Africa were also mentioned by 
Rohlfs.82 
[R]eaching the interior parts of Africa from the Mediterranean had so many advantages that 
cannot be ignored, it could keep the communication with the head quarter of the African
Association and the motherland. If the negligence of the Ottoman was not there one could
keep communications between Tripoli and Berlin so easily using the Telegraph … With
regards to that Tripoli has the easier and quicker possibility to keep communication with
Europe more than Loango Angola.
Rohlfs went further and described Tripoli to be the Germans own old place. 
… It could not be denied that the province of Tripoli could be considered our old place where 
Hornemann started his journey as well as Barth83 who started and ended up his journeys in 
the province of Tripoli...,
in addition to Vogel, von Maltzan84 and Nachtigal85 who started from the province 
of Tripoli his journey to Borgo and Wadai. 
… One of the main advantages of starting from North Africa is that there is good means of 
transportation not like in the other parts … in the north shore where livestock specifically 
camels are used and not the human being.86
Heinrich Barth
He was born in Hamburg in 1821. He visited the province of Tripoli several times 
between 1849 and 1855, starting from the coast, and had various tours in the 
province during which he succeeded in reaching Gharyan, Murzuq, and Ghat. 
He crossed the geographical borders and arrived in Chad and Congo. Barth was 
the first European to visit Adamawa, in 1851, starting his journey from the city 
of Tripoli. The area he visited was between Tripoli in the north to Adamawa and 
Cameroon in the south and from Lake Chad and Bagirmi in the east to Timbuktu 
82 Rulfis, Riḥla ilā al-kufrā, p. 166.
83 Barth, Heinrich, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa, London, 1857.
84 Maltzan, Heinrich von, Reise in den Regentschaften Tunis und Tripolis 1826–1874, Dyk, Leipzig, 
1870.
85 Nachtigal, Gustav, Sahara and Sudan: Tripoli and Fezzan, Tibesti, translated from German 
into English by A. Fisher, vol. 1, Hurst, London, 1974.
86 Rulfis, Riḥla ilā al-kufrā, p. 169.
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in the west.87 Barth provided information about the geography of the province 
and the most important routes that lead to central Africa, among other sorts of 
information. 
Map 6: Barth’s journey to the province of Tripoli
87 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾal-ʿahid alʿuthmānī al-thānī, pp. 142–143.
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Christian Bunsen, the Prussian ambassador to Westminster, suggested the 
appointment of Heinrich Barth, Adolf Overweg (1822–1852), and James Richard-
son to head a scientific mission of the English Association for Promoting the Dis-
covery of Interior Parts of Africa to Central Africa to North Africa in order to build 
up commercial relations with the states in central Africa in 1849. They arrived 
in the city of Tripoli in 1849 and left in 1850. However, the deaths of Richardson 
(March 1851) and Overweg (September 1852), who died of mysterious diseases, 
left Barth to carry on the scientific mission alone. Later, Eduard Vogel (1829–1856) 
was sent by the British government to accompany Barth on his journey. 
Adolf Overweg
Explorations were in many ways’ European endeavors of national or individ-
ual interests. Adolf Overweg, a German explorer, could be an example. Born in 
Hamburg in 1822 he was then a member of the mission sent by the English Asso-
ciation for Promoting the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa to Central Africa, 
the “3-man expedition”. Overweg contracted a mysterious disease and died 
in Maduari (Chad) in 1852. He wrote valuable information on the nature of the 
region, the routes they used and its importance. He also wrote information about 
the vegetation in the area of Kuka in Borno (now Nigeria).88
Eduard Vogel
He was born in Krefeld in 1829 and one of the best-known German travelers who 
came to the province of Tripoli. He worked for the British government. He had great 
knowledge in the fields of botany and astronomy, which helped him to find new 
information about the geography of the region. In 1853, Vogel left Tripoli with 
a caravan to provide supplies to the Barth expedition. Vogel used the trans-Saha-
ran trade route to arrive in Kuka in Borno in 1854. He visited many places in this 
province such as ‘Ayn Zara, Tarhuna, Bani Walid, Sawkanh, Murzuq and others. 
His reports directly contributed to cataloguing the geographical qualities of the 
province.89
88 Nachtigal, Gustav, Sahara und Sudan: Ergebnisse sechsjähriger Reisen in Afrika, Erster Theil, 
Berlin, 1879, p. 7.
89 Fīru, al-Ḥawlīyyāt al-lībiyyā, p. 489; Mūrī, al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Lībiyā, pp. 
57, 59.
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Gerhard Rohlfs
He  was born in Vegesack, now part of Bremen, in 1831. He studied medicine but 
did not finish his studies, preferring to travel around Europe. He also traveled 
to Algeria, where he worked as a doctor.90 This was his first connection to North 
Africa. His first journey was limited to Morocco and Algeria, but he attracted the 
attention of August Peterman, a German geographer, one of the most famous 
of the 19th century. He was interested in collecting geographical information for 
drawing maps of Africa. He encouraged Rohlfs to continue in this field. Rohlfs 
was the second European traveler to visit the region of the Draa River in the south 
of Morocco. Their efforts were later supported by the Berlin Geographical Society, 
the British Royal Geographical Society, and the Senate of Bremen, which pro-
vided them financial support and equipped the mission with all the necessary 
resources. For his work and the information that he provided, he was awarded the 
Patron’s Medal of the Royal Geographical Society of London in 1868. Rohlfs began 
his journey from Oran toward Tangier and then took the route toward the interior 
of the country. He crossed the Atlas Mountains to reach ‘Ayn Salih. From there, he 
took the road between Ghadames and the western mountains to reach the city of 
Tripoli. He was the first European to cross Africa from Tripoli, passing through the 
Sahara Desert to Lake Chad and along the Niger River in 1865–1867 (now Lagos on 
the Gulf of Guinea). Rohlfs’ trips to the city of Tripoli were very productive, mainly 
because he used new routes and provided valuable information about the region. 
This granted him the confidence and support of those who were interested in his 
activities, which is why he returned to Tripoli in 1865. Moreover, he was widely 
welcomed in different communities in Tripoli as he created contacts with dif-
ferent merchants, consuls, government officials.91 Rohlfs’ journey heralded the 
beginning of German interest in discovering the city of Tripoli. Although his first 
journey focused on collecting geographical information, he also became inter-
ested in the politics of the region and collected information on this aspect as well. 
It is worth mentioning that Rohlfs was in direct contact with the King of Prussia 
and obtained his consent to start his exploratory activities.
90 Rulfis, Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā, pp. 21, 26.
91 Ibid., p. 39.
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Map 7: Rohlfs journey to al-Kufra in the province of Tripoli
Rohlfs’ second journey started from the city of Tripoli, from which he headed 
first to Ghadames and then went on to Mizdah and Fezzan. He traveled along the 
road of Wadi al-Shati and reached Murzuq, where he met Moḥammad al-Kaṭronī, 
the guide who had accompanied the traveler Heinrich Barth on his journey. 
Al-Kaṭronī provided great help and support to many German travelers such as 
Barth, Rohlfs and Nachtigal, as they mentioned in their writings.92 Al-Kaṭronī was 
an expert who knew the routes and his experience helped them a great deal. In 
92 Ibid.
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addition, his knowledge and contact with the local people helped them to avoid 
many problems that faced earlier travelers. Rohlfs remained in Murzuq, which 
was an important trade center and the capital of the mutaṣarrīfīyya Fezzan,93 until 
1866. Then he continued his journey toward central Africa and reached Mandara 
in Cameroon. He was accompanied by Moḥammad al-Kaṭronī, but when Rohlfs 
decided to travel to the Gulf of Guinea, Moḥammad al-Kaṭronī decided to return to 
Fezzan. Rohlfs then reached the English colony of Lokogh in Niger where he was 
welcomed by the English who wanted to take advantage of his presence among 
them by involving him in some transactions with the leaders of the African tribes, 
due to his experience in dealing with them. He succeeded in completing the tasks 
assigned to him. He then continued to Lagos and from there took an English ship 
to Liverpool, ending a journey that had lasted two years.94 Rohlfs returned to the 
province of Tripoli in 1867, 1868, and 1869 but this time he was commissioned 
directly by the Prussian King Wilhelm II and the Chancellor Bismarck. They 
requested him to deliver gifts from the King of Prussia to Sultan Omar al-Kanmī 
in Borno. Rohlfs’ journeys to Tripoli did not stop there. In 1873–1874 he returned 
to the region, this time selecting the desert for his explorations. He managed to 
attract a number of German scientists who were interested in this area to travel 
with him, and was accompanied by Karl Alfred Ritter von Zittel, a German pale-
ontologist, and the botanist Paul Friedrich August Ascherson. Rohlfs also brought 
a photographer called Remeleto to document the stages of his journey.95 The last 
of Rohlfs’ journeys to the province of Tripoli was in 1878–1879, when he visited 
al-Kufra and many other places in the central parts of the province. He left lengthy 
accounts summarizing the geography, nature and agriculture in these regions.96 
He also wrote important notes regarding customs and traditions, health, and 
trade in Tripoli in general.97 Rohlfs had the capacity and skills that enabled him 
to achieve great success in collecting information about the province, which 
made it easier for him to write many documents and books that were used by the 
king and the chancellor when making decisions and convincing politicians.98 The 
findings of his journeys were significant for the development of German policy 
93 Nākhtīgāl, al-Ṣaḥrāʾ wa bilād al-Sūdān, p. 52.
94 Rulfis, Ghīrhārd, Riḥla ʿabar Afrīqiyā mushāhadāt al-raḥḥāla al-ʿalmānī Rulfis fī Lībiyā wa 
Burnu wa Khalīj Ghīnīya 1865–1867, dirāsa wa tarjama ʿImād al-Dīn Ghānim, markaz jihād al-
lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1996, pp. 46, 48; Rohlfs, Gerhard, Quer durch Afrika: 
Reise vom Mittelmeer nach dem Tschad-See und zum Golf von Guinea, Leipzig, 1874–1875.
95 Rulfis, Riḥla ʿabar Afrīqiyā mushāhadāt al-raḥḥāla al-ʿalmānī Rulfis fī Lībiyā, p. 60.
96 Rohlfs, Von Tripolis nach Alexandrien, pp. 63, 78.
97 Rulfis, Riḥlaʿabar Afrīqiyā mushāhadāt al-raḥḥāla al-ʿalmānī Rulfis fī Lībiyā, pp. 265, 321.
98 Rulfis, Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā, p. 164–165.
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toward the province of Tripoli, especially given his good relations with the Prus-
sian king and the chancellor. His proximity to decision-makers gave his opinion 
more weight than otherwise and qualified him to carry out many political tasks at 
different stages. Rohlfs submitted a request to the king to send a German consul 
to the province of Tripoli. He also had a certain vision concerning the eastern part 
of the province and he proposed it as a convenient place for settling European 
immigrants. Finally, the information that he supplied and his own views about 
the province of Tripoli were formative in awarding it a particular status as German 
policy in Africa was set. He mentioned that Tripoli is the “Key to Africa”. He died 
in Germany in 1896.99
Heinrich von Maltzan
He was born in Dresden in 1826. Interested in the geographical features of North 
Africa, he was also known as an orientalist scholar, writer and poet. His first 
journey to Morocco in 1852–1853 was only exploratory. His second journey was 
to Tunisia, from where he decided to travel to the province of Tripoli in 1869 to 
conduct scientific research. He contacted the Austrian consul, Luigi Rossi (well 
known to the natives under the name Jiji),100 who was responsible for the German 
residents in the province of Tripoli and asked him to provide the needed security 
measures for his journey and to facilitate his mission, which took place.101 The 
most important aspects of von Maltzan’s journeys to the province of Tripoli can 
be seen in his interest in the social life of people, including traditions and norms, 
using a scientific methodological research. He wrote also about the German 
inhabitants in the province of Tripoli and the poor treatment that they received at 
the hands of the Ottoman government there. He did not have any political orien-
tations or colonial aspirations, as he came independently and was not supported 
by the German Geographical Association or any other association.102
99 Rulfis, Riḥla ʿabar Afrīqiyā mushāhadāt al-raḥḥāla al-ʿalmānī Rulfis fī Lībiyā, p. 29.
100 See Gustav Nachtigal, translated by Allan G.B. Fisher and Humphrey J. Fisher, Sahara and 
Sudan: Tripoli and Fezzan, Tibesti, C. Hurst & Co, London, 1974, p. 17. This consul “was no career 
consul, but a merchant, born in Trieste; he had spent almost his whole life in Tripoli, and was 
familiar, as few are, with the country and its people”.
101 Māltisān, Fī riḥāb Ṭarābulis wa Tūnis, pp. 13, 34; Maltzan, Reise in den Regentschaften Tunis 
und Tripolis 1826–1874.
102 Maltzan, Reise in den Regentschaften Tunis und Tripolis 1826–1874.
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Gustav Nachtigal
He was born in 1834 in Eichstedt, in the Prussian province of Saxony-Anhalt. He 
was a German doctor who had completed his medical studies at Halle University 
and his job was the reason for his presence in the North African region, which 
he first visited in 1862 while recovering from a lung infection. In 1863 he worked 
as a doctor in Tunisia and later started his exploratory activities.103 He was then 
selected by von Maltzan and Gerhard Rohlfs to deliver the gifts from Prussia to the 
Sultan of Borno.104 He spent more than five years on a journey started from the 
city of Tripoli which led him to the middle and interior parts of the Sahara and 
eventually to Borno.105 Nachtigal obtained the help of the Ottoman authorities 
in the province of Tripoli to facilitate his journey toward Borno. This is indicated 
in an Ottoman document sent by the mutaṣarrīfīyya of Fezzan to the governor of 
the province of Tripoli. The mutaṣarrīf informed the governor that he had pro-
vided Nachtigal with the needed assistance when he arrived at Murzuq. Orders 
were given by the government of the province to provide all the assistance needed 
to facilitate this journey.106 It is noteworthy that he reached some areas which 
had not been visited previously by any other European travelers. These included 
the Tibesti Mountains107 and this achievement was recorded under his name. He 
wrote about health conditions, diseases and how the local people dealt with them 
in the southern areas of the province of Tripoli.
103 Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, p. 1.
104 Ibid.
105 Rūsi, Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī, p. 396.
106 Wathīqā 4189, Wathāʾiq Dār al-māḥafūḍāt al-tārīkhiyya al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrā, Ṭarābulis.
107 Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, pp. 34–35.
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Map 8: Nachtigal’s journey in the province of Tripoli
Gottlob Adolf Krause
He was born in 1850 in Ockrilla near Meissen. His journey, which started in 
1868, was distinctive from those of other travelers. It took place in the context of 
broader European efforts to colonize many parts of Africa. German colonies had 
already been established in the center of the continent, such as Togo, Cameroon 
and other countries. In addition, he spent a relatively long period of time in the 
region compared with other travelers who visited North Africa.108 He first visited 
West Africa, and then the province of Tripoli in the period between 1868 and 1869, 
when he was 18 years old. He met Gustav Nachtigal there. He succeeded in reach-
ing Murzuq and returned to the city of Tripoli, then returned to Germany, having 
108 Krawzā, Taqārīr Ghūtlūb Adūlf Krawzā al-ṣaḥafīyya, p. 34.
German Travelers in the Province of Tripoli   95
decided to continue his studies, focusing on geographical discovery. It is worth 
mentioning that Gustav Nachtigal was interested in his work, which is why he 
asked the German Geographical Association to support him. The association pro-
vided him with financial support on his second journey to the province of Tripoli 
in 1872, where he stayed until 1882 before visiting West Africa.109 His last journey 
to the province of Tripoli was between 1907 and 1912. He witnessed the Italian 
invasion and wrote reports to a German magazine about what was happening and 
what the Italians were doing there.110 A competent linguist, Krause developed his 
Arabic language skills until he was able to study a manuscript on history of the 
mutaṣarrīfīyya of Fezzan. This was considered a significant academic achieve-
ment. He was also interested in the Hausa language, which drew the attention of 
the Academy of Sciences in Berlin, which awarded him financially for his scien-
tific efforts unequaled by any other German traveler.111
Ewald Banse
He was born in 1883 in Braunschweig and was chiefly known as a geographer.112 
He started his journeys when he was very young. He visited the province of 
Tripoli for the first time in 1906–1907. Gustav Nachtigal advised him to go back 
to Germany and finish his education first. He followed this advice, remaining in 
Germany for two more years before returning to the province of Tripoli in May 
1909, where he stayed until the end of the year. His third journey was in 1911, 
when he experienced the Italian occupation of the province.113 The geographer 
Banse learned Arabic and resided in the province to understand its nature and 
how to deal with the local people. He also drew many maps of the city of Tripoli 
and took photographs of many areas. He drew a plan of the old city and included 
the recently constructed streets and modern buildings. He was the first traveler 
109 Ibid., pp. 29, 33, 52.
110 Sebald, Peter, Malam Musa/G.A. Krause 1850–1938. Forscher Wissenschaftler Humanist, 
Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1972, p. 37.
111 Ibid.
112 Uhden, Richard: Ewald Banse, Westermanns Monatshefte, Bd. 138, 1925, p. 73–76. See also 
Lammers, Uwe, “Sieben Leben”, Technische Universität Braunschweig: Seminar für Philoso-
phie, 2015, (electronically published January 23, 2015).
113 Banzā, Ifāld, Ṭarābulis maṭlaʿ al-qarn al-ʿaishrīn fī waṣif al-jughrāfī al-ʿalmānī Ifāld Banzā, 
translated and studied by ʿ Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, 
Ṭarābulis, 1998, pp. 21, 27.
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who used cars and trains, during his last journey in 1914.114 It is worth empha-
sizing the role played by some local people who helped and supported many 
German travelers such as Moḥammad al-Kaṭronī and his son Ali who accompa-
nied Barth, Rohlfs and Nachtigal. In addition to al-Kaṭronī, another man, Ṣalaḥ 
Ibn ʿAbd al-llāh al-Faẓanī, accompanied Banse on his journeys. In short, these 
travelers had a major role in drawing the attention of the German political lead-
ership toward the province of Tripoli and highlighting its economic, political and 
strategic importance. Through their writings and explorative research, the prov-
ince of Tripoli was viewed as an important center of trade and a bridgehead to 
cross toward central Africa. 
3.2  Trade between Germany and the Province of Tripoli
Trade was one of the most important pillars of the relationship between the prov-
ince of Tripoli and Europe. It constituted a linking point between the north and 
the south. The trade between the province of Tripoli and Germany in the period 
between 1884 and 1909 was important. The real development of trade between 
the two sides reached a significant volume in 1884, when German exports to 
Tripoli amounted to a total of £ 15.000. This level was the same in 1885. This infor-
mation is stated in documents in the German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv) 
amongst the reports written by the British consul to Tripoli.115 In terms of total 
exports of the province of Tripoli to Germany, exports were estimated at £ 4.000 
in 1886. Although this value was not enormous in comparison with other Euro-
pean countries, it gives a clear signal about trading traffic at that time.116 The 
Industrial Revolution in Europe led the European powers to seek new markets for 
their products. Also, in 1845, details were given on types and amounts of specific 
products. For instance, sponge in the value of 192.000 lira was exported.117 These 
statistics are limited to the business operations in the port of the city of Tripoli. 
The report by the British consul in the province of Tripoli included significant data 
about the volume of trade exchange between this place and Germany and shows 
that the volume of trade fluctuated. As stated in the report that Germany was 
114 Banzā, Ṭarābulis maṭlaʿ al-qarn al-ʿaishrīn, p. 25.
115 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 
bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. ІІ 22970/02.1901.
116 Ibid.
117 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das 
Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, R901/52458.
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ranked the sixth in the list of countries exporting to and importing from Tripoli. 
However, trade volume sometimes declined and at other times increased. To give 
an example, in the years 1888 and 1889, German trade volume fell to seventh 
place, as the report from the British consul indicated. German trade volume 
also declined in 1893 and 1894, Germany was then ranked the eighth with trade 
volume reaching £ 7.000 and £ 4.000 respectively. In return, Germany exported 
more to the province of Tripoli than it imported from there. In 1893, export value 
was estimated at £ 16.000, then showed a remarkable increase in 1894, when it 
reached £ 27.500118 and reached £ 29.000 in 1895.119 Germany also imported some 
tripolitanian goods, for instance the amount of imports in 1895 amounted to only 
£ 4.000 which was too small compared to the amount of German exports in the 
same year mentioned above. To highlight the volume of trade from 1895 to 1901 
table 5 below120 summarizes the value of German exports to the province of Tripoli 
during the period 1884–1909 in pounds sterling.
Table 5: Value of German import from Tripoli (1884–1909)








The value of exports of Germany to the province of Tripoli amounted to 50.000 
golden francs in 1902, then in 1903 increased to reach 720.000 golden francs (cur-
rency as stated in the document). This encouraged the German consul in Malta 
to submit a proposal to his government indicating the need to create a direct 
line with the province of Tripoli starting from Hamburg. At the same time, he 
118 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 
bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. ІІ 11590.   
119 BuIbid., Nr. 27611/96.
120 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 
bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. ІІ 22970/02.1901.
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explained how this could increase German trade with the province.121 Moreover, 
it is stated in a document written by the British consul that the city of Benghazi 
had received two German steamships in its harbor in 1902. The weight of their 
goods was 1878 tons. This line was always used by the German transport ships.122 
During 1903, fifteen German steamships docked at the port of Tripoli. Their cargo 
was estimated at 16.026 tons. However, in the following year, the volume of trade 
declined to only twelve steamships carrying an estimated 13.140 tons.123 In 1905124 
Tripoli received only five steamships carrying what estimated to be 4936 tons only 
which included various commercial goods the province of Tripoli imported from 
Germany. The following table125 illustrates German exports in the period 1903–
1906 with values estimated.
Table 6: Amount of German exports to the province of Tripoli (1903–1906) in kilogram
Type 1903 1904 1905 1906
Tea 3.280 3.840 5.320 210.000
Iron 2.200 – 3.000 12.000
Wool 1.840 No available data 960 –
Silk 1.000 740 920 –
Leather 240 No available data126 800 12.000
Gold and silver 1.900 – 400 4.000
Chemical and medicine 640 – 480 30.000
Glass and china earthenware 200 – 880 7.000
Alcohol 120 – – –
Sugar – 1.600 – –
Hardware store (Khardowat) – 600 320 87.000
Rope for ships – 640 640 –
Soap – – 80 –
Paper – – 320 –
121 Wathīqā 353, Taqrīr al-qunṣul al-ʿalmānī fī Mālṭa 31/12/1905, ʿImād al-Dīn Ghānim, “al-
Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā”, p. 46.
122 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 2, vom 16. Okto-
ber 1904 bis Dezember 1909, R901/4411, Nr. II 3021/8.
123 Ibid., Nr. II 22579/05, pp. 5–6.
124 Ibid., Nr. II w 5828/07.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., Nr. II 22579/05, pp. 5–6.
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Machine – – 440 –
Colour – – 1.120 –
Cotton textile – – – 60.000
Other – – 880127 20.000128
Starting from 1907 to 1909 it is noted in another report by the French consul in the 
province that there had been an increase in the number of ships arriving there. 
In 1907 there were seven ships heading toward the port of Benghazi, with cargo 
estimated at about 8617 tons. The number increased to ten ships, with an estima-
ted cargo of 14.237 tons, in 1908.129 This contributed directly to the strengthening 
of the status of German trade among other countries involved in trade relations 
with the province. Germany then ranked fourth place on the list. The diversifi-
cation of imports from the province of Tripoli was behind this development. The 
imports were focused on two key types of goods: first, livestock which included 
cows, goats, sheep, foxes and rabbits in addition to poultry, pigeons and others, 
plus leather. The second important type of goods was the sponge.130 The growing 
trade between Germany and the Tripoli prompted some German trade institu-
tions to report to the chancellor on their activities. One of these institutions was 
the German Chamber of Commerce (Zentralstelle für Vorbereitung von Handels-
verträgen). The German Chamber of Commerce, in their reports to the govern-
ment, confirmed the importance of German trade with the province of Tripoli, 
and alerted the government that the volume of trade was not as sizeable as that 
of other countries, thus trying to encourage the government to develop this field. 
The reports also emphasized the need to take advantage of the business tran-
sactions and sea routes that already existed there. This was especially true after 
the Ottoman Empire applied a unified customs system, like all European coun-
tries had.131 Of course, the German Chamber of Commerce was not isolated from 
the ongoing political events in Europe, and was well aware of the Italian efforts 
to control the province of Tripoli; they also noted the colonial development of 
the French presence. Therefore, the German Chamber of Commerce warned the 
German chancellor that, if positive and practical efforts to strengthen German 
127 Ibid., Nr. II w 5828/07.
128 Ibid. 
129 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 2, vom 16. Okto-
ber 1904 bis Dezember 1909, R901/4411, Nr. II o 3449/09.  
130 Ibid., Nr. II o 4196/09.
131 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das 
Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 1, vom Juli 1869 bis Oktober 1888, A.Z.14524/99, Juni 1899, 
Zentral stelle für Vorbereitung von Handelsverträgen, R901/52508.
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trade with this province were not undertaken, the situation would be difficult, 
especially given any new political changes in the region. The report presented 
Tunisia as an example of the deterioration of German trade that had occurred 
since France had taken control of the markets there.132 The report mentioned 
above referred to an important point regarding the connection between politics 
and economy, stressing that the success of German trade related primarily to its 
policies. The report further requested the government take a firm position on this 
subject, and explained that if Germany agreed on the occupation of France or Italy 
of the province of Tripoli then the country should enforce strict conditions to ensure 
its rights and to trade with the province to protect its interests.133 Among the measu-
res demanded by the German consul in Valetta named Tushar,134 was the establish-
ment of a German bank in the city of Tripoli. This was supposed to be a step forward 
in developing economic relations between the two sides. Moreover, because of the 
importance of this step, the consul insisted repeatedly that his governmentopen 
the bank.135 The government responded to these calls effectively and established a 
German bank in the city of Tripoli in 1905,136 known as the Hans Bank.137 However, 
there is not much information about its activities or what happened to the bank. 
3.3  The German Consulate in the Province of Tripoli
Many international political powers were represented in Tripoli, especially those 
powers with which the province of Tripoli had strong economic relations. Accord-
ingly, there were representatives there from different European states and cities 
as well as representatives from Arabic and other Ottoman provinces that had 
political or economic interests in the province, such as Tunis.138 The consuls were 
132 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 
bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. 16857, 17. Juni 1899.
133 Ibid.
134 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das 
Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 10, vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. Dezember 1908, 12. Februar 
1907, R16115.
135 Wathīqā 25, Mursala min al-qunṣul al-ʿalmānī fī Vālītā ilā al-khārijīyyā al-ʿalmānīyya, 
23/5/1905, Wathāʾiq al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī, al-ʿalmānī bi-al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa 
al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis; Wathīqā 86, Mursala min al-qunṣul al-ʿalmānī fī Vālītā ilā 
al-khārijīyyā al-ʿalmānīyya, 31/12/1905, Wathāʾiq al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī, al-ʿalmānī bi-al-markaz al-
waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis.
136 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī  al-thānī, p. 80.
137 Kākiyā, Lībiyā fī al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī 1835–1911, p. 114.
138 Abīd, Munīr, “al-Inʿikāsāt al-mādiyya li-nashāṭ al-tujjār al-tūnisiyyīn bi-Binghāzī min khilāl 
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considered observers of the situations in the country or province to which they 
had been sent because they were close to both the situation within the country 
and the political administration. Most of the European countries had opened 
consulates in the Ottoman Empire’s provinces, including Tripoli. For instance, 
Austria had had a consulate since the 17th century to take care of the Austrians 
and the Germans in Tripoli prior to the opening of the German consulate.139 The 
German diplomatic representation was established late compared to other Euro-
pean countries because of the internal political situation in Germany at that time. 
Before the German consulate was established, the Austrian consul was assigned 
to protect the citizens of what was called the Union of North Germany, supervised 
by Prussia. However, there were signs that some German citizens in the prov-
ince140 were under the protection of the British consulate, as well, and sometimes 
the Italian, but this was only temporary. This was revealed when some German 
travelers arrived seeking protection or requiring letters of recommendations. 
They would contact different consuls depending on the benefits that they could 
gain. For instance, when Gustav Nachtigal was in this place contacted the Aus-
trian consulate,141 while Rohlfs sought protection from the Italian consulate.142 
Some Germans decided to be the ‘protection’ under some European consulates 
according to their personal and economic interests. The Austrian consulate was 
supposed to provide protection to the German citizens in the province of Tripoli; 
this was stated in the agreement between the two parties signed on December 6, 
1891. This agreement included many aspects, among them the commercial and 
political interests of both parties. Thus, the Austrian consulate carried out the 
necessary transactions for German citizens in the provinces where there was no 
German consulate and vice versa. All consuls were obliged to realize this agree-
ment.143 The consulate of France in the province of Tripoli was founded in 1630, 
in the first phase of Ottoman rule in this region. The English consulate was estab-
lished in the Ottoman province Algeria in 1585 and supervised both the English 
and Maltese communities as Malta was then subject to the English Crown. This 
baʿḍ al-tarikāt wa ʿalā ḍaūʾ rasāʾil wukalāʾ al-īyālā al-tūnīsīyya bihā”, aʿmāl al-muʾtamar al-awal 
li-l-wathāʾiq wa-l-makhṭūṭāt fī Lībiyā wāqiʿuhā wa afāq al-ʿamal ḥaulahā, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn 
li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya wa-kulīyyāt al-ʿādāb Zilītin, 1992, pp. 1242–1243.
139 Ghānim, ʿImād al-Dīn, al-Biʿthā al-ʿalmānīyya ilā Lībiyā 1912 wa mashafāhā fī Ghiryān, mar-
kaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2001, p. 13.
140 Māltisān, Fī riḥāb Ṭarābulis wa Tūnis, p. 34.
141 Ghānim wa Shlūtir, “al-Qunṣuliyya al-ʿalmānīyya fī Ṭarābulis”, p. 5.
142 Rulfis, Riḥla ʿabar Afrīqiyā mushāhadāt al-raḥḥāla al-ʿalmānī Rulfis, p. 65.
143 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 1, 
vom Juni 1881 bis 22. Februar 1883, Nr. Іc 8548/11, 31. Mai 1910, R16106.
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was after they signed an agreement cornering trade and diplomatic representa-
tion, which provided them an opportunity to be in Morocco. Britain also estab-
lished a consulate with Samuel Toker as the first British consul in 1658 after 
signing an agreement with the ruling government in the province of Tripoli in July 
1658.144 The British consul Warrington was responsible for number of citizens of 
different European countries, including Austria, from 1814 until 1826, as well as 
Hannover, Portugal, Sardinia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and others.145 
With regard to Spain, it signed an agreement with the province of Tripoli on Sep-
tember 10, 1784 identifying the political and trade foundations, with the first 
Spanish consul then appointed.146 Italy had also opened a consulate in the prov-
ince of Tripoli in 1861.147 The Netherlands, the United States and Tuscany also 
opened consulates. Tuscany also signed an agreement between the Pasha in the 
province of Tripoli and the Lord Aksmot when he visited in 1816. It was agreed to 
open a consulate to be managed by consul Warrington, and this lasted until 1822 
when the Tuscan consul took over consular functions.148 German diplomatic rep-
resentation in the province of Tripoli was not like the other European countries, 
since it had passed through two main stages: first with its establishment as a con-
sular agency, but not a full consulate, and then when the diplomatic representa-
tion was developed into a consulate. Many questions from German travelers, 
traders and politicians arose that questioned Germany’s presence in the province 
of Tripoli. These included the opening of a consulate there, the fate of German 
merchants there and the protection for them and their businesses? Gerhard 
Rohlfs had officially addressed his government in 1865 about the need for polit-
ical representation in Tripoli and he expressly referred to the strong presence of 
other Europeans through their consuls. He mentioned that he personally asked 
some of them to ensure the protection of his journey and he thought this should 
be performed by his country. He also made a proposal to be the consul there.149 
He repeated his request several times supported by many factors, one of them 
his realization of the importance of the province and its characteristics, which 
he knew well, in addition to his strong relations with the Prussian King Wilhelm, 
who was informed personally about his journeys.150 But what was the govern-
144 Fīru, al-Ḥawlīyyāt al-lībiyyā mindhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī, pp. 157, 537.
145 ʾUghlī, “al-Maṣādir al-mutaʿaliqa bi Lībiyā”, p. 57.
146 Rūsi, Lībiyā mundhu al-fatḥ alʿarabī, p. 306.
147 al-Abyaḍ, Rajab, Ṭarābulis al-ghārb fī kitābāt al-raḥḥāla khilāl al-qarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashar al-
mīlādī, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2009, p. 267.
148 Ḥasan, al-Yawamiyyāt al-lībiyyā, p. 298.
149 Ghānim wa Shlūtir, “al-Qunṣuliyya al-ʿalmānīyya fī Ṭarābulis”, p. 5.
150 Rulfis, Riḥla ʿabar Afrīqiyā, p. 50.
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ment’s attitude toward these views? There was a clear discrepancy between the 
government’s position and their individual demands to establish the consulate. 
The government considered the time not yet suitable, and that the number of mer-
chants in the province of Tripoli was insufficient to justify opening a consulate. 
The arguments of the opposing party emphasized the historical evidence including 
the growth of commercial exchange between Germany and the province of Tripoli, 
which required diplomatic representative of the two sides. At that time Germany 
was ranked fourth after Britain, France and Austria in terms of their exports to the 
province of Tripoli. Before 1884, Gustav Nachtigal mentioned, the hanseatic cities 
and other German states were represented by Rossi, the official representation of 
the British consul.151 The province of Tripoli was viewed by Germany as a gate for 
the transport of German goods to central Africa, where Germany had established 
a political presence by the end of the 19th century.152 As part of Bismarck’s more 
outward looking policies at the time, the government agreed to open a consular 
agency in 1884.153 Rather than a German, the person selected as deputy consul was 
Aghido Rossi, the son of Luigi Rossi, who was also Austria’s consul in Tripoli. Rossi 
received his position informally, from the German Kaiser, on January 13, 1884 and 
began his work from that date.154 However, the consular agency was not opened 
until February of that year and it was not until January 15, 1885 that he took the oath 
of the office and had the responsibilities assigned to him.155
Votre Altesse a bien voulu m adresser sous date du 14 fevrier de l annee derniere, qui accom-
pagnait le diplôme de sa Majeste l Empereur, en vertue duquel a daigne gracieusement me 
nommer au poste de Vice Consul de l Empire Allemand a Tripoli.156
Aghido Rossi owned a company in the province of Tripoli which was working in 
trade. He sought to be different, and he asked a German factory to produce a special 
flag for his company.157 The consular agency building was located in the old city, but 
its location has not been identified exactly. The German traveler Krause referred to it 
as being close to but outside the city wall, probably in the newly constructed quarter, 
like the consulate of the United States of America and the Austro-Hungarian consu-
151 Nachtigal, Gustav, Sahara and Sudan: Tripoli and Fezzan, Tibesti, translated from German 
into English by A. Fisher, vol. 1, Hurst, London, 1974, p. 18.
152 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 57.
153 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Nr. 3687.
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late. In other words, it was located in the area of Bab al-Bahar, near to the Draghot 
mosque,158 while other information indicates that it was located in the Rabad, in 
the western part of the city.159 Aghido Rossi continued as the German deputy consul 
until 1897 when he was removed from office due to complaints about lack of trans-
parency and accusations of corruption. The complaint was presented by a certain 
Haller, who resided in Stettin (which belonged to the Germany territories at that 
time), and owned a factory that produced flags. He submitted his complaints to 
the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that Aghido Rossi had not paid the 
debts owed. This included payment for the flag they had produced for his compa-
ny.160 Ernsto Labi was assigned as deputy consul in the province of Tripoli on 
December 24, 1897.161 He was also not German, but belonged to a Jewish family 
from the province of Tripoli that was well known as they were politicians and 
merchants. The German Kaiser Wilhelm appointed Labi deputy consul because of 
his good reputation and qualifications required for the position. Moreover, there 
had been no deputy consul at this period of time.162 On April 12th, 1898, the inau-
gural confirmation was made by the Ottoman Empire approving him as the 
German deputy consul in the province of Tripoli.163 In the same year he took the 
oaths to exercise his new functions.164 He was also the consular agent for Belgium 
in the province.165 Ernsto Labi em bodi ed the new way to be a consul in the new 
context of the latest Ottoman provinces of North Africa between the British and the 
French consuls, in competition for more control over the Ottoman land from the 
East (Egypt) the West (Tunis) and the South (Sudan, Chad, Mali, and Algeria). This 
is why Labi prioritized the documentation of political information and events as the 
other European consuls did. This was revealed in his reports to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Germany. All the information he documented contained both 
commercial and the political events. He wrote all correspondences in French. And 
the British National Archive mentioned that – he speaks and writes Italian fluently 
and has a fair knowledge of French and Arabic… He is a liberal minded – as it had 
158 Ghānim, wa Shlūtir, “al-Qunṣuliyya al-ʿalmānīyya fī Ṭarābulis”, p. 12.
159 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, p. 82.
160 Ibid., p. 82.
161 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Nr. 
296269−7, R901/52508.
162 Ibid.; see as well National Archive, Series Foreign Archive, Kew Garden, London, FO 195-
1082, Tripoli Dept. 1890. 
163 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Nr. 
9245, R901/52508. 
164 Ibid.
165 Ghānim, ʿAmalīyyat al-ghūwaṣāt al-ʿalmānīyya, p. 19.
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been used in foreign affairs since the 17th century, which was a source of some 
tension in the late 19th century with other German politicians, who argued that he 
should write in German.166 Other complaints by Hans Banks and German citizens 
residing in the province of Tripoli include the accusation that he was neglecting 
them and he was not taking care of German interests as he did for the Italians, 
and was not doing the required tasks properly.167 These complaints were submit-
ted by Hans Banks who ran the German shipping company in Tripoli. The German 
documents indicate that the complaint from Banks contained information about 
the negligence of the deputy consul and that their situations were getting worse 
day by day. They believed that the German government was indifferent to their 
needs and they stressed that this was not the first time these concerns had been 
raised. Banks added that the German consulate in Tunisia was also neglecting 
them and provided information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Labi had 
opened a new branch of an Italian company called the Navigazione Generale Ital-
iana.168 This new company enabled the Italian ships on the coast of the province 
of Tripoli to sale to the coast. Banks believed that this might cause serious damage 
to German trade. He also explained that Labi was also supervising the Italian 
consulate in the province of Tripoli and he argued that was why he did not 
honestly encourage and protect German trade and activities. Furthermore, he did 
not meet the German citizens personally and listen to their problems or demands, 
but left it to the employees of the consular agency.169 Despite these complaints, 
Labi continued in his position until 1908. However, the complaints mentioned 
above had strengthened the demands of those insisting on appointing a German 
citizen to this position. Padel, the general German consul in Beirut, stressed that 
these demands were completely false and lacking facts and evidence. However, 
as the result of these complaints, Labi requested to be removed from the position. 
Thus, von Bari, of the German Consul General in the province of Tripoli, had to 
transfer Labi’s responsibilities to Albert Altmann.170 Altmann held the military 
166 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das 
Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 10, vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. Dezember 1908, R16115, Nr. 
A1965301, 1907.
167 Wathīqā 16032, Wathāʾiq al-ʾarshif al-ʿalmānī, 14.12.1907, mawajūda bi-shuʾbat al-wathāʾiq 
al-ajnabīyya, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis.
168 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das 
Kaiserliche Deutsche Vizekonsulat in Tripolis, Bd. 10, vom 16. August bis 31. Dezember 1908, 
R16115, Nr. A1965301.
169 Ibid.  
170 Politisches Archiv, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, November 1909 Konsulat, 
Bd. 6, Mai 1909 bis Dezember 1909, R141611.
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rank of captain. He was appointed consul on April 2, 1908, during a period in 
which the Ottomans were trying to resist European expansion by increasing mod-
ernization in the region.171 The documents of the German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs state that, in accordance with a letter sent by Altmann personally, he had 
accepted the position and was assuming his responsibilities onthe same date 
mentioned above. However, he did not receive the approval of the Ottoman gov-
ernment. Altmann was the deputy consul of the Reich172 and the first report he 
sent to the deputy of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated May 26, 1908.173 
By September 1908, he had received the approval of the Ottoman Empire.174 
Albert Altmann was a businessman who had business interests in the province of 
Tripoli, where he was living. He was also one of the people who complained about 
Labi. He was observed to have performed the consulate tasks in an effective way 
and he wrote all reports in the German language. He provided in his report’s 
rich information about the major projects in the province175 and emphasized the 
importance of the province of Tripoli for German trade. He also suggested estab-
lishing a direct shipping line between Germany and Tripoli in order tooppose 
the French, British and Italian monopolies in the Mediterranean Sea. However, 
there were also many complaints against him. There was a report issued by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin at that time that stated that the Germans in 
the province of Tripoli were not satisfied when he was the consul and that they 
suggested the government send a representative to visit them and explore their 
situations and to appoint someone else.176 Altman himself did not hide his dis-
satisfaction. In one of his correspondences he indicated that the officials in the 
province of Tripoli did not want to deal with him on the pretense that he had 
been assigned to the position only temporarily.177 Altman continued in these 
171 For more details on this period and on the discussion of modernisation see Lafi, Nora, Ville 
arabe et modernité administrative municipale: Tripoli (Libye actuelle) 1795–1911, Histoire Ur-
baine, 1-3 2011, pp. 149–176.
172 Politisches Archiv, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, seit November 1909 Kon-
sulat, Bd. 6, Nr. Zc 6491/09. 
173 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 10, 
vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. Dezember 1908, R16115.
174 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis , 
Bd. 6, Mai 1909 bis Dezember 1909, Nr. Ic 6848.
175 Wathīqā 88, Wathāʾiq al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī al-ʿalmānī, Risālā min naʾib al-qunṣul al-ʿalmānī 
ʾAltumān ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-ʿalmānīyya 4.5.1909, al-wathāʾiq al-maujudā bi al-markaz 
al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis.
176 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche Deutsche Vizekonsulat in Tripo-
lis, Bd. 6, Mai 1909 bis Dezember 1909, R141611, Nr. Zc 472, 1. Juni 1909.
177 Ibid.
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responsibilities for only 14 months. Then the task was entrusted to another 
German, called Paddle, but he did not take it up. He sent a letter to the chancellor 
that he woul go to the province of Tripoli to explore the situations first.178 He 
arrived on June 17, 1909 and wrote to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that 
he was personally supervising the situation and that somebody called Gerenz 
(the name as stated in the document) had taken over responsibility for the consu-
lar agency from Altman.179 In the six months after Altmann, the Italian consulate 
was supervising the German consular agency through its Consul General Julius 
Pestalozza.180 It was obvious from the German documents that Altmann had per-
formed his duties very well and that he deserved to be honored by the govern-
ment for his efforts. This was the opinion of the German government despite com-
plaints against him.181 Voices were raised repeatedly during the time of the 
consular agency demanding the government establish an independent consulate 
in the province of Tripoli. This came from the German Colonial Association. They 
supported Rohlfs’ views and others who were advocating speeding up implemen-
tation of this request. They expressed their demand clearly and in public, when 
the government submitted the request to the German Chancellor in 1899 that 
there should be an independent German consulate in the province of Tripoli and 
the person in charge should be a German.182 The same demand was raised by 
other influential persons such as the German Consul in Valletta on Malta, an 
island very close to Tripoli but ruled by the British. He submitted a report to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs explaining the general conditions in the province 
and stressing the need to open a German consulate to keep up with current 
events.183 Another report issued by the German Foreign Ministry indicated the 
need to send a senior representative to assess the situation directly and confirm 
the importance of the province of Tripoli for Germany.184 Altman had supported 
that view in a letter to the chancellor, indicating that many of the powerful and 
178 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, 
1/6/1909, Nr. Іc 8141.
179 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, 
Nr. Іc 8764/09.
180 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, Nr. 
Іc 8861, a letter from the German consulate in Rome to the German chancellor.
181 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, Bd. 
7, vom Januar 1910 bis Dezember 1912, R141612 , Nr. Ic 446.
182 Ghānim, ʿAmalīyyat al-ghūwaṣāt al-ʿalmānīyya, p. 19.
183 Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya”, p. 45.
184 Politisches Archiv, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Vizekonsulat in Tripolis, seit November 1909 
Konsulat, Bd. 6, Nr. Zc 472.
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less powerful countries had consulates in Tripoli and encouraged Germany to 
do the same.185 The establishment of a German consulate in Tripoli was increas-
ingly viewed as a necessity. This led to a transformation of the consular agency 
into an independent consulate managed by the Germans. The consulate was 
opened on November 16, 1909 and Alfred Tilger was appointed as the first consul. 
He was born in the German city of Aachen. Tilger studied medicine in Würzburg 
and received his degree in medicine. He had worked as a doctor in Germany and 
later in Milan, Italy, especially for the Germans who were living there. He also 
worked in the German consulate there. He traveled to Tripoli when he was 
assigned to the position, and continued until 1914. With the beginning of World 
War I he returned to Germany and continued his profession as a doctor.186 The 
Ottoman Government in Istanbul was contacted by the German authorities to 
inform them of the appointment of Tilger and requesting their approval.187 The 
information contained in the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
indicates that the consulate was officially opened on December 9, 1909.188 The 
information the Ministry received on the character of Tilger was encouraging and 
it seemed that he was the suitable person to represent the German Reich in the 
province of Tripoli because of his experience in this area. Tilger performed the 
consular task very well, and he was able to make many changes at the local and 
international levels despite the current circumstances, as Ali A. Ahmida depict-
ed.189 Internationally, there was a trend to form alliances and to expand political 
and economic influence; locally the Ottoman Empire had started to change its 
policy toward the province of Tripoli, which had become the scene of the hidden 
185 Ibid., Nr. Ic 6766.
186 Krawzā, Taqarīr Ghūtlūb Adūlf Krawzā al-ṣaḥafīyya, p. 279.
187 Politisches Archiv, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, Bd. 6, vom Mai 1909 bis 
September 1909, R141611, Nr. Іc/ 5426.
188 Ibid., Nr. Іc 16416.
189 The compradore merchant class benefited from the enhancement of Ottoman state autho-
rity and the transition to a more capitalistic economy that meant greater communication and 
trading between cities and the hinterland. Composed mostly of Libyan Jews or Europeans (main-
ly Maltese, French, Italian) and dominant in local and import-export trading, this group had its 
own courts, some tax exemptions, and state protection. A number of these merchants, including 
Libyan Jews, held European citizenship, and they defended European interests before and du-
ring colonialism. In 1910, these non-Muslim traders and artisans numbered 18.093; these inclu-
ded 2.600 Maltese merchants of British nationality, and 930 Libyan Jewish merchants who were 
Italian nationals. In the city of Tripoli 8.609 Jewish Libyan artisans and traders had Ottoman 
nationality, and 500 others were French citizens. Ahmida, Ali A., “From tribe to class: the origins 
and the politics of resistance in colonial Libya”, Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Document-
azione Dell‘Istituto Italiano per l‘Africa e l‘Oriente, 63-2, 2008, pp. 297–310.
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conflict between the Ottomans and Italy. Italy was conducting many projects in 
the province that, were more economic in nature but with more and more ambig-
uous political intentions.190 Tilger was distinguished from the other consuls 
since he had a broader vision and was assisted by his experience as a doctor, 
helping the local people at many times, in addition to his strong personality. This 
prompted the Ottoman governor to trust him.191 His relationships also included 
many of the local people, which enabled him to be close to local events. He estab-
lished his own library inside the consulate building that contained many docu-
ments about the history of the province of Tripoli, maps, newspapers and some 
manuscripts.192 He was also interested in collecting the Italian newspapers and 
seeking to better understand what Italy was intending to do in Tripoli. He trans-
lated all this information into German, and offered his own analysis.193 He also 
analyzed situations and sent varied reports to the German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. His reports offer rich information about significant events during this 
important period of increased change in this Ottoman province. They very often 
contained economic information, but also political details. For example, his 
report in 1912 contained information on new customs procedures that had been 
implemented by the new authorities in Libya. He wrote about the current eco-
nomic activities in the Libyan ports such as al-Khums, Misurata and Zuwarah. He 
stated that all these ports had implemented the new customs system with refer-
ence to the continued flow of Libyan exports to Germany.194 This report contained 
mainly economic information. However, in 1913 his report contained varied infor-
mation, speaking for instance about the war in Benghazi. Tilger reported on the 
battles between the Libyans and the Italians that had started in 1911 and contin-
ued through December 1913. He offered some details about the battle of al-Kuyfīya 
that took place on November 28, 1911 and the losses to the Italians, who had 70 
soldiers killed or injured. He emphasized that the battles did not stop between 
the two parties, and that on January 16, 1913 there was a large battle known as the 
battle of Sīdi Krāyīm al-Qārba’ and Italian losses were heavy, with 79 killed and 
190 Marx, Christoph, Geschichte Afrikas von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart, Ferdinand Schöningh, 
Paderborn, 2004, p. 150.
191 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 11, 
vom 1. Januar 1909 bis 31. März 1911, R16116.
192 Ghānim, wa Shlūtir, “al-Qunṣuliyya al-ʿalmānīyya fī Ṭarābulis” p. 15.
193 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amt, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kai-
serliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 13, vom April 1912 bis April 1913, R16118.
194 Bundesarchiv, Die Jahres-Handelsberichte des Ksl. Vizekonsulats in Tripolis (Tripolitanien), 
vom August 1907 bis Juni 1916, R901/4443, Nr. IIº1526.
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279 injured, while the Libyan mujāhidīn had captured 25 soldiers.195 The war was 
taking place across the whole Ottoman region of Fezzan, Cyrenaica and Tripoli. In 
this context, diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire changed fundamentally. Italy 
started to re-organize the province of Tripoli in the context of Tripolitanian resist-
ance. The Ottoman Empire lost the war in Tripoli after a protracted resistance. 
Italy had to find a way to implement new rule and demand new relationships 
with the local population. In early colonial Tripoli of 1911–1912, local elites had to 
follow Italian town-planning procedures for rebuilding the city and the infra-
structure of the whole province.196 In this context, Italy needed to stabilize its 
relationship with former consulates and this may be why Italy had not made any 
comments on the presence of the German consul and had accepted Tilger as the 
German consul in Libya.197 However, Tilger preferred to be dismissed from the 
position despite his good relations with the Italians. According to a letter to the 
chancellor from the German consul in Constantinople, Tilger wanted to leave the 
job for personal reasons in addition to not being able to perform his tasks under 
the circumstances of the Italian occupation of the province. This was not a formal 
request but was mentioned in a personal correspondence between him and the 
consul in Constantinople. The consulate in the province of Tripoli was officially 
under the direct supervision of the ambassador in Constantinople, who felt the 
need to inform the chancellor, but Tilger remained in office and did not leave.198 
In 1914, when World War I broke out, Tilger was in Europe, where he had been 
called by the officer responsible for collecting information about the east. This 
was Captain Rudolf Nadolny. Tilger informed Nadolny about the new German 
strategy toward Tripoli to be applied on the ground. The new strategy was directed 
towards working against the British in Egypt and the French in Algeria and 
Tunisia.At the beginning, Tilger was not convinced of the tasks assigned to him, 
arguing that these were not connected to the work of a consul. But then he 
returned to Tripoli to serve his country. He was supposed to be performing tasks 
such as: 
 – Supporting the military operations of the German forces according to the 
available methods and constituents.
195 Bundesarchiv, Die Jahres-Handelsberichte des Ksl. Vizekonsulats in Tripolis (Tripolitanien), 
vom August 1907 bis Juni 1916, R 901/4443, Nr. ІІº222/14.
196  For more details see Bocquet, Denis and Nora Lafi, Local elites and Italian town-planning 
procedures in early colonial Tripoli 1911–1912, Libyan Studies Journal, 3-1, 2002, pp. 59–68.
197 Politisches Archiv, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, Bd. 7, vom Januar 1910 bis 
Dezember, R 141612, Nr. 15508.
198 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, 
Bd. 7, Nr. Іc 1830.
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 – Strengthening German policy in Tripoli focusing on the Italian side, persuad-
ing them that the German presence did not intend to compete with Italy and 
that their interests were not opposedto Italian interests.
 – Supporting the al-Sanūsīyya  movement that could be used by the Germans 
against the British in Egypt in raising the spirit of jihad against the French, 
who were the main enemies of Germany. These were the new main tasks of 
Tilger in Libya and he worked hard to realize them. At the same time, there 
was a German called Otto Mannesmann who was working with Tilger to 
realize these goals. Mannesmann started working in the consulate in October 
1914. It can be said that he worked as a communications officer between 
Germany and the Libyan mujāhidīn in the eastern part of the country with 
Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf. International developments and the formal alliance 
of Italy with of the main powers Britain, France, and Russia who were all at 
war with Germany spelled the end of the presence of the German consulate. 
Indeed, the German consulate in Libya closed on April 28, 1915. The consu-
late properties were confiscated by the Italians until October 16, 1939, with 
the assigned consul Lepique in a newly built part of the modern city of Trip-
oli.199 It is also worth mentioning that the Germans also tried to open a con-
sular agency in Benghazi in 1911, but this project was not accomplished.200
Political developments had led Germany to open a consular agency in Tripoli in 
1884, which became a full consulate in 1909. These institutions played vital roles 
and worked to develop relations between the two sides, especially political and 
economic relations.
199 Ghānim, wa Shlūtir, “al-Qunṣuliyya al-ʿalmānīyya fī Ṭarābulis”, p. 18.
200 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 17, 
R16122, Nr. 1c 12071 ea, 4/10/1911.

4   German Economic Activities in the Province of 
Tripoli and Ottoman-German Relations in 1910
German-Italian economic interests in the Province of Tripoli faced both German 
and Italian activities and ambitions in the province. Italian reaction faced privile-
ges provided to some Germans in Tripoli directly from the Ottoman government. 
This is discussed in German archives based mainly on some statistics on trade 
activity between them, trade exchange and the different stages of its development 
from the establishment of a direct shipping line in 18891 gathered by Banks, the 
director of the company from 19062 to 1918. 
Before World War I, different phases of the relations depended on the rule of 
different Ottoman Sultans and the German Emperor. 1880 was the starting point 
of official German-Ottoman relations after German unification, which continued 
even during the deterioration of the Ottoman Empire. During this time, Germany 
supported the Ottoman Empire and relations strengthened until the heralding of 
a new relationship with Italy with the announcement of German neutrality during 
the Italian invasion of the province of Tripoli. The African continent had been the 
center of negotiations and competition between the European powers before 
World War I, leading to many agreements between the main European powers. 
Agreements involved Italy, Germany and the Ottoman Empire will also be the 
focus in this chapter, along with other agreements, in order to understand how 
the Italian occupation of the province of Tripoli happened. The Bank of Rome in 
Tripoli and other Italian actors took advantage, culminating in an occupation of 
Tripoli in 1911. The reaction of the Ottomans backed by the Germans was the 
declaration of a resistance jihad. The local people supported Tripoli with the help 
of Ottoman officers. A German health mission was sent from Germany in 1912 in 
order to help the mujāhidīn (local resistance) in their war against the Italians.Italian 
politicians considered the province of Tripoli to be part of their territories3 and 
they did not allow any other party to seek economic or political influence over the 
province. This was obvious from 1907 when, for example, privileges were given to 
a certain German named Wachs.4 Italy was not happy with this decision. An 
1 Muḥāfaẓa, Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya, p. 22.
2 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das 
Kaiser liche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 10, vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. Dezember 1908, R16115, Nr. 
A 1965301.
3 For a very interesting interpretation of this issue see Novati, Gian Paolo Calchi, L’Africa d’Italia. 
Una storia coloniale e postcoloniale, Carocci editore, Roma, 2011.
4 No more names were given in the document and no description of who this person was.
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Italian ambassador was sent to the province of Tripoli in order to persuade the 
Ottoman government of their own viewpoint and to limit such privileges to the 
Italians.5 This subject was the focus of correspondence between the German 
consul in Tunis and the Italian ministers in 1908.6 The correspondences also con-
tained discussion on what had been circulating in Italy of late about the German 
interests in the province of Tripoli.7 Italy was closely following all the events 
taking place in Tripoli and they claimed that there were German weapon smugg-
ling operations into the province.8 Italy also showed suspicion when the Germans 
acquired properties such as land in the province, trying to establish settlements.9 
This could also be used to show the increasing German interests, in addition to 
the establishment of the new direct German navigation line passing Valetta.10 The 
German Hans Banks was behind the establishment of the maritime navigation 
line 11 and this helped Germany to greatly increase the volume of its trade with the 
province. This was more obvious in 1907 when its trade volume was six times 
higher than in 1906.12 Credit was given to the new shipping line and to the German 
maritime agency Deutsche Levante-Linie shipping company Hamburg 1889–1970, 
which was managed by two Germans, Banks and Altman, with their ambition to 
expand their economic activity in Tripoli.13 The German maritime agency, with its 
good services, offered its good reputation to many traders to transport their goods 
to Tripoli and handle their business with the province.14 In addition, the German 
maritime company Bremer Dampferlinie Atlas was operating in the province of 
5 Wathīqā A13216, Mursala min al-safīr al-ʿalmānī bi- Istānbūl ilā al-khārijīyyā al-ʿalmānīyya, 
20/8/1907, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā”, p. 47.
6 No names were given in the document.
7 Wathīqā 19, Mursala min al-qunṣil al-ʿalmānī fī Tūnis ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-ʿalmānīyya, 
12/4/1908, Wathāʾiq al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī al-ʿalmānī.
8 Wathīqā 324, Mursala min al-Qāhira ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-ʿalmānīyya, 12/2/1907, Wathāʾiq 
al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī al-ʿalmānī.
9 Rāfiq, al-ʿArab wa al-ʿūthmānīyyūn, p. 463.
10 Wathīqā A13216, Mursala min al-safīr al-ʿalmānī bī Istānbūl ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-
ʿalmānīyya, 20/8/1907, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā”. 
11 Wathīqā 242, Mursala min Istānbūl ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-ʿalmānīyya, 27/12/1907, Wathāʾiq 
al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī al-ʿalmānī.
12 Wathīqā A12274, Mursala min Hāns Bānkis (Hans Banks) ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-ʿalmānīyya 
qisim al-shuʾ ūn al-qunṣuliyya, 14/12/1907, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā”, p. 48.
13 Wathīqā A19731, Mursala min al-safīr al-ʿalmānī bī Istānbūl ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-
ʿalmānīyya, 27/12/1907, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyyafī Lībiyā”, p. 52.
14 Wathīqā A10621, Taqrīr wakīl al-qunṣuliyya al-ʿalmānīyya, bi- Ṭarābulis ʾAltumān ḥawala al-
auḍāʿ fī Lībiyā, 19/6/1908, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā”, p. 60.
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Tripoli in 1907 and participated in the increasing volume of trade there.15 The 
Italian government established its own maritime line that linked the port of 
Tripoli and Misurata with Italy.16 The project establishing a new line with Alexan-
dria was supervised by Ernsto Labi, agent for Italian maritime affairs and later the 
head of the German consular agency in 1909. Labi was re sponsible for Italian 
trade activities at this agency starting from late 190717 and was simultaneously 
the manager of the Italian company Navigazione Generale Italiana, a company 
working in the city of Tripoli.18 Italy had also succeeded in opening the Bank of 
Rome.19 However, Italy assumed that these projects alone were not enough to 
establish strong economic influence able to compete with the German presence. 
Thus, the Italian ambassador in Istanbul met the German ambassador there and 
informed him that they did not accept what had been done by the German traders 
in the province of Tripoli in 1907, and asked him explicitly to limit these trade 
activities.20 The Italians were also alarmed by the position of the Ottoman 
governor in Tripoli with regard to Germany, especially during the rule of governor 
Reçeb Pasha (1904–1908) in 1908. Reçeb Pasha refused to give the Italians any 
privileges and stood against their policy in the province.21 Italians started to cam-
paign against such governors and against the German economic interests specifi-
cally. This Italian opposition to the German activities reached its peak when the 
Italian press published some investigations that warned the government against 
condoning these activities, and described the presence of the Germans as “a 
German colony in Tripoli”. This was because a former German officer named 
Hans von Lochow22 had bought a piece of land in the province as an investment23 
following the issuing of the Ottoman land code on properties. The government’s 
reaction was fast. The Italian foreign minister summoned the German ambassa-
dor, asking him to provide a full explanation on this issue. The Italian fear esca-
15 Politisches Archiv dess Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das 
Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 10, vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. September 1908.
16 Wathīqā 359, Mursala min al-Qāhira ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-ʿalmānīyya, 12/5/1907, 
Wathʾāiq al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī al-ʿalmānī.
17 Ibid. 
18 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 10, 
vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. August 1908, R16115, Nr. A1965301.
19 Wathīqā A12274, Wathāʾiq al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī al-ʿalmānī; for a history of this bank see De 
Rosa, Luigi, Storia del Banco di Roma: Dal 1911 al 1928 , Roma, Banco di Roma, 1983, vol. 2.
20 Wathīqā A19731, Wathāʾiq al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī al-ʿalmānī.
21 al-Zāwi, Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, pp. 281, 284.
22 McClure, William Kidston, Italy in North Africa, An Account of the Tripoli Enterprise, 2013, p. 40.
23 Wathīqā A9389, Risālā mūwajahā min al-safīr al-ʿalmānī fī Rūmā ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā, 
12/6/1911, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā”, pp. 67–68.
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lated to the degree that Hans von Lochow was accused of being a spy.24 In fact, 
von Lochow came from Germany to settle permanently in the province of Tripoli 
and had begun to practice his life as a citizen of the province. He started to do 
business and trade in Tripoli. He bought a store in this city. In 1908 he extended 
his activity to the field of agriculture, renting a piece of land near to the center of 
the city of Tripoli from a British owner named Albert Lak. Later on, in 1911 he 
managed to buy another piece of land that contained 2.500 olive trees and 18 
wells. He sent a request to the German government for agricultural machinery 
and supplies to extract water and build a network to irrigate the land.25 He 
announced that he was trying to convince other Germans, specifically from the 
city of Schwerin, to come to his farm and settle there.26 However, Germany showed 
limited interest in agriculture in the province of Tripoli.27 On June 1, 1902, an inci-
dent happened to the German doctor Louay Brovsky, who was living in Sūq 
al-Turk (market in the city of Tripoli) involving harassment by some hired Jews. 
They had been hired by some Italians to distribute advertisements that insulted 
him, which led him to sue them in court. As a result, the Italians Lentu and Techi-
chio28 were accused of incitement to crime motivated by political reasons.29 Their 
reasons were to keep the province of Tripoli from the political ambitions of the 
other European countries and to enable Italy to control the province.30 Italy was 
not satisfied with the results of their efforts to fight against the German economic 
presence in the province. These efforts did not stop any of the German activities. 
Italy then tried to involve other parties. A dialogue between the Italian and the 
British government was established. As a result, Marquis di San Giuliano, the 
Italian prime minister, expressed resentment about this situation. Di San Giuli-
ano stressed at the same time that the Ottoman authorities represented by 
governors in Tripoli stood against any Italian economic activity while allowing 
the Germans to carry out many projects there. He used the example of the Germans 
being granted the right to build the port of Tripoli by the Ottoman government, 
while the Italians were denied the project. In addition, the Germans were allowed 
24 Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā”, p. 68.
25 Ibid.; Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 3, vom Januar 
1910 bis Mai 1912, Deutsche Tageszeitung, R901/4412, 12.6.1911.
26 Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmānīyya fī Lībiyā”, pp. 68–69.
27 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 3, vom Januar 1910 
bis Mai 1912, Deutsche Tageszeitung, R901/4412, 12.6.1911, Nr. IIo 855.
28 No more names were provided in the document.
29 Itis not stated in the document if these Italians were official government representatives.
30 Wathīqā 12, Milaf al-wathāʾiq al-ijtimāʿīyya, 1/6/1902, shuʾbat al-wathāʾiq wa al-makhṭūṭāt, 
al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis.
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to buy land in the province while the Italians were not.31 The German presence 
remained significant as they enjoyed special treatment by the ruling class and 
public alike. Moreover, German goods continued to flow into the province even 
during the period of Italian occupation, specifically the first year of the invasion. 
Despite this change in political atmosphere, the country continued to import 
materials manufactured in Germany, such as iron goods and some sewing machi-
nes and other products.32 The evolution of German political relations with the 
province of Tripoli left a positive impact on the economic sector in the province 
and contributed to the development of commercial traffic between the two 
parties. As the economy was closely connected to politics, any political progress 
reflected positively on the various other sectors. In Germany the rapid economic 
growth during the industrial revolution necessitated creating a new horizon for 
the disposal of production.33 This was accompanied with efforts to support eco-
nomic institutions by providing the raw materials that were needed from outside. 
The economic development resulted in increasing the wealth in Germany, which 
was estimated to be 11.000 million pounds in 1894, while it had reached 17.500 
million pounds in 1910.34 The economic growth was generated by mechanized 
industry. Machines were also exported abroad. Economic progress continued to 
move forward, strengthening the economic sector, which enabled Germany to 
assume a rank ahead of the United States of America and Britain in 1913.35 German 
trade activities with the province of Tripoli began to grow gradually in the last 
quarter of the 19th century. German trade with Tripoli began in earnest with the 
initial stages of opening the German consulate agency in the province of Tripoli 
in1884 and the consulate in 1909. The arrival of German goods from Saxony, 
Nuremberg, Hagen and other German cities in the port of Tripoli in 1904 was evi-
dence of the commercial traffic between the two.36 Other evidence37 could be 
31 Wathīqā 119, Mursala min al-sīr ʾAdward ilā al-sīr ʾAd. Rūd, maktab khārijiyya, 28/7/1911, 
Wathāʾiq al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī al-injīlīzī, Wathāʾiq ghīr muṣanafā, shuʾbat al-wathāʾiq wa al-
makhṭūṭāt, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis.
32 Ghānim, “Taqrīr qunṣil al-rāykh al-ʿalmānī bi-Ṭarābulis”, p. 286.
33 Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa, pp. 31–32.
34 (no author), “Tharwt Almāniy”, Majallat al-muqtaṭaf, Majallat ʿilmiyya, ṣināʿiyya zirā iyya, 
al-mujalad 36, vol. 4, al-Qāhira, 1910, p. 413.
35 Brown, Jeffrey, al-Madaniyya al-ʿAūrūbbyyā fī al-qarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashr 1815–1914, translated by 
Moḥammad Aḥmed ʿAlī, Dār nahdat Miṣr li-l-ṭibāʿa wa al-nashr, al-Qāhira, 1966, p. 151.
36 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 9, 
vom 1. Juli 1903 bis 15. August 1906, R16114, Nr. A533, 3. Dezember 1905.
37 For an overview of the economy in the wilāyāt in the second half of the 19th century see Man-
tran, Robert, La Libye des origines à 1912, Aix-en Provence, CNRS.
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found in the German documents and statistics about the active economic life in 
the province of Tripoli and illustrated the greater interest of the German officials 
in the province. Statistics reflected different aspects related to the economy and 
wealth there. For example, a German report mentions the number of livestock 
owned by the local people in the province including horses, sheep, cows, camels, 
goats and birds.38 Some other statistical data found in the German Federal Archive 
in Berlin relate to a ship called Aegina, which started from Hamburg heading to 
the port of Tripoli on March 18, 1910. The report stated that the cargo load consis-
ted of 200 kg wool, 700 kg buckshot, 300 kg Chinese ceramics, 3.000 kg iron pro-
ducts, 2.000 kg enamel, 24.000 kg flour, 7.000 kg tar, 300 kg leather and 700 kg 
shoes cream.39 After this ship was offloaded in the port of Tripoli, it was reloaded 
with new goods from the province of Tripoli. These goods were transported to 
Egypt and Syria. The goods offloaded in Egypt included: 21.000 kg pigments, 200 
kg wool, 1.000 kg butter, 1.050 kg mats. The ship then headed to Syria carrying 
1.000 kg wool, 1.000 kg goat hair and 950 kg olive oil.40 In March of the same year, 
the ship Anatolia departed from the port of Hamburg, carrying 3.000 kg of tea. It 
was heading to the port of Tripoli, but first docked in the port of Belgium where 
the ship was loaded with the following goods: glass for windows (1.000 kg), sugar 
(55.000 kg), sulfur (11.000 kg), wool (500 kg), wax (600 kg). After the ship arrived 
in the port of Tripoli and was offloaded, it was reloaded with goods from the pro-
vince and set off to Egypt.41 The export of German goods to the province of Tripoli 
continued during the year 1911 according to reports by Alfred Tilger, the German 
consul there. It included exchange of products like tea, beer, flour, steel products, 
machinery, and enamel. The value of exports by Germany to the province of 
Tripoli reached 56.828 Italian lira.42 The following tables 743, 844, 945 and 1046 illus-
trate the amount of exports from the German port of Hamburg to the port of 
Tripoli, transported by cargo ships (see also Appendix 1).
38 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 
bis Oktober 1904, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. ІІ 11590. 
39 Bundesarchiv, Die Jahres-Handelsberichte des Ksl. Vizekonsulats in Tripolis (Tripolitanien), 
vom August 1907 bis Juni 1916, Tripolis, R901/4443, Nr. IIº55911.
40 Bundesarchiv, Die Kaiserlichen Konsularbehörden in Tripolis, vom Dezember 1912 bis Februar 
1914, R901/3608, Bd. 1, Nr. IIº55911.
41 Ibid.
42 Bundesarchiv, Die Kaiserlichen Konsularbehörden in Tripolis, Bd. 1, Nr. IIº58016.
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Table 7: Goods transported from the port of Hamburg to the port of Tripoli by cargo ship Khythnos 
on May 19, 1910










Table 8: Goods transported from the port of Hamburg to the port of Tripoli by cargo ship Anatolia 
on June 12, 1910













47 All quantities were given in the report in kilograms.
48 It is to be noted that some goods were repeated with different quantities and no justification 
is provided.
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Table 9: Goods transported from the port of Hamburg to the port of Tripoli by cargo ship Lipsos 
on July 19, 1910












Table 10: Goods transported from the port of Hamburg to the port of Tripoli by cargo ship 
Galata on August 13, 1910
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A report written by German consul Alfred Tilger illustrated that trade from 
Germany to the city of Benghazi between November 1911 and 1913 included pro-
ducts like beer, tea, flour, iron products, and ‘Emil machines’. The German consul 
estimated the quantities in Italian lira in his report as follows: 
 – From October to April 1912 the value of goods was estimated to be 56.828 
Italian lira.
 – From May 1912 to October 1912 the value of goods was estimated to be 128.176 
Italian lira.
 – From November 1912 to April 1913 the value of goods was estimated to be 
110.573 Italian lira.49
These tables and statistics referred to the evolution of trade between the pro-
vince of Tripoli and Germany. These tables show that trade was more organized 
in the first decade of the 20th century, when the largest and most industrial pro-
ducts were exported to the province of Tripoli through the port city of Ham-
burg.50 The German companies had a significant share in trade between the 
two parties; one of these companies was C. Sonnenkalb, which was a private 
company founded in Leipzig and focused on exporting tea to Tripoli.51 More-
over, most private companies focused their operations on the mining indust-
ries. They made considerable efforts to obtain the approval of the authorities of 
the province of Tripoli and the central government in Constantinople to pursue 
their activities in the province. The German private companies were at that time 
competing with the French companies, which were mainly interested in nitrates, 
which were very valuable. To give an example the company Aktien-Gesellschaft 
für Bergbau und Hüttenindustrie in Frankfurt/Main submitted a request to the 
German government to obtain the approval of the Ottoman authorities that 
allowed them to search for nitrates in the province of Tripoli in 1911 (see Appen-
dix 2). Moreover, after similar discoveries of nitrates in Tunisia, the company 
submitted proposals to cooperate with the Ottoman authorities there.52 They 
were already in Tunis and asked to be allowed to work in Tripoli. Other German 
companies working in the province of Tripoli included a company called Abel 
und Schellenberg, which started in 1905 and faced strong opposition from the 
49 Ibid., Nr. IIº58016.
50 Bundesarchiv, Die Jahres-Handelsberichte des Ksl. Vizekonsulats in Tripolis (Tripolitanien), 
August 1907 bis Juni 1916, Tripolis, R901/4443, Nr. IIº559.
51 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 2, vom 16. Oktober 
1904 bis Dezember 1909, R901/4411, Nr. II3021/8.  
52 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 3, vom Januar 1910 
bis Mai 1912, Tripolis, R901/4412, Nr. IIº 855.
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Italian and the French.53 In addition, there was a company named Deutscher 
Lloyd Transport-Versicherungs Gesellschaft Berlin, working in the shipping 
sector. The company complained several times to the German government about-
the difficult circumstances in the port of Benghazi, such as it not being able to 
accommodate the large ships. In 1910, the company asked the German govern-
ment for insurance against any risks or losses there.54 Other companies were 
working in Benghazi, such as H. Weickert und Enke, managed by the German Karl 
Sparig who arrived in Benghazi in 1900 to open the first branch of the company. 
Other German companies that worked in the province of Tripoli included: Hein 
und Co., Leipzig; Kästner und Toebelmann, Erfurt; Anton Robinson, Hamburg 
and Schneider und Rothacker, Alexandrien.55 The commercial activities were 
pursued not only via these companies but included interested individual inves-
tors engaged in different types of economic activities abroad. German travellers 
submitted reports and proposals to the German government back at home clearly 
highlighting and stressing the importance of the province Tripoli for the German 
trade. Furthermore, they stressed the need for the German government to take 
positive steps to control the market in Tripoli, which was to help in accessing the 
market in sub-Saharan Africa. This prompted the German government to give its 
permission to the industrial and commercial sectors to initiate trade and business 
operations in the region, despite the small volume of exports from the province 
to Germany. These included goods like leater,56 ivory, goat’s hair,57 poultry, nitrite 
and barley.58 A 1914 report states orange peel was also exported from Tripoli to 
Germany.59 The Ottoman Empire began different reforms starting with the efforts 
of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) who began series of reforms called Tanẓīmāt. 
These were extensive and included many sectors such as the economy, education, 
military and agriculture.60 Sultan Mahmud II had initially focused on the conver-
sion of state institutions from the traditional system to modern bureaucratic ins-
53 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 9, 
vom 1. Juli 1903 bis 15. August 1906, R16114.
54 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Bd. 6, Das Kaiserliche Deutsche Konsulat in Tripo-
lis, vom Mai 1909 bis September, R141611, Nr. Ic 2783.
55 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, R141595, Nr. 489, Leipzig, 20. Oktober 1909.
56 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 6, vom Mai 1914 bis 
April 1915, R901/4415, Nr. ll02225.
57 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 48.
58 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, pp. 75, 77.
59 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 3, vom Januar 1910 
bis Mai 1912, R901/4412, Nr. II0411.
60 Minawi, The Ottoman Scramble for Africa, pp. 6–7.
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titutions. Reforms were announced in 1839, when a new tax system replaced the 
old one.61 These reforms were followed by the announcement of the constitution 
at the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1876.62
The Ottoman sultans tried to rely on European aid for the success of these 
reforms, particularly Britain, which actually supported them at the beginning. 
It seems that the Ottoman Empire adopted some clearly European experiences, 
so that the Empire could cope with the developments in Europe and face the 
dangers surrounding it.63 The European ‘aid’ was delivered by the British ambas-
sador in Istanbul, who had enjoyed close relations with the Ottoman officials who 
were responsible for implementing the reforms. Moreover, the Ottomans brought 
trained Germans to train the military forces Istanbul.64 Meanwhile, the Ottomans 
sent their missions to study and to be trained in Europe, mainly in Germany. The 
Europeans, particularly the British, had for their part tried to put pressure on the 
Ottomans for substantial reforms to benefit the Europeans living in the Ottoman 
Empire and, in particular, that they be be treated equally to the Muslims. They 
focused their efforts on improving the status of some Christian denominations, 
such as the Catholics and the followers of the Eastern Church under the autho-
rity of the Pope. Those Christians who benefited from the Ottoman reforms were 
from different European countries such as France, Austria, Russia and protestant 
Britain.65 The beginning of relations went back to before German unity, and were 
61 Is the compulsory enlistment of people in a national service, most often a military service, 
Zürcher, Erik-Jan, Turkey: A Modern History, London, 2004, p. 53.
62 See the seminal work of, Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire 
and Modern Turkey, vol. 2, Cambrige University Press, Cambridge, 1977, 518p; see also an over-
view by the Majmūʿa min al-bāḥithīn, al-Mausūʿa al-ʿarabiyya al-ʿālāmīyyā, vol. 6, mūʾassasa 
aʿmāl al-mausūʿa li-l-nashr wa al-tawzīʿ, 1999, p. 245.
63 al-Bustāni, Sulaymān, al-Dawlā al-ʿūthmānīyyā qabl al-dustūr wa baʿdah, Zīyāda, Khālid (ed.), 
Dār al-ṭalīʿa li-l-ṭibāʿa wa al-nashr, Bayrūt, 1978, p. 25, 41; Rāfiq, al-ʿArab wa al-ʿūthmānīyyūn, 
p. 380; al-Jamīl, Sayyār, al-ʿArab wa al-ʿatrāk al-inbiʿath wa al-taḥdīth min al-ʿathmana ilā al-
ʿalmanā, markaz dirāsāt al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya, Bayrūt, 1997, p. 55.
64 al-Ḥuṣarī, Sāṭiʿ, al-Bilād al-ʿarabiyya wa al-dawlā al-ʿūthmānīyyā, maʾhad al-dirāsāt al-
ʿarabiyya, maṭabaʿat al-risālah ʿĀbdīn, al-Qāhira, 1957, p. 60.
65 On the issue of the influence of Europe in the Ottoman Empire, some scholars have relativized 
the paradigms of imported and exported; see, for example, on the province of Egypt, Lafi, Nora, 
“Alhadatha wal-idâra al hadâriyya fî Misr al-’Uthamâniyya. As’ila wa tafisîrât” (Modernity and 
Administration in Ottoman Egypt: Questions and Research Perspectives), in Jadal al-mawḍū’īyah 
wa-al-dhātīyah fī kitābat tārīkh Miṣr: Dirāsāt muhdāh ilá al-mu’arrikhah al-kabīrah Nillī Ḥannā 
(Objectivity and Subjectivity in the Historio graphy of Egypt: In Honor of Nelly Hanna), ed. by 
Nelly Hanna, Nasser Ahmed Ibrahim, al-Hay’ah al-miṣrīyah al-’āmmah lil-kitāb, Cairo, 2012, pp. 
263–273 and for the province of Tripoli: Lafi, Nora, “Mediterranean Connections; The Circulation 
of Municipal Knowledge and Practices during the Ottoman Reforms, c. 1830–1910”, in Another 
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either political or religious relations. Prussia had signed a trade agreement with 
the Ottoman Empire in 1761; it was, in fact, a treaty of friendship and trade and 
was renewed in 1790 and again in 1803.66 Prussia also played an important role in 
mediating between the Ottoman Empire and Russia to end the war between them 
through signing the Adrianople agreement in 1829.67 The second war between 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire (known as the Crimean War) in the Balkans and 
Caucasus had started in 1877, when Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire 
and Bulgaria. Russia had endorsed this movement and entered the war. Russia 
wanted to regain territory lost during the Crimean War and to end the Ottoman 
rule in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The Ottoman Empire lost part of its terri-
tories in these areas in 1878.68 Ottoman-German relations also had cultural and 
religious aspects; for instance, a number of German Christian clergy arrived in the 
territory of the empire within the framework of missionary activities in the mid-
19th century, specifically to Palestine.69 These missionary activities continued in 
different parts of the Ottoman provinces.
Relations evolved over time even during the stage of the declaration of a 
unified Germany and the rule of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck as a strong politi-
cian. Bismarck tried not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire 
and what known as the “eastern issue”.70  However, political developments dicta-
ted that he takes a position on current events. He then called for the Berlin Confe-
rence in 1878 to settle this conflict, as mentioned above. Bismarck’s position was 
clear: in the Balkan war between 1877 and 1878 he supported the Ottoman Empire. 
This was driven only by the political and economic interests of Germany. Rela-
tions between the two sides had gone through two phases before the First World 
War. The first was in the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and lasted until 1908, 
when the second phase began with the coming of the Committee of Union and 
Progress to power in 1908, after ending the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in the 
Global City. Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment, 1850–2000, ed. 
by Pierre-Yves Saunier and Shane Ewen, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, Houndmills, 2008, pp. 
35–50.
66 Sanū, ʿAbd al-Raʾūf, ʾAlmāniya wa al-islām fī al-qarnayn al-tāsiʿa ʿashar wa al-ʿaishrīn, al-
furāt li-l-nashr wa al-tawziʿ, Bayrūt, 2007, pp. 33–34.
67 Ibid.
68 Gökpinar, Hakan, Deutsch-Türkische Beziehungen 1890–1914 und die Rolle Enver Paschas, 
Marburg, 2011, p. 96; Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets Before Bullets: The Imperlial Russian Army 
1861–1914, Indiana University Press, 1992, pp. 52–57. 
69 Sanū, ʾAlmāniya wa al-islām, p. 31.
70 Ibid., pp. 31, 36.
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same year.71 The year 1880 was the starting point of official German-Ottomans 
relations after German unification. As noted above, the sultans hired German 
experts in their reform process. The first German to arrive was the officer Helmuth 
von Moltke the elder (born 1800 in Parchim), who was asked by Sultan Mahmud 
II in 1838 to assist in modernizing the Ottoman Empire’s army.72 Von Moltke was 
the commander of the German armies that defeated the French in the time of von 
Bismarck. He performed great tasks for the Ottoman state such as training the 
military forces, and when he returned to his country he monitored the training 
from there.73 The German officer von Dergultich also played an important role in 
the education and training of the Ottoman army. He was a teacher at the School 
of Military Staff of the Ottoman Empire. His task was to train the army in the 
advanced, modern German method to be able to catch up with the European 
countries in this regard.74 There were other German officers, for example von 
Hofes and Camp Hofes,75 in addition to the German army commander Colmar 
Freiherr von der Goltz, who arrived in Istanbul in (1882–1883) as head of the 
German military mission. The main task of the mission was to train the Ottoman 
army forces in accordance with the modern German methods.76 To support these 
efforts, it had been agreed to provide the Ottoman army with German-made 
weapons, including the cannon called Krupp. This was in the time of Mahmud 
Şevket Pasha (ruled 1910–1912), an Ottoman general and statesman and grand 
vizier of the Ottoman Empire.77 In addition, a large number of Ottoman students 
were sent to study in Germany. Some of them joined the military schools in 
Prussia, while others were enrolled in other institutions in order to benefit from 
German expertise.78 A significant event that revealed the depth of German-Otto-
man relations at that time was the visit of the German Emperor Wilhelm II and his 
wife to the Sultan Abd al-Hamid II in Istanbul. They arrived in Istanbul on board 
71 Brrū, Taufīq, ʿAlī, al-ʿArab wa al-turk fī al-ʿahd al-distūri al-ʿūthmānī 1908–1914, maʿhad al-
dirāsāt al-ʿarabiyya al-ʿālāmīyyā, jamiʿat al-duwal al-ʿarabiyya, 1960, pp. 338–339.
72 Bucholz, Arden, Moltke and the German Wars, 1864–1871, Palgrave, 2001.
73 Gökpinar, Deutsch-Türkische Beziehungen 1890–1914, p. 37.
74 al-Ḥuṣarī, al-Bilād al-ʿarabiyya wa al-dawlā al-ʿūthmānīyyā, p. 70. 
75 Brūkilmān, Kāril, Tārīkh al-shuʿūb al-islāmīyya, translated by Nabīh Amīn and Munīr al-
Baʿalabakī, Dār al-ʿilm li-l-malāyyīn, Bayrūt, 1974, p. 593; Waḥīd, al-Qawl al-mufīd fī ḥukum al-
sulṭān ʿAbdul-Ḥamīd, p. 343.
76 Rāfiq, al-ʿArab wa al-ʿūthmānīyyūn, p. 427; Sanū, ʾAlmāniya wa al-islām, p. 37.
77 Brrū, al-ʿArab wa al-turk, p. 348.
78 For an overview on this issue see Römer, Matthias, Die deutsche und englische Militärhilfe 
für das Osmanische Reich 1908–1914, Frankfurt am Main, Lang, 2007; see also Waḥīd, al-Qawl 
al-mufīd fī ḥukum al-sulṭān ʿAbdul-Ḥamīd, p. 343.
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of the German yacht Hohenzollern in 1889.79 They were received by Sultan Abd 
al-Hamid II at a time when most European countries were competing for the favor 
of the Ottoman Empire. The visit of the German emperor at that time was impor-
tant in strengthen ing the relationship between the two parties, as viewed by the 
Ottoman Sultan.80 It is obvious that this visit came within the framework of the 
consolidation of German policy toward the Ottoman Empire, and it was a mile-
stone in the distinctive political approach to strengthening relations with them. 
The German emperor tried to take advantage of the international situation by 
highlighting the role of Germany as a non-colonial power. He visited the Ottoman 
Empire again in 1898. During this visit he gave a speech in Damascus confirming 
the strength and resilience of the relationship between the two sides, and clearly 
pointed out that he would remain faithful to good relations with the Ottoman 
Turks and the Muslims in general.81 This visit can be described as a working visit 
where bilateral agreements were signed to implement a series of economic pro-
jects in the territory of the Ottoman Empire; one of these projects was the Ottoman 
railway. The con struction of the Ottoman railway started in the 1860s and 1870s 
with the aid of the British. Britain had obtained a concession to create railway 
lines linking the cities of Izmir and Aydin in Turkey, and in Tunis, another very 
telling example.82 The railway between Izmir and Aydin was opened in 1867. The 
French also implemented some parts of the railway in Tunis and in the area of 
Levant (Bilād al-Shām).83 Later on, in 1888, a company was established with the 
help of the Deutsche Bank called Société du Chemin de Fer Ottoman d’Anatolie. 
This company was created by the Deutsche Bank to operate the Ottoman railway 
and completely took over its construction. This move came in the context of the 
competition between Germany and Britain to implement projects related to the 
infrastructure of the Ottoman state.84 In addition, during the visit of the German 
Emperor in 1898, the Société du Chemin de Fer Ottoman d’Anatolie was granted 
the privilege of rebuilding Istanbul Haydarpaşa Railway Terminal, which took on 
79 Gökpinar, Deutsch-Türkische Beziehungen 1890–1914, p. 49.
80 al-Bustānī, al-Dawlā al-ʿūthmānīyyā, p. 42.
81 Rāfiq, al-ʿArab wa al-ʿūthmānīyyūn, p. 428; Gökpinar, Deutsch-Türkische Beziehungen 
1890–1914, p. 48.
82 See Lafi, Nora, “Tunis als Laboratorium osmanischer Modernität: das Beispiel der Vorstadt-
bahn (1863–1881)”, Moderne Stadtgeschichte, special issue “Die Osmanische Stadt“, edited by 
Nora Lafi and Florian Riedler (guest eds.), 2018-1, pp. 16–25.
83 al-Jamīl, al-ʿArab wa al-ʿatrāk, p. 92; Sanū, ʾAlmāniya wa al-islām, pp. 4, 9.
84 See for example Geyikdagi, Necla V., French Direct Investments in the Ottoman Empire before 
World War I, Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2011.
German Economic Activities in the Province of Tripoli in 1910   127
its classical structure when constructed in 1909.85 In addition, a contract was 
signed assigning the Société du Chemin de Fer Ottoman d’Anatolie and the Deut-
sche Bank the task of extending the railway line from Izimit to Ankara, with work 
starting in 1892.86 In 1894, the company was granted a project to extend the 
railway as far as Konya in Turkey.87 Between 1900 and 1908, the company was 
given the task of extending the railway line between Damascus and Medina.88 It 
was a part of the Ottoman Hejaz railway network that was supposed to extend the 
line from the Haydarpaşa Terminal in Istanbul beyond Damascus to the holy city 
of Mecca. A public subscription was opened throughout the Islamic world to fund 
construction. The railway was to be a waqf.89 That is, an inalienable religious 
endowment or charitable trust.90 Moreover, they succeeded in obtaining a privi-
lege permitting them to exploit the mineral resources discovered on both sides of 
the railway, specifically in Iraq, to a distance of 20 meters.91 The Germans realized 
through their explorers and travellers that Iraq was an oil and mineral-rich 
country. This was followed by the flow of German capital to Turkey, for example, 
the signing of a huge contract to build the railway line between Berlin and 
Baghdad, which was signed by Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1903.92 Britain did not 
accept this contract and resisted the project in a violent way. The outbreak of the 
First World War in 1914 was a direct reason to block completion of this project.93 
Other projects included developing the ports of Basra and Alexandria, establi-
shing the German Bank of Palestine in 1899, cultivating cotton in Adana in 1905, 
and restoring the ships in the Marmara Sea in 1899, among other projects.94 Gene-
85 Jaschinski, Klaus and Julius Waldschmidt, Das Kaisers Reise in den Orient 1898, Bd. 27, Wolf-
gang Weist, Berlin, 2002, p. 65.
86 Brūkilmān, Tārīkh al-shuʿūb al-islāmīyya, p. 593.
87 al-Jamīl al-ʿArab wa al-ʿatrāk, p. 92.
88 Rāfiq, al-ʿArab wa al-ʿūthmānīyyūn, p. 428.
89 The word waqf is used in Islam with the meaning of holding certain property and preserving 
it for the confined benefit of certain philanthropic use and prohibiting any use or disposition of it 
outside that specific objective, extracted from http://journal.mufad.org/attachments/article/452/7, 
pdf (March 2016).
90 Nicholson, James, The Hejaz Railway, Stacey International Publishers, 2005.
91 (no author), “al-Dawlā wa al-ʾAlmān”, Majallat al-Manār, Majallat shahrīyya tabḥath fī falsafat 
al-din wa shuʾūn al-ijtimāʾ wa al-ʾumrān, maṭabaʿat al- manār, al-Qāhira, 18-61, 333H/1915, p. 472.
92 Hagen, Gottfried, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg. Flugblätter und Flugschriften in arabischer, 
persischer und osmanisch-türkischer Sprache aus einer Sammlung der Universitätsbibliothek 
Heidel berg, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1990, p. 15; Yāghī, Ismāʿīl Aḥmed, al-Dawlā al-ʿūthmānīyyā fī 
al-tārīkh al-islāmī, maktabat al-ʿAbikān, 1998, p. 205; Brrū, al-ʿArab wa al-turk, p. 38. 
93 Jaschinski, and Julius Waldschmidt, Das Kaisers Reise in den Orient, pp. 64–65.
94 Sanū, ʾAlmāniya wa al-islām, pp. 51, 59.
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rally, Germany managed to acquire 67 % of the total European investments in the 
Ottoman Empire by 1895.95 It should be noted that the rapprochement between 
the Ottomans and Germans also included the cultural aspect. Germany opened a 
number of schools in the Ottoman provinces and some states under their rule, 
such as Palestine, in order to disseminate the German culture and language 
among the people of the sultanate.96 Germany had also established a number of 
schools along a line parallel to the railway lines that they built. The Germans 
were involved in building schools in the Ottoman Empire, as were the French and 
the British.97 The Germans tried to spread their educational system and culture. 
German-Ottoman relationswere improving rapidly when Italy invaded Libya in 
1911. Germany decided then to support the Ottoman Empire and tried to bridge 
the gap in viewpoints between Italy and the Ottoman Empire in Libya.98 The situ-
ation developed significantly in 1915, when Germany and Turkey agreed to attack 
Britain in Egypt starting from Libyan territory. Germany also supported the power 
and authority of the Ottoman Empire in its territories in Asia, where France, 
Britain and Russia were trying to pressure the Ottoman government to comply 
with their demands, whether in Syria, where France was involved, or in Armenia, 
which was within Russian’s sphere of interest, or the issue of the railway line 
Berlin-Baghdad by Britain, an issue that directly affected German interests.99 At 
that time, the German ambassador in London, Prince Karl Lichnowsky, announced 
that the goal of these countries was not to serve the interests of the peoples of the 
region, but to divide the areas and subject them to their influence without taking 
into account the authority of the Ottoman Empire.100 Germany also tried to 
support Russia in their proposal to the Ottoman government to reform the Arme-
nian states within their borders. The German position supported the rights of the 
Ottomans in the region, while Russia wanted to combine all the categories under 
one flag to be ruled by European or Christian Ottoman leaders. Germany then 
insisted on holding a conference, at which they adopted different local reforms 
primarily conceived to serve the interests of the residents.101 The situation in the 
Ottoman Empire was rapidly changing, especially when Union and Progress 
95 Muḥāfaẓa, Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya, p. 22.
96 Brrū, al-ʿArab wa al-turk, p. 339.
97 Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 15.
98 Mīkhāʾīl, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-injīlīzīyya al-lībiyyā, p. 29.
99 Many articles have been published on these issues. See for example the research of Abu 
Shouk, Ahmed Ibrahim, “The Hijaz railway: motives, results and impacts”, Journal of Islam in 
Asia, 6-1, 2009, p. 1-28.
100 Brrū, al-ʿArab wa al-turk, pp. 567–568.
101 Ibid.
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ended the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1908. They declared him deposed by 
a decision issued by the senate with the approval of shaykh al-Islām Moḥammad 
Ḍīiaʾal-Dīn in Istanbul.102 This coup received wide acceptance from most of the 
European countries, in particular France and Britain, and here began the second 
phase of German relations with the Ottoman Empire. Germany then began to 
apply the cautious policy designed by their ambassador in Istanbul, Adolf Mar-
schall von Bieberstein. At this stage, Germany realized that it required a more 
active policy to protect its special relationship with the Ottoman Empire, regard-
less of who held political power there. Thus, they announced their reservations 
about this change because of the special relations they had with Sultan Abd al-
Hamid II. However, they were watching very carefully the rapprochement between 
the new government and the British and the French. Germany then tried to follow 
a policy of positive neutrality and reservation coping with the course of current 
events. The new Union and Progress government attempted to introduce new 
reforms and measures to serve the in ter ests of the Ottomans first, and passed a 
resolution that included the abolition of foreign concessions; this did not satisfy 
the European countries. The situation developed further when the Grand Vizier103 
Moḥammad Kâmil Pasha, who supported the Europeans, was isolated. Then the 
conflict on the demarcation of borders between the province of Tripoli and Tunisia 
emerged in 1910. The conflict was between the Ottomans and France about the 
eligibility of the province of Tripoli. Germany then offered to mediate to resolve 
the crisis peacefully, without resorting to the military option. Germany actually 
succeeded in resolving the conflict and in forming a Turkish-French committee 
that took over the task of demarcating the borders.104 Despite the fact that France 
was able to control some of the territory of the province of Tripoli, the issue was 
settled with the signing of the convention on the final demarcation of the border 
between the two sides in 1910.105 The German-Ottoman relationship remained 
close until the First World War, by which time Turkey had become very dependent 
on its ally. One example of this dependence is the commander of the Ottoman 
102 al-Shinnāwi, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Moḥammad, al-Dawlā al-ʿūthmānīyyā dawlā islāmīyya muf tara 
ʿalayhā, maktabat al-ʾanjalū al-maṣriyya, al-Qāhira, 1980, p. 117.
103 The Grand Vizier was the prime minister of the Ottoman sultan, with absolute power of 
attorney and, in principle, dismissible only by the sultan himself; Wittek, Paul, The Rise of the 
Ottoman Empire, London, 1938.
104 On this issue see the thesis of Ben Sliman, Fatma, Thèse de l’Université de Tunis with an ar-
ticle: Ben Sliman, Fatma, “Frontière et nation. L’exemple de la frontière tuniso-algérienne avant 
1881’, in idem, Penser le National au Maghreb et Ailleurs, Dar Noqoush Arabia, 2012, pp. 45–63.
105 Shukrī, Moḥammad Fūʾād, Mīlād dawlāt lībiyā al-ḥadīthā wathāʾiq taḥrīrahā wa istiqlālihā, 
vol. 1, (1945–1947), maṭbaʿat al-iʿtimād, al-Qāhira, 1957, p. 430.
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fleet in the Black Sea, the German general Otto Liman von Sanders, appointed in 
1913.  He was not new to this position, having supervised the training and deve-
lopment of the Ottoman army in the past. Von Sanders achieved positive results 
in reorganizing and rebuilding the Ottoman army and sent a report to his govern-
ment presenting his achievements.106 He was accompanied by a number of other 
German navy officers who occupied important positions in the Ottoman fleet. The 
Ottoman authorities appointed the task of supervising the castles and fortifica-
tions in the Dardanelles to the German officers.107 At the outbreak of the First 
World War, Turkey then declared neutrality, but this position was short-lived, and 
Germany quickly convinced them to stand on its side after becoming its ally in 
September 1914. This was preceded by the signing of a treaty between the two 
sides at the end of July in the same year.108 The agreement necessitated the com-
mitment of both sides to neutrality toward the conflict between Austria and 
Serbia, and they were not supposed to intervene unless Russia entered the war in 
a way that threaten ed Germany and in turn Turkey.109 Despite the serious political 
situation, good relations continued between the two parties by enhancing the 
cultural aspect, in particular, the establishment of the German-Turkish Associa-
tion (Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung). Even after the outbreak of the war, German 
projects continued within the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The Eastern News 
Agency was established in Berlin in 1915 and was directed by Max von Oppen-
heim. The news agency played a major role in supporting the Ottoman Empire 
and the propaganda of the idea of Islamic jihad launched by Oppenheim. The 
main task of the Eastern News Agency was disseminating propaganda in the 
Ottoman Empire against the triple alliance, while the agency had also underta-
ken a significant role in spreading news as well as German culture within the 
Ottoman Empire. One of the outcomes of its efforts was the establishment of the 
German-Turkish Friendship House (Haus der Deutsch-Türkischen Freundschaft) 
in Istanbul in 1917.110 The question that arises here is whether Germany was genu-
inely interested in the completion of these large-scale projects in the framework 
of bilateral relations and the development of the Ottomans’ economic and mili-
tary institutions, or whether the projects functioned as a means of non-military 
incursion into the region to undermine British dominance. The answer to this 
question lies in the fact that Germany had prospered economically and militarily. 
106 Sanū, ʾAlmāniya wa al-islām, pp. 69, 87.
107 Yāghī, al-Dawlā al-ʿūthmānīyyā, p. 220.
108 Shukrī, Mīlād dawlāt Lībiyā al-ḥadīthā, p. 459.
109 Brrū, al-ʿArab wa al-turk, p. 612.
110 Sanū, ʾAlmāniya wa al-islām, pp. 83, 91–96.
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Germany had controlled some areas in Africa, but remained a minor force in the 
region. This is why it looked to the Ottoman Empire as a partner first, and second 
because the latter extended its control over Asia. Asia was considered by the 
Germans as one of the vital areas for investment and exploitation of mineral 
wealth, as well as a strong market for their products and industries. Therefore, 
the Ottoman Empire was of high strategic importance for Germany. Cooperation 
with the Ottoman ruling powers would enable Germany to communicate with 
these areas without requiring the permission of the British, who controlled the 
majority of the sea ports at that time. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire 
itself was inneed of an ally among the powerful countries that it could rely on, 
considering the ongoing political developments that had negative impacts on the 
empire and ultimately resulted in its losing control over large parts of its territo-
ries to the European countries. The political positions of the German government 
toward the issues related to the Ottoman state, in particular, and the region of the 
Mediterranean were generally different from the other European countries and 
this was also the case in the issue of the province of Tripoli.
Political Developments and International Agreements
The competition between the main European powers made it necessary to engage 
in negotiations and agreements. It is illuminating to consider main and competing 
interests of these European powers before discussing the individual agreements. 
It was obvious that the African continent was the center of negotiations that 
led to many agreements between the European powers. This was the starting point 
in signing agreements between the different parties concerned with colonialism 
and economic expansion in Africa. The struggle over dividing Africa was con-
ducted parallel to the process of dividing the properties of the Ottoman Empire 
in the north of the continent. The province of Tripoli was a center of conflict 
between Britain and France, specifically when both obtained contiguous colonies 
in Africa.111 Britain began to feel the danger of Germany as a powerful new state, 
especially after its victory over France. It subsequently developed a new policy to 
maintain its strength within Europe and thereby protect its colonies abroad, and in 
particular its strategic interests in the Mediterranean, Egypt, and India.112 Both 
111 al-Dijānī, Aḥmed Ṣidqī, Lībiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī au Ṭarābulis al-ghārb fī ʾ ākhir al-ʿahd 
al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī (1882–1911), al-maṭabaʿa al-faniyya al-ḥadītha,ʿal-aṣbagh bi-l-zaitūn, al-
Qāhira, 1971, p. 312.
112 Mommsen, W.J. (ed.), Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus, Frankfurt, 1969, p. 72.
132   German Economic Activities in the Province of Tripoli in 1910
countries sent a number of travellers under the guise of geographical explora-
tion and the study of natural phenomena, monuments, archeology as well as the 
history of the region. The reports presented by those travelers make clear that the 
attention of Britain was directed primarily toward the eastern part of the province 
of Tripoli, specifically Cyrenaica. The French focused their attention on the south, 
especially the city of Ghadames and its environs, in order to secure their colonial 
Empire. This was due to the location of Ghadames on the border with the Algerian 
territory which had been under French occupation since 1830. Ghadames was 
close to the Tunisian territory, which had been subjected to French protectorate 
since 1882. From these two regions they tried to extend their influence to Gha-
dames.113 Soon, Italy entered the conflict. The Italian politicians realized the seri-
ousness and effectiveness of their expansion policy and correspondingly tried to 
take advantage of the situation in order to achieve their goals. At the beginning, 
Italy was interested in the eastern part of Africa, in an attempt to realize their 
ambition to establish a major empire starting from the east coast of Africa. Thus, 
from this standpoint, Italy struggled politically to gain control over the province 
of Tripoli, especially since Germany did not have any clear colonial ambitions in 
the region.114 It could be said that the preparation phase started at the beginning 
of the 19th century, Italy then focused its efforts to gain strong political acceptance 
from the major countries. As for Austria, it was seeking to establish an alliance 
with Germany because it did not have the power to enable it to engage in any new 
conflicts and thus ensure access to new gains through its alliances with Germany 
or other European countries. Russia’s position was different because of strategic 
interests as it was in an opposite position to the Ottoman Empire. It supported 
France and tried to prevent its collapse, to keep the balance of power in Europe. 
At the same time, its strategic interests required it to enter into agreements, even 
with enemies.115 Germany’s concern to strengthen its position in Europe led it to 
enter into a number of agreements and treaties that enabled the state to play an 
important political mediary role. Externally, Germany tried to secure its strategic 
objectives in Africa in particular.116 These are the goals that led von Bismarck to 
follow the policy of rapprochement with France to limit the power superiority 
of the British and at the same time to be an obstacle to any attempt at a French 
113 Ḥasan, al-Faqīh Ḥasan, al-Yawmiyyāt al-lībiyyā, vol. 1 and 2, 958h–1248h (1551–1832), taḥqīq 
Moḥammad al-ʿUsṭā  wa ʿAmmār Jiḥīdar, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, 
Ṭarābulis, 1984, p. 21.
114 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 110.
115 ʾUmar, ʿAbdul-ʿAzīz ʾUmar, Tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-muʿāṣir 1815–1919, Dār al-
maʿārifa al-jamiʾīya, al-Qāhira, 2000, pp. 196–197.
116 Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus, p. 72.
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attack on Germany.117 European powers engaged in agreements to ease the rela-
tions between them. Amongst these agreements were those that helped Italy to 
occupy the province. The political role of and agreements signed by Germany are 
also viewed as significant. One example is the German Italian agreement of 1887, 
which helped the Italians to occupy the province of Tripoli. It is argued here that 
all the conventions and treaties were only a step toward avoiding the opposition 
of European powers that might prevent Italy from occupying Tripoli. Italy also 
benefited from other agreements that were signed by other European powers, 
such as the Anglo-French Agreement. 
The Triple Alliance (Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary) in 1882
The Berlin Conference is considered the start of the political agreements between 
the European countries concerning their colonies in Africa and other regions. 
From that point, Italy tried to work with Germany and Austria-Hungary to attain 
colonies in Africa. This agreement was known as the Triple Alliance and was 
settled in 1882.118 It focused mainly on the issue of the common defence policy.119 
Italy considered this agreement a foundation for realizing its ambitions. The same 
agreement was used by Italy as a defense mechanism against France, to stop 
France from expanding in the province of Tripoli as it had in Tunisia before.120
It is worth mentioning that this alliance was restored several times. First 
in 1887, when Italy obtained a guarantee of military support from Germany if 
France tried to change the situation in Tripoli to its advantage or to expand its 
control over Morocco.121 The alliance was next renewed in 1891, then in 1902 and 
again in 1912.122 The three parties worked to emphasize retaining the situation in 
117 Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 21.
118 See for example Scott, Ivan, “The making of the Triple Alliance in 1882”, East European 
Quarterly, 12-4, 1978, p. 399; See also al-Dijānī, Lībiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī, p. 329; Shukrī, 
Moḥammad Fūʾād, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, Dār al-fikr al-ʿarabī, al-Qāhira, 1984, p. 109; Welt-
geschichte der Neuzeit, ed. by F. A. Brockhaus in cooperation with Gernot Dallinger und Hans-
Georg Golz, bpb, Mannheim, 2006, p. 125.
119 al-Mausūʿ ā al-ʿarabiyya al-ʿālāmīyyā, J9, p. 199.
120 Muḥāfaẓa, Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya, p. 26.
121 Tishāijī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, al-Masʾalā al-tūnīsīyya wa al-siyāsa al-ʿūthmānīyyā 1881–1913, 
translated by ʿAbd al-Jalīl al-Timīmī, Dār al-kutub al-sharqiyya, Tūnis, 1973, p. 192; Ismāʿīl, Ḥilmi 
Maḥrūs, Tārīkh Afrīqiyā al-ḥadīth wa al-muʿāṣir min al-kushūfāt al-jughrāfīyya ilā qiyām munaẓamat 
al-waḥda al-ʿafrīqiyya, vol. 1, muʾassāsat shabāb al-jāmiʾa, al-Iskandariyya, 2004, p. 263.
122 al-Mausūʿ ā al-ʿarabiyya al-ʿālāmīyyā, J9, p. 500.
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North Africa. Italy was able to obtain a promise from Austria that the latter would 
re strain its ambitions in the province. This gave Italy the opportunity to extend its 
control there. The alliance continued to be the focus of European relations until 
the First World War in 1914.123
Anglo-Italian Agreement in 1887
Italy did not limit its contact to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Following negotia-
tions with Britain, an agreement of mutual support was published in 1887. It was 
initially a secret agreement as it had been agreed in 1883124  based mainly on mutal 
pledges to maintain the situation as it was.125 At the same time, Britain and Italy 
agreed to limit French influence in the Mediterranean. The main agreement spe-
cified that Italy would support Britain in Egypt, and Britain would support Italy in 
North Africa.126  Thus Italy had British support for its political ambitions in Tripoli.
German-Italian Agreement in 1887
The Chancellor Otto von Bismarck signed a bilateral agreement with Italy; in this 
agreement Germany, stated the eligibility of Italy to occupy the province of Tripo-
li.127 The position of Germany was clearly against France. It is obvious that most 
of the European powers tried to isolate France or form coalitions against it. That 
was the reason behind the German position in favor of limiting the influence of 
France in Tripoli and Morocco. Germany was prepared to provide military support 
to Italy when needed. By signing these agreements, Bismarck intended to defend 
Germany’s rights, to confirm its neutrality, and to preserve its position as a major 
power in Europe. This was in spite of the earlier German position, which was 
somewhat moderate toward the Ottoman Empire. The German Italian agreement 
123 Ibid.
124 al-Ḥarīr,ʿAbd al-Maula Ṣāliḥ, “al-Tamhīd li-l-ghazū al-iṭālī wa mawqif al-lībīyyīn minhu”, 
buḥūth wa dirāsāt fī al-tārīkh al-lībī 1911–1943, vol. 2, majmūʿa min al-asātidha wa al-bāḥithīn, 
ishrāf Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Ḥasan al-Sūrī wa Ḥabīb Wadāʿa al-Ḥisnāwī, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍidal-
ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1984, p.27. 
125 Mīkhāʾīl, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-injīlīzīyya al-lībiyyā, pp. 16-17; Muḥāfaẓa, Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā 
min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya, p. 26; al-Kaiyāli, ʿAbd al-Wahāb et.al, Mausūʿat al-siyāsa, vol. 5, al-
mūʾassasa al-ʿarabiyya li-l-dirāsāt wa al-nashr, Bayrūt, 1979, p. 554.
126 al-Dijānī, Lībiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī, pp. 330, 332.
127 Maḥrūs, Tārīkh Afrīqiyā al-ḥadīth, p. 263.
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enabled both parties to work in accordance with their own interests. On the one 
hand, Germany guaranteed to keep Italy within the alliance, and on the other hand, 
the agreement ensured that an influential power depended on Germany, which 
paved the way for it to be involved in negotiations with other European countries 
sharing the same interests in the Mediterranean, such as Britain, France and others. 
Italy intended to enter into agreements with them to ensure its rights in the region. 
Article 3 of the treaty mentioned that, in the case that France extended its control 
over areas in North Africa, Italy would do the same to maintain its position in the 
Mediterranean. Italy was granted the right to take military action in the French 
territories in Europe in consultation with its ally Germany in accordance to this 
treaty.128 It is worth mentioning that the same year witnessed bilateral negotiations 
between Italy and Austria-Hungary, and with Spain. The negotiations discussed the 
political activity of the Italians, who signed agreements with all the countries that 
were considered as obstacles ontheir way to occupying Tripoli, and thus had suc-
ceeded in signing different agreements with them.129
Anglo-French-Italian Agreement in 1890
Italy succeeded through this agreement in receiving the explicit support of France 
and Britain to control the province of Tripoli. This agreement came shortly after 
the end of the Second Berlin Conference, and was signed because the conference 
did not refer explicitly to the right claimed by Italy in Tripoli. Thus, Italy engaged 
in individual negotiations with the major powers which resulted in the signing of 
an agreement on October 30, 1890 guaranteeing Italy what it wanted to achieve 
on the North African coast stretching between Egypt and Tunisia.130
Anglo-French Agreement in 1899
Britain and France were considered the largest European colonial powers, which 
resulted in the many intersections of interests between them that led to several 
clashes. In order to avoid any negative developments, both sides agreed to enter 
into negotiations and reached a fair agreement in 1889. In this agreement, zones 
128 ʾUmar, Tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-muʿāṣir 1815–1919, p. 223.
129 al-Kaiyāli, et al., Mausūʿat al-siyāsa, vol. 5, p. 554.
130 Mannāʿ, Moḥammad ʿAbd al-Razāq, Judhūr al-niḍāl alʿarabī fī Lībiyā, Dār maktabat al-fikr, 
Ṭarābulis, 1972, p. 15.
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of influence for both parties were identified, both in relation to the continent of 
Africa and to some other regions.131 This agreement was viewed with suspicion 
by Italy, which considered it an obstacle to its presence in North Africa, specifi-
cally in the province of Tripoli. Italy’s opposition was mainly based on Britain’s 
recognition of the French presence in Saharan Africa and the southern region of 
the province of Tripoli, which was formalized in the agreement.132 In this, France 
began to seek control over Morocco by initiating many activities in the sou-
thern regions of the province of Tripoli and the west on the border with Tunisia, 
which was of course a French protectorate at the time. The Italians then started 
to express their concerns and opposition against the French political activities, 
prompting the French foreign minister to declare in 1899 that his country did not 
have any colonial ambitions in the province of Tripoli. This paved the way for the 
signing of several agreements between the two later on.133
Italian-French Agreement in 1900
This treaty was a result of the agreement mentioned above, when Italy sought 
to work on several major directions to be able to mobilize the European powers 
to its side. Italy thus realized that there is nothing inappropriate when former 
enemies become allies of the day. This was accomplished with France, despite 
the previous disappointments, but that did not hinder the Italian attempts at 
rapprochement to keep France away from the province of Tripoli, with Italy thus 
starting to work effectively in that direction. The first step in this policy was to 
involve Germany as the strongest ally in mitigating the conflict with France. 
The real beginning can be attributed to 1885,134 and again in 1898,135 when Italy 
took an important step and dropped the obstacles in customs and taxes against 
France. This paved the way for the creation of a calm situation that accelerated 
the understanding between the two sides and ultimately led to the convening of 
a secret agreement in 1900.136 This was followed by another agreement in 1901, 
131 Mīkhāʾīl, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-injīlīzīyya al-lībiyyā, p. 18.
132 al-Dijānī, Lībiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī, p. 334.
133 Yaḥya, Jalāl, al-Maghrib al-kabīr al-ʾuṣūr al-ḥadīthā wa al-hūjūm al-istiʿmāri, vol. 3, al-Dār 
al-qaumīyya li-l-ṭibāʿa wa al-nashr, al-Iskandarīyya,1966, pp. 706–707.
134 Qāsim, Jamāl Zakarīya, “Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-ṭarābulisiyya 1911–1914”, al-Majalla al-
tārīkhiyya al- maṣriyya li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, al-Qāhira, 1967, p. 308.
135 al-Dijānī, Lībiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī, p. 332.
136 Lewis, Mary Dewhurst, Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia 1881–1938, 
p. 222.
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which focused mainly on Mediterranean politics.137 Through these agreements, 
Italy managed to receive the assurances of the French that they would not involve 
themselves in any kind of competition in the province of Tripoli.138 The deal inclu-
ded the adoption of a dividing line between the areas of influence in the region. 
In return, Italy accepted the right of France to the occupation of Morocco.139 Thus 
the rapprochement between the two countries led to a division of influence in the 
two remaining regions of Morocco and Tripol in the north of Africa.140
Franco-British Entente Cordiale in 1904
The Entente Cordiale was a significant part of the series of treaties that the Euro-
pean governments consistently signed during this vital stage of history. These two 
major powers tried to overcome their conflicts, mainly what was called the first 
Morocco crisis, to sign an agreement in 1904.  The first Morocco crisis occurred when 
Germany was concerned about the relationship between France and Britain after 
signing the Entente Cordiale in 1904141 that ended the long conflicts between the 
two and declared Morocco a French sphere of influence. The entente made it possi-
ble to allow French control of Morocco without undermining the internal balance of 
power in Europe. Thus, it gave the right to France to land its troops in Morocco and 
Britain was given absolute control over Egypt.142 Germany then tried to highlight the 
weaknesses of the entente and the new relationship between France and Britain. 
According to Jones,143 Germany made a dramatic movement to use the threat of 
war to stress to the European powers the significance of consulting Germany on 
imperial matters. Jones wrote that Kaiser Wilhelm II arrived in the city of Tangier in 
northern Morocco in 1906 and met the Sultan of Morocco, Moulay ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al- 
Ḥasan. The German Kaiser then declared Germany’s support for the sultan’s inde-
pendence and the integrity of his kingdom, which made Morocco an international 
137 Tishāijī, al-Masʾalā al-tūnīsīyya, p. 234; Qāsim, “Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-ṭarābulisiyya”, 
p. 308; Kāmil, Maḥmūd, al-Dawlā al-ʿarabiyya al-kubra, Dār al-maʿārif, al-Qāhira, (D.T), p. 332.
138 Tishāijī, al-Masʾalā al-tūnīsīyya, p. 234.
139 al-Kaiyāli, et. al., Mausūʿat al-siyāsa, vol. 5, p. 554; Tishāijī, al-Masʾalā al-tūnīsīyya, p. 334.
140 Ziyāda, Lībiyā fī al-ʾuṣūr al-ḥadīthā, p. 59.
141 See Williamson, Samuel Richard, The Politics of the Grand Strategy. Britain and France Prepare 
for War in 1904-1914, Ashfield Press, London, 1990; Embry, Kristi N., “The Entente cordiale between 
and France, 8 April 1904”, extracted from http://www.branchcollective.org/?ps_articles=kristi-n-
embry-the-entente-cordiale-between-england-and-france-8-april-1904 (March 7, 2016). 
142 Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 205.
143 Jones, “Algeciras Revisited”, p. 5.
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crisis.144 France tried to offer a compensatory accord with Germany similar to the 
ones it had managed with other countries concerned with Morocco. However, 
Germany refused the offer and insisted on using the system of ‘diplomatic imperi-
alism’ to humiliate France and called for an international conference to decide on 
the future of Morocco.145 The Algeciras conference was thus held in 1906 to solve 
the first Moroccan crisis. Twelve countries, including Morocco, Britain, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Spain, and Portugal participated, as well as the American pre-
sident Theodore Roosevelt.146 Germany’s aim in the conference was to acquire 
political and economic gains in Morocco via ‘imperialism diplomacy’. However, 
it failed to achieve the required gains due to many factors.147  One of them was 
the basic judgment errors and diplomatic failure that overestimated the help that 
could be gained from Russia and Spain. The conference act included decisions 
to build upgroups of Spanish and French troops to protect the Moroccan ports, 
which were seen as important for the French colonization of Morocco.148 Despite 
these setbacks Germany tried to find another area in the Mediterranean region. 
Meanwhile, it worked on enhancing its relationships with other allies such as the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the province 
of Tripoli was considered in the German political and military strategy before the 
First World War. Despite the fact that Tripoli was not mentioned explicitly in this 
agreement, it was a cornerstone in the agreements that were signed after this 
date. This agreement was a significant turning point in the path that led the major 
countries to agree on controlling the region on the coast of the Mediterranean. It 
was the authentic beginning of the division of Europe into the two main encamp-
ments that took their final form in the First World War.
The Anglo-French-Italian Agreement in 1906
Italy did not spare any efforts to get the full consensus and support of Europe. In 
this regard, Italy entered into a tripartite agreement with Britain and France in 
1906. This agreement explicitly identified the areas of influence of each party in 
North and East Africa and the Red Sea regions.149
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
146 See Collin, Richard H., Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion: A New View 
of American Imperialism, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, London, 1985.
147 Jones, “Algeciras Revisited”, p. 8.
148 Ibid.
149 Muḥāfaẓa, Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya, p. 27.
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The Italian-Russian Agreement in 1907
The Italian prime minister had tried to sign an agreement with the tsar of Russia, 
Nicholas II. The agreement assured Russian support to Italy in the province of 
Tripoli. In turn, Italy promised to support Russia in the area of the straits of Bos-
phorus and Dardanelles150 and to hinder the expansion pursued by Austria in 
the Balkans. At that time, it was well known that Austria and Italy were allies. 
However, Italy was threatened by the expansion of Austria in nearby areas, 
which motivated it to support Russia more strongly. This agreement was a signi-
ficant diplomatic support to Italy. In spite of the existence of several agreements 
that emphasized the need to maintain the territories of the Ottoman Empire by 
the major European powers, no real action toward this end took place on the 
ground.151 This was mainly because of the emerging ambition of the European 
countries that made each seek to strengthen its presence abroad. Moreover, each 
country tried to add new territories to provide the raw materials needed for the 
development of its economy. For instance, Britain did not respect its agreements 
with the Ottoman Empire when it obtained control over Cyprus in 1878, which 
had been under Ottoman rule from 1571. However, when the Italian government 
expressed its desire to colonize the province of Tripoli, it was supported by the 
British Foreign Minister Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881) without reservation.152 
Thus, Italy was able to sign a number of political agreements considered a poli-
tical victory. It could take advantage of the conflicting interests of the European 
countries and successfully exploited these to occupy the province of Tripoli. Taken 
together all of these events amount to Italy’s preparations to colonize Tripoli. The 
preparing efforts were twofold. Firstly it was performed externally and included 
signing the agreements mentioned above, secondly there were internal activities 
concerning the Italian state itself. Internally, the Italian government tried to con-
vince the parliament and the political parties of the idea of invasion.  
4.1  Bank of Rome and Scientific Missions. The Italian Occupation
Italy started colonization activities relatively late due to the fact that the country 
was only united in 1870 and lacked the military capabilities. However, Italy had 
150 al-Dijānī, Lībiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī, p. 336; al-Kaiyāli, et al., Mausūʿat al-siyāsa, vol. 5, p. 
554.
151 Sanū, ʾAlmāniya wa al-islām, pp. 61–62.
152 Mannāʿ, Judhūr al-niḍāl alʿarabī, p. 15.
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changed its policies in line with the rest of the European countries.153 One of the 
Italian objectives behind the establishment of colonies was the political gains 
that expanding its political and economic influence would bring. It sought eco-
nomic gains to support its economy by finding new markets for its products and 
thus creating new sources of revenue for the state.154 Italy began to obtain territo-
ries on the African continent. It began first in eastern Africa, in Ethiopia, in 1882, 
but suffered a bitter defeat in the battle of Adwa in 1896.155 Italy then directed its 
attention to North Africa, specifically toward Tunisia at first, but lost it to France. 
Italy then proceeded to take the necessary measures to carry out a military opera-
tion there. The government intended to prepare the ground in the province eco-
nomically, politically and culturally before the declaration of war on the Ottoman 
Empire there. The Italian politicians were aware of the seriousness of the stage 
that they were preparing for, because the political situation in Tripoli was dif-
ferent from the rest of its neighbors in North Africa. This region was under the 
direct authority of the Ottoman Empire, which was one of the obstacles that Italy 
faced. The other obstacle was the local population. The Italian policy-makers had 
to be careful about their steps in pursuing their colonial goals and they started 
to work internally to prepare Italian public opinion to accept the idea of  sending 
troops to war on the coast of North Africa. This was considered a challenge after 
their defeat in East Africa. This was intensified when the left-wing came to power 
and assured people it would improve their standard of living and alleviate all 
the economic and social problems. Moreover, they launched the idea of migra-
ting to new lands that would be later Italian colonies.156 As the Ottoman Empire, 
specifically in North Africa, was regarded as disintegrating by the French and 
British governments, Italy launched a huge economic investment in Tripoli and, 
through schools for the Jewish population, created a division between Jews from 
Europe and Jews from Tripoli.157 The Italians were very focused on all the internal 
and external affairs of Tripoli, and the Italian government became very sensi-
tive to everything that would oppose its activities there, especially the efforts of 
153 Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, p.103.
154 al-Ḥarīr, “al-Tamhīd li-l-ghazū al-iṭālī wa mauqif al-lībīyyīn minhu”, p. 29.
155 Qāsim, “Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-ṭarābulisiyya”, p. 308; Ismāʿīl, Tārīkh al-ʿarab al-
ḥadīth, p. 262.
156 Mannāʿ, Judhūr al-niḍāl alʿarabī, p. 14; Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, p. 106.
157 See the work of Simon, Rachel, “The Relations of the Jewish Community of Libya with 
Eu rope in the Late Ottoman Period and Jewish-Muslim Relations in Libya in the 19th–20th Cen-
turies”, in “The Socio-economic Role of the Tripolitanian Jews in the Late Ottoman Period”, in 
Abitbol, Michel (ed.), Communautés juives des marges sahariennes du Maghreb, The Ben-Zvi 
Institute Jerusalem, 1982, p. 253–63.
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any other European country. One of these activities by the Europeans was the 
issue of identifying the borders of territories belonging to Turkey and the British 
in the border area between the province of Tripoli and Egypt in 1904.158 When 
the Italian government was informed of this agreement in 1904, they immedi-
ately contacted the British government requesting an explanation. Britain then 
replied that this issue was not existent. The same happened with France, which 
repeatedly tried to gain territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire in the 
border region between the province of Tripoli and the former Ottoman province 
of Tunis colonized by France.159 This prompted Italy to propose that the consuls 
of Italy and Britain, as well as one employee of the Ottoman state, should solve 
the problem of the eastern and western borders. The Ottomans refused this pro-
posal, and considered the issue an internal affair of the sultan. Their refusal did 
not deter the Italian government from repeating the attempt, insisting on having 
an active and major role in the conflict, but all their efforts failed. On the same 
issue, the Italian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire announced in 1891 that Italy 
would not accept any activities that might change the balance of power in the 
Mediterranean region, especially by the French. Italy was aware of the attempt 
by France to strengthen its presence in Tripoli through varied cultural activities, 
as it tried to open French schools in the province. This effort also included great 
pressure put on the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the French government made 
several requests to the Ottoman government to facilitate the work of its ambas-
sador in Tripoli. In this instance, France succeeded in getting the permission of 
mutaṣarrīfīyya of al-Khums to build a church and a residence for priests in the 
city of al-Khums in 1903.160
The question that arises here is what the motives of France were in imple-
menting all these activities inside the province of Tripoli at this particular time 
considering the agreements they had already signed? The answer to this question 
was that, at this stage, France did not intend to gain benefits from Tripoli but 
intended to use it to exercise pressure on the Italian government to compromise 
and reach a settlement satisfactory to both parties in the region of North Africa.161 
The press also played a major role as the Italian newspapers had been writing 
about the activities of France in the disputed areas with the Ottoman Empire. 
158 Egypt had been occupied by Britain since 1882.
159 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 186.
160 Jhān, ʿAlī Moḥammad, al-Ḥayāt al-thaqāfiyya bi Miṣrāta athnāʾ al-ḥukm alʿūthmānī al-thānī 
1835–1911, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2007, p. 77.
161 Muḥāfaẓa, Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya, p. 27.
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They worked to highlight the attacks by France on the borders of the province.162 
They did not ignore the news that the French were trying to obtain the privilege 
of building the port of Tripoli in 1905.163 The Italian government then started to 
investigate this information supported by the press. This prompted France to 
immediately declare it as rumors to reassure the Italian government.164 The Italian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs named Tatony165 explained this issue in the Italian 
Senate. The Italians then assigned their ambassador to the Ottoman Empire to 
clarify the iItalian policies with the Ottoman sultan. He argued that they were 
only intended to maintain the situation in the region and that their goals were 
purely peaceful. The main argument used by the Italians to explain the situation 
was that if the Sultan granted any privileges in the province of Tripoli to other 
countries, this would negatively affect their economic interests and would there-
fore inevitably lead to force the government to change its policy toward the Otto-
mans.166 Germany was also attacked by the Italian press because Italy sought 
to strengthen its in the internal affairs of the province. The newspapers then 
doubted the German intentions, stressing that their activities were not only eco-
nomic in nature but that they sought to control the province politically.167 The 
newspapers indicated openly and directly that Germany was seeking to take 
control of the important port of Tobruk by leasing it from the Ottoman govern-
ment, but went even further by stressing that there were negotiations taking 
place between the Ottomans and the Germans.168 Germany was also subjected 
to propaganda from the French and British newspapers, as they tried to depict 
Germany as suspicious and mistrusted considering its activities in North Africa 
generally and in Tripoli, specifically. That was after Germany had tried to mediate 
between the Ottomans and the French on the issue of the borders between Tri-
politania and Tunisia. The French press wrote then that Germany was seeking to 
internationalize the issue, especially with regard to the oasis of Janet,169 located 
162 Tishāijī, al-Masʾalā al-tūnīsīyya, pp. 193, 206–207. 
163 A plan of the harbour of Tripoli was drawn a bit before; for this question, see Plan du port de 
Tripoli de Barbare levé en 1816 et 1821, Dépot général de la Marine, 1823.
164 Yaḥya, al-Maghrib al-kabīr, pp. 716–717.
165 As the name mentioned in the reference.
166 Yaḥya, al-Maghrib al-kabīr, p. 717.
167 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das 
Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 11, vom 1. Januar 1909 bis 31. März 1911, R16116, “Die Deut-
sche Flagge in Tripolis”, La Grande Italia, Nr. 2, 8. Januar 1911.
168 Ismāʿīl, Tārīkh al-ʿarab al-ḥadīth, p. 266.
169 For mode details on this issue see Pottier, René, La Tripolitaine vue par un Français, Dar 
al-Fergani, Tripoli, n.d.
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near the confluence of influence between the province of Tripoli and Algeria, and 
Germany was accused of defending the Ottoman Empire.170 Generally, Italy was 
supported by the flexibility shown by the European countries that measured the 
political situation according to their economic strategic interests and all agreed 
that the Italians should focus their efforts on their goal of occupying Tripoli. In 
doing so, they intended to keep Italy away from other regions like the Balkans, 
for example, and thus Italy found the support of all the Europeans. 1889 could be 
considered as the actual beginning of the Italian penetration into the province of 
Tripoli, especially with regard to the cultural aspects like schools, language and 
mass media, and extending the work of the Bank of Rome.171 The Bank of Rome 
was expanding inside the province,172 as it opened branches in Benghazi,173  in 
Darna,174 and in Gharyan in 1907175 in addition to the branch in the city of Tripoli. It 
conducted initially normal banking activities, then started to buy agricultural land 
from the local population and paid very high prices,176 prompting many of the local 
people to sell their land. Moreover, the bank started to grant the local population 
loans. A guarantor was needed to repay the loan later if the recipient was unable to 
repay it. A debtor who was unable to repay had his land confiscated.177 This helped 
the Italians to establish a huge economic base in the province of Tripoli. The Bank 
of Rome also established companies that came to be administered directly by the 
bank officials and succeeded in attracting a number of Libyan citizens to work for 
these companies.178 Information indicated that the number of these workers ranged 
170 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 1, 
vom Juni 1881 bis 22. Februar 1883, R16106, Berlin Tagblatt, Nr. A13737, 8.8.1906.
171 ʿAbd al-Qādir, ʿIṣmat, Daūr al-nuwāb al-ʿarab fī majlis al-mabʿūthān al-ʿūthmānī 1908–1914, 
al-Dār al-ʿarabiyya li-l-mausūʿāt, Bayrūt, 2006, p. 245.
172 Qāsim, “Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-ṭarābulisiyya”, p. 307.
173 Mirt, Azjān, “Nashāṭ maṣraf Rūmā min khilāl al-wathāʾiq al-ʿūthmānīyyā”, translated by 
ʿAbd al-Karīm abu- Shuwaīrib, Majallat al-wathāʾiq wa al-makhṭūṭāt, 19 ̸ 20, markaz jihād al-
lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2003–2004, p. 178.
174 Sebald, “Eine unerschlossene Quelle zur Geschichte Libyens: die Artikel des deutschen 
Afrika forschers Gottlob Adolf Krause (Malam Mosa) aus dem Jahre 1911 zur italienischen 
Kolonial eroberung”, in Libyen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, ed. by Burchard Brentjes, Halle, 
1979, pp. 21-22.
175 Ghānim, ʿImād al-Dīn (translator), Taqārīr biʿthat al-ṣalīb al-aḥmar al-ʿalmānī fī al-ḥarb al-
lībiyyā al-iṭālīyya, 1911–1912, rev. and intr. by Ḥasan ʿAlī Fahmī Khishīm, maṭābaʿ al-thawrā al-
ʿarabiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1987, p. 43.
176 Maḥmūd, Ḥasan Sulaymān, Lībiyā bain al-māḍi wa al-ḥāḍir, muʾassasat sijil al-ʿarab, al-
Qāhira, 1962, p. 220; Mannāʿ, Judhūr al-niḍāl alʿarabī, p. 15.
177 al-ʿAqād, Ṣalāḥ, Lībiyā al-muʿāṣira, Maʿhad al-buḥūth wa al-dirāsāt al-ʿarabiyya, al- 
maṭbaʿa al-faniyya al-ḥadīthā, shāriʿ al-aṣbagh bi-l-Zaitūn, 1970, p. 12.
178 Sebald, “Eine unerschlossene Quelle zur Geschichte Libyens”, p. 21.
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between 200 and 300. The activities of the bank varied to a great extent and  were 
all done under the guise of investments in the province and the introduction of 
modern industries that included e.g. an ice factory, an olive oil factory and varied 
other projects. All these projects aimed to introduce the Italian influence into the 
province. As a result, Italy managed to acquire 22 % of total foreign trade with the 
province of Tripoli in 1911.179 The staff of the bank were involved in collect ing as 
much information as possible about the province while trying to win the trust of 
the local people and prepare them to accept the Italian presence on their land.180 
The Italian government started to establish a number of Italian schools within 
the province,181 in addition to the Italian schools already opened in 1876 during 
the reforms (Tanẓīmāt) and in 1878182 (both were located in the center of the city 
of Tripoli).  Later on, the Italian government opened eight more schools in some 
other coastal cities such as Benghazi, in which they opened five schools. In Derna 
there were two schools, and three schools were opened in al-Khums in 1911.183 
Italian sources estimated the number of students enrolled in these schools at 
about 3.000 pupils in 1911, a figure reflecting a widespread interest in learning 
the Italian culture. The project was supported by the Italian government, which 
dedicated 46.000 Italian liras per year to ensure its success.184 It is worth menti-
oning that some of those schools taught in both Italian and Arabic, side by side, 
as a way to attract a large number of Arabs who wished to teach their children the 
Arabic language and refused to let them into schools that taught only Italian. It 
is notable that education in these schools was free.185 Italy also sent a number of 
scientific and medical missions to identify some of the natural phenomena, the 
geography of the area, and to study some medicinal plants and herbs. al-Ḥarīr 
mentioned that these were sometimes connected to colonial aspirations and not 
just scientific missions.186 They succeeded in collecting accurate information 
179 Ibid.
180 al-Ḥarīr, “al-Tamhīd li-l-ghazū al-iṭālī wa mauqif al-lībīyyīn minhu”, p. 32.
181 al-Ḥasan, Ḥasan, al-Anẓima al-sīyāsiyya wa al-dustūriyya fī Lubnān wa saʾir al-buldān al-
ʿarabiyya, Bayrūt, 1967, p. 389.
182 Ḥasanīn, ʿAlī al-Ṣādiq, “al-Madāris al-iṭālīyya wa taṭawuruha fī Lībiyā 1835–1950”, aʿmāl 
al-nadwā al-ʿilmiyya al-thāminā allatī ʿuqidat bi-l-markaz fī al-fatra min 26-27/9/2000, ed. by 
Moḥammad al-Ṭahir al-Jarārī, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, 
pp. 431-432.  
183 Sebald, “Eine unerschlossene Quelle zur Geschichte Libyens”, p. 21.
184 Ismāʿīl, Tārīkh al-ʿarab al-ḥadīth, p. 265.
185 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, pp. 39, 47.
186 al-Ḥarīr, ʿAbd al-Maula Ṣāliḥ, “al-Taḥarukāt al-sīyāsiyya al-iṭālīyya, wa al-tamhīd li-iḥtilāl 
Lībiyā”, Majallat al-buḥūth al-tārīkhiyya, 10-2, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, 
Ṭarābulis, 1987, p. 14. 
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about the geography of the province.187 The Italian government sent a group 
of specialists to study the nature of the coast of the province of Tripoli. These 
specialists reached the city of Tripoli as sponge hunters and actually worked in 
this field there, which allowed them to carry out comprehensive surveys of the 
coast and present to a thorough study to the Italian authorities and the Ottoman 
Empire.188 Among the most important of those missions was that of Count Sforza, 
which arrived inTripoli in 1910. Sforza, who was the head of the mission, claimed 
that they had come to search for minerals, and specifically to detect phosphate. 
However, the real motive behind their activities was revealed later: they were on 
a military mission to draw strategic military maps.189 The Ottomans then arrested 
the members of the mission and some of them were put in jail; the O’Shea Lau-
sanne treaty (between the Italians and the Ottomans) freed them in 1912.190 The 
Italian government also encouraged Italian citizens to migrate to the west of the 
province of Tripoli,191 and by 1911 there were 620 Italian citizens there.192
Some Ottoman governors played a major role in hindering the Italian mission 
in Tripoli; these include Reçeb Pasha (1904–1908). Reçeb Pasha was aware of the 
seriousness of the situation; this was revealed in his many efforts to introduce 
reforms and to develop the military forces in Tripoli. In addition, he established 
schools as an effort to raise the level of education and awareness of the local 
population to the level demanded by the events and possess the ability to con-
front Italy, as he was aware of the Italian attempt to occupy the country.193 Reçeb 
Pasha was not the only governor who stood up to the Italian project. Governor 
Ibrahim Pasha (1910–1911) was also highly aware of the extent of the Italian colo-
nial project and influence over the country. He very soon began to fight against 
this project by organizing the conscription and training of volunteers from the 
local population. Ibrahim Pasha also worked hard to obstruct the activities of the 
Bank of Rome, and contacted the government in Istanbul to provide the latest on 
Italian colonial intentions, but he did not receive any response to those reports.194 
Instead, the Ottoman Empire issued an order to immediately open a branch of the 
187 Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, p. 12; Ḥasan, Lībiyā baina al-māḍi wa al-ḥāḍir, p. 219; 
al-ʿAqād, Lībiyā al-muʿāṣira, p. 12.
188 Lūtiskī,Vladimir, Tārīkh al-aqṭār al-ʿarabiyya al-ḥadīth, translated by ʿAfīfa al-Bustāni, re-
vised by Yūrī Rūshīn, Dār al-taqadum, Moscow, 1973, p. 368
189 Ismāʿīl, Tārīkh al-ʿarab al-ḥadīth, p. 265.
190 Shukrī, Mīlād dawlāt Lībiyā al-ḥadīthā, p. 428.  
191 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 131.
192 Sebald, “Eine unerschlossene Quelle zur Geschichte Libyens”, pp. 20–21.
193 al-Zāwi, Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, pp. 281–282.
194 Ibid., p. 284.
146   German Economic Activities in the Province of Tripoli in 1910
Ottoman Bank in the province of Tripoli in 1906,195 to work together with their 
Agricultural Bank, which had been established previously. The government then 
decided to reduce the profit margins from 6 % to 4 % in response to the Bank of 
Rome’s activities to access land. They also issued a decree to facilitate all the 
procedures for the citizens and not to impose tough conditions. Moreover, they 
emphasized to the bank’s administration that in cases of losses they should resort 
to the Ministry of Finance to compensate themand not to impose taxes on the 
people of Tripoli. However, the government was cautious in implementing these 
procedures, which were discussed secretly. The governor was asked to be cau-
tious in implementing these procedures so as not to attract the attention of the 
Italians or other European countries. The government of Ibrahim Hakki Pasha 
(1910–1911) in the Ottoman capital was not in a position to fulfill the serious 
responsibilities entrusted to it (it was in a difficult situation due to the onset of 
decline within the empire at the same time), which is why it disregarded these 
warnings when alerted to the imminent danger in the province of Tripoli.196 The 
government then took a very dangerous act in response to the pressures of the 
Italians and isolated the governor Ibrahim Pasha in September 1911, and did 
not send someone to take on his responsibilities. This allowed the Italians to 
reveal their true intentions197 and take the initiative to send parts of their fleet 
to the Mediterranean, particularly off the coast of Tripoli. They demonstrated 
their force as a prelude to the invasion. At that time the country was suffering 
of poor conditions due to the negligence of the government of Ibrahim Hakki 
Pasha, which withdrew a large number of soldiers sent to Yemen for the neces-
sities of security. The government did not replace the soldiers.198 The internal 
political situation in the province of Tripoli helped Italy to succeed in most of 
these activities; the province was being neglected by the government in Istan-
bul due to the difficult political situation in the empire (distance between the 
province and the center of government). Not enough reforms had been conduc-
ted in the province, especially the reforms required at this crucial stage, except 
for the efforts of individual governors in Tripoli. On September 27, 1911, Britain 
and France confirmed an alliance against the Italians and Ottomans. An eco-
195 The Branch of Benghasi was opened in 1911 and closed in 1912, like in Tripoli. The London-
Galata-Istanbul Izmir opened in 1856 and Djeddah in 1912 and closed in 1916. For a more detailed 
history see Autheman, André, La Banque impériale ottomane, Comité pour l’Histoire Econo-
mique, Paris, 1996; see also Billiotti, Adrien, La Banque Impériale Ottomane, Paris, 1909.
196 al-Wāfī, Moḥammad Abd al-Kārīm, al-Ṭarīg ilā Luẓān, Dār al-Furjānī, Ṭarābulis, 1977, p. 69.
197 Qāsim, “Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-ṭarābulisiyya”, p. 310.
198 Prätor, Sabine: Der arabische Faktor in der jungtürkischen Politik: Eine Studie zum osmani-
schen Parlament der II. Konstitution (1908–1918), Berlin, 1993.
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nomic and strategic competition pushed Italy to engage more in the direction 
of a military occupation in the region.199 The Ottomans did not estimate the 
Italian motives in the way they deserved; they thought that if they provided all 
the necessary measures and procedures that they could deal with the situation. 
The Italo-Turkish War in 1911
Italy was determined and declared war on the Ottoman Empire on September 29, 
1911. The Italian military fleet was composed of 23 ships carrying 40.000 troops. 
They attacked the center of the city of Tripoli. Another military fleet was directed 
toward the east; some historical documents state that the fleet consisted of 36.000 
troops, in other sources 32.000 troops200 arrived on 19 ships. They were under the 
command of General Ottavio Bricola and their destination was the city of Beng-
hazi.201 Thus the Italian navy sequentially attacked the coastal cities of Tripoli 
and al-Khums, Benghazi, Darna and Tobruk in the first days of October.202 They 
first concentrated their attack on the port of Tripoli, and succeeded in sinking 
a number of ships anchored there. They were also able to destroy the maritime 
telecommunication line that connected Tripoli to Istanbul on October 3, 1911.203 
This was the first day of the Italo-Turkish war in Libya. The Italians were able to 
reach the city of Tripoli on October 5.204 The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
had received news of the attack via a telegraph sent by Alfred Tilger.205 Faced with 
199 al-ʿAqād, Lībiyā al-muʿāṣira, p. 13; Brrū, al-ʿArab wa al-turk, p. 328.
200 Hūwīdī, Muṣṭafa ʿAlī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā khilāl al-ḥarb al-ʿālāmīyyā 
al-ʾūlā, revised by Ṣālāḥ al-Dīn Ḥasan al-Sūri, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, 
Ṭarābulis, 1988, p. 27.
201 Mannāʿ, Judhūr al-niḍāl al-ʿarabī fī Lībiyā, p. 19; Kāmil, al-Dawlā al-ʿarabiyya al-kubra, p. 332.
202 See Gallica BNF: Tripoli, guerre italo-turque (Italo-Turkish War) [camp de l’armée italienne 
au pied de remparts]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol], Documents iconographiques, 1911, 
Tripoli, and see also Guerre italo-turque [militaires italiens dans une maison de Tripoli]: [photo-
graphie de presse]/[Agence Rol], Documents iconographiques, Consultable in Gallica; Maḥmūd, 
Lībiyā baina al-māḍi wa al-ḥāḍir, pp. 221–222. 
203 McClure, William Kidston, Italy in North Africa, an Account of the Tripoli Enterprise, Darf, 
London, 1986, p. 41.
204 Tshanar, Frānntis wa Frītis Shitīyyāt wa Salwā al-Khamāsh, Tārīkh al-ʿālam alʿarabī, Dār 
ṣādir, Bayrūt, 1975, p. 234; al-Tilīsī, Khalīfa Moḥammad, Maʿarik al-jihād al-lībī min khilāl al-khiṭaṭ 
al-ḥarbīyya al-iṭālīyya, al-munshaʾa al-ʾāmmā li-l- nashir wa al-tawziʿ wa al-iʿlān, Ṭarābulis, 
1982, p. 19; al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, p. 80.
205 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 5, vom März 1913 
bis April 1914, R901/4414, Nr. II˚ 3798. 
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this violent attack there was no option available to the local population and the 
local government other than to resist using the available weapons, which were 
few and some were very old.206 Despite the lack of weapons and the lack of suffici-
ent forces, they resisted and were accompanied by some of the Turkish officers. 
Nashat Pasha, the governer of the province of Tripoli in 1911, was in charge. He 
was based in the western region, and had taken the area of al-Aziziyah has, a 
military base.207 The Ottoman Empire then entered into direct negotiations with 
the Italians in order to settle the war in Libya.208 The negotiations were held in 
Lausanne in Switzerland and resulted in the signing of an agreement between the 
two sides, known as the Treaty of Lausanne, on October 18, 1912.209 The Ottomans 
then withdrew from the province of Tripoli, which was then named Libya. The 
Ottomans announced that Libya was being granted independence, even if Libya 
was then occupied by Italy. The Ottomans left Libya to face its destiny to Italy.210 
However, the Ottomans retained some of their concessions in Libya, such as the 
appointment of staff for religious affairs in 1912,211 and allowing the people to 
pray for the Ottoman Sultan in mosques. 
The residents of Libya were exposed to a harsh policy by the Italians during 
the occupation.212 The Italians restricted the movement of people and placed 
a blockade on the whole country to prevent the arrival of any aid or weapons. 
They also placed strict controls on the borders, which led to a severe shortfall in 
food and other consumer goods that had been imported. This blockade had very 
negative impacts on the prices of the available goods, which became much more 
expensive. The drought that hit the country in 1911 made the situation worse.213 
According to a report214 in the German political archives on the general situation 
206 Sebald, “Eine unerschlossene Quelle zur Geschichte Libyens”, pp. 28–29.
207 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, p. 93.
208 Since 1911 Province (wilāyāt) of Tripoli was named Libya; see Larfaoui, Mahmoud-Hamdane, 
L’occupation italienne de la Libye: les préliminaires, 1882–1911, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2010.
209 Bundesarchiv, Nr. A5735; Vandewalle, Dirk, A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, p. 25; Wright, Libya: A Modern History, p. 28. 
210 Tshanar, Tārīkh al-ʿālam alʿarabī, p. 234.
211 Brūkilmān, Tārīkh al-shuʿūb al-islāmīyya, p. 601.
212 See on this issue the picture: Guerre italo-turque (Italo-Turkish War) [militaires italiens 
derrière une barricade dans une rue de Tripoli] [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence 
Rol], Gallica, BNF Paris, Publication: [Novembre 1911]. Reference 17067; see also 10-10-11, Tripoli 
[groupe de militaires marchant dans une rue] [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence 
Rol] Gallica, BNF Paris, Publication: [Octobre 1911], Reference Number 16590. 
213 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Tripolis, Bd. 7, vom Januar 1910 bis Dezember 
1912, R141612, Nr. 691, Mai 1912.
214 Ibid.
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in Tripoli in 1911, the agricultural harvest of that year was very poor and poverty 
was widespread among the population of the city of Tripoli. It also stated that 
the number of beggars on the streets had greatly increased.  The report menti-
oned that this situation was not unique to this city and that the same phenome-
non could be witnessed in other parts of the country. Moreover, the report stated 
that prices of buying or renting land or houses had increased significantly.215 The 
report illustrated that the many battles that had taken place had damaged agri-
culture fields in rural areas. Consequently, there was a severe reduction in the 
production of oranges, olives, palm trees and others.216
4.2  Jihad in Libya and the German Position toward it
The Libyan fighters were called mujāhidīn and the whole war against the Italians 
declared as jihad. The term Libyan mujāhidīn is also used in this book to describe 
the mujāhidīn in Libya and it does not mean that this was a nationalist move-
ment.217 Many of the mujāhidīn refused to recognize the treaty of Lausanne and 
decided to proceed with jihad. They regarded the treaty of Lausanne as having 
surrendered the country to its enemies. Thus, the Islamic jihad and the Libyan 
jihad were officially announced as a response to Italy’s declaration of war against 
the Ottoman Empire in September 1911. Even if jihad in Libya at that time was not 
a nationalist movement, the jihad movement was composed of many local move-
ments. The majority of the local movements were coordinated by tribal leaders. 
Using the weapons that were available to them, they launched attacks on Italian 
encampments, cities, or centers of occupation. It is worth noting that the majority 
of fighters in the various independent local movements were not trained soldiers, 
but took part as part of an ideological battle against Italian occupation. Neither 
did they come from any particular social class, but represented all sections of 
Libyan society. In addition to mujāhidīn they were also referred to as volunteers. 
These fighters were joined by troops from the Ottoman forces, who had a greater 
degree of military training.
Among the mujāhidīn was Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, who was one of the mujāhidīn 
leaders in Yafren in the Western Mountains, Moḥammad Sūwf al-Maḥmūdi who 
was the tribal leader of al-Maḥamīd tribe in north east of the city of Tripoli, and 
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
217 See Simon, Rachel, Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism: The Ottoman Involvement 
in Libya during the War with Italy, 1911–1919, Klaus Schwarz, Berlin, 1987.
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Moḥammad ʿAbd al-llāh al-Būsayfī, one of the mujāhidīn leaders in the Western 
Mountains and others.218 One of the well known mujāhidīn was Sayyid Aḥmed 
al-Sharīf al-Sanūsī, who belonged to al-Sanūsīyya political – a religious Sufi 
order, tribe and political movement219 that played a major role in the history of 
Libya. The movement and its relations with the Ottomans were important.220 
Following the outbreak of war between the Italians and the Libyan mujāhidīn 
in Libya, Germany sent a number of journalists to report on what was going on 
there and to evaluate the situation. Not only Germany, but also Britain and France 
had reporters in Libya.221 Nevertheless, the Italian politicians were suspicious of 
the activities of these reporters and put many obstacles in their way.222 They also 
imposed strict censorship on all reports that were sent to Europe before they were 
published. These actions led some German journalists and others to stop their 
work and return to their countries, reporting the harassment of the Italian autho-
rities.223 As the conflict developed and, following a number of unequal battles 
between the Libyan mujāhidīn and the Italians, the Italian government released 
a decree on November 5, 1911 announcing its suzerainty over all of Libya.224 In 
return, Germany issued a rejection of this decree, followed by France and Bri-
tain.225 The German rejection meant that this decree was not granted internati-
218 Khishīm, Ḥasan ʿ Alī, Ṣafaḥāt min jihādanā al-waṭanī, Dār maktabat al-fikr, Ṭarābulis, 1974, p. 54.
219 Ibrāhīm, Maḥmūd, al-ʿAlāmah Moḥammad bin ʿAlī al-Sanūsī al-jazāʾiri mujtahidan 
mujāhidan 1788–1859, dīwān al-maṭbuʿāt al-jamiʾīya, al-Jazāʾir, 2009, p. 124.
220 al-Sanūsīyya was a religious movement in Libya at the beginning of the 19th century founded 
by al-Mahdi al-Sanūsī and gained his name, al-Sanūsī is the title of all the sons of al-Mahdi al-
Sanūsī, who took the leadership. They are the followers of al-Mahdi al-Sanūsī politically, ideolo-
gically and personally, see Ibrāhīm, al-ʿAlāmah Moḥammad bin ʿAlī al-Sanūsī, p. 124.
221 On this issue see Tripoli, les officiers étrangers suivant la guerre [Image fixe]: [photographie 
de presse]/[Agence Rol] November 1911, Gallica, BNF, Paris, Reference 17327.
222 See Labranca, Nicola, La guerra Italiana per la Libya: 1913–1931, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2012, 293p.
223 Ghrīfintīs, Ghayūr Ghafūn, Tārīkh al-ḥarb al-lībiyyā al-iṭālīyya, translated by ʿImād al-Dīn 
Ghānim, revised by al-ʿAmīn al-Ṭāhir Shaqlīlā, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, 
Ṭarābulis, 1986, p. 112.
224 See on this issue: Tripoli, l’état-major italien pendant la lecture de l’acte d’annexion [Image 
fixe]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol] Octobre 1911, Gallica, BNF, Paris, Reference 17330. 
And see also Tripoli, le général Caneva lisant l’acte d’annexion; à sa droite, l’amiral Borea Rica 
[Image fixe]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol] Gallica, BNF Paris, Publication: [Octobre 
1911], Reference number 17313; Māsāi, Būl, al-Waḍaʿ al-dawalī li-Ṭarābulis al-ghārb: nuṣūṣ al-
muʿāhadāt al-lībiyyā al-firinsīyyā ilā nihāyat al-qarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashar, translated by Moḥammad 
al-ʿAlāqī, revised by ʿAlī Ḍawī, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1991, 
p. 153; Ghrīfintīs, Tārīkh al-ḥarb al-lībiyyā al-iṭālīyya, p. 123.
225 Rāshid, Aḥmed Ismāʿīl, Tārīkh ʿaqṭār al-maghrib al-ʿarabī al-sīyāsī al-ḥadīth wa al-muʿāṣir
(Lībiyā – Tūnis – al-Jazāʾir – al-Maghrib – Mūrītaniya), Dār al-nāhḍa al-ʿarabiyya, Bayrūt, 2004, p. 40.
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onal legitimacy. However, this uncompromising attitude did not last long, espe-
cially after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1912. It seemed that if Italy did 
not succeed in imposing political and military pressure on the Ottoman Empire 
and some European countries, Italy could not sign that agreement. It led to the 
international recognition of the Italian existence in Libya even if it was not expli-
citly announced. Even if Germany initially opposed Italy’s aims, strategic inter-
ests and the political and economic relations with the rest of Europe determined 
its position in the end. Thus, the German government in Berlin was primarily 
serving its interests, which is why it had declared its opposition at first, and then 
changed its decision and declared its support of the Italians. They maintained 
their strong relationships with the Ottoman Empire in parallel with their support 
for the Libyans.226
A number of German officers were fighting on the frontline alongside Enver 
Pasha and his mujāhidīn in the city of Derna in the far eastern part of Libya 
against the Italians. These officers sent their reports to the government in Berlin; 
among those officers was the Baron von Dalwing.227 Furthermore, they had taken 
on the task of helping the Turkish leaders in the management of war battles and 
organizing the mujāhidīn and those Germans can be described as guides for mili-
tary operations.228 This German position was echoed by the leaders of the Islamic 
Libyan jihad, in particular by Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, who led the jihad movement in 
the western part of the country, specifically the area of the western mountains. He 
trusted the German Emperor Wilhelm II and believed he was pursuing a moderate 
policy toward Libya. He also worked to spare the country from entering war on 
a number of occasions. From this point, Sulaymān al-Bārūnī (1872–1940) was in 
contact with the German emperor several times, especially after the signing of the 
Treaty of Ouchy in 1912 between the Italians and the Ottomans. His initial message 
dating to December 27th, 1912 required Germany to recognize Libya as an indepen-
dent state that had its existence based on that convention. On January 4th, he sent 
another message asking the German government to protect the Libyans and their 
rights. He asked the emperor of Germany to do his best to influence the king of 
Italy, considering that they were allies, and make him announce the indepen-
dence of Tripoli. He also asked the emperor to impose pressures on the Italians to 
226 Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 13.  
227 Ghrīfintīs, Tārīkh al-ḥarb al-lībiyyā al-iṭālīyya, p. 354.
228 Rāthmān, Lūthar, “Niḍāl al-shaʿb al-lībī ḍid al-istiʿmār”, Muḥaḍarāt al-mawsam al-thaqāfī 
al-awal 1979–1980, ed. by Moḥammad ʿAbd al-Sālam al-Jafāʾirī, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-
ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1989, p. 212.
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withdraw their forces from Libya.229 He pointed to the uncivilized methods pursued 
by Italy in Libya, including but not limited to paying some local leaders to stop 
fighting against them and join the Italian army, which would lead to a weakening of 
the Libyan front.230 Sulaymān al-Bārūnī resumed his contact with Germany in 1913. 
Following the signing of the Treaty of Ouchy in Lausanne (1912), the leaders 
of the independence movements were divided as to how to respond to the new 
developments. One faction argued for continued conflict with the Italian forces, 
whilst the other faction preferred the option of negotiation on the basis of the 
treaty. Sulaymān al-Bārūnī belonged to the former faction, even going so far as 
to proclaim the independence of Tripolitania. As Italian hostilities continued, he 
decided to travel to Turkey, where he was elected a general for the West Mountain 
Front in the Turkish Council of Commissioners. The majority of the independence 
fighters and a number of tribal leaders supported al-Bārūnī and by this stage he 
was also supported by the Ottoman state.231 His requests to Germany to support 
the nationalist movements stressed the country’s desire and ability to be inde-
pendent from foreign rule. Germany continued its support for the independence 
movement in Libya which became more explicit during World War I. Germany’s 
position had become very complicated due to the alliance with Turkey. They were 
seeking to use Libya as a base to attack the allies in North Africa (Britain, France 
and Italy). At the same time, Italy controlled Libya, which until that point was 
neutral and had not announced joining any of the parties to the conflict in World 
War I. Thus, Germany had to take steps to ensure the achievement of its inte-
rests. Germany tried to influence Sayyid232 Aḥmed al-Sharīf, the commander of 
the mujāhidīn in eastern Libya, to stop the war against the Italians and to start 
fighting the British in Egypt. However, when Italy declared Italy’s accession to 
the Allies, Germany began to reconsider its position and pursued a comple-
tely different policy; it began providing financial and military support to the 
mujāhidīn in their war against the Italians.233 German forces managed to pene-
229 al-Shaqrūnī, Tawfīq ʿ Ayād, “Wathāʾiq ʿ an taḥrukāt Sulaymān al-Bārūnī al-dawlīyya”, Majal-
lat al-wathāʾiq wa al-makhṭūṭāt, 6-6, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 
1991, pp. 148, 150.
230 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, vom 
April 1912 bis April 1913, R16118, Nr. A115. 
231 al-Ghatmī, Maḥmūd al-Mahdī, “Sulaymān al-Bārūnī”, Majallat al-wathāʾiq wa al-makhṭūṭāt, 
19-20, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2003–2004, p. 251.
232 A religious position and title for the leaders of al-Sanūsīyya move ment in Libya. See Morimoto, 
Kazuo (ed.), Sayyids and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet, Routledge, 2012.
233 Rāfiq, al-ʿArab wa al-ʿūthmānīyyūn, p. 47; al-Ḥasan, al-Anẓima al-sīyāsiyya wa al-distūriyya, 
p. 390.
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trate the blockade imposed by the Italian troops on all sea ports that could be 
used to bring weapons into Libya. The blockade was evaded using German sub-
marines. The aid was unloaded at the cities of Sirte, Misurata and Tobruk in 
1915. At the same time, German aid reached the mujāhidīn more indirectly, as 
in the case of a convoy loaded with about 2.000 Mauser guns, which had been 
made in Germany. This was in addition to six mountain defenders with ammu-
nition and some other equipment. The weapons were delivered by an officer 
working for the British occupation forces in Egypt, who delivered the weapons 
to the mujāhidīn across the Egyptian- Libyan border.234 In the eastern part of 
Libya, German support for the men of the Libyan resistance was a source of great 
concern to the Italians as well as to the British in Egypt. They had been watching 
the situation closely, inspecting the German intervention and continuous aid pro-
vided to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf via Istanbul.235 The delivery of Germany mili-
tary aid to the Libyan mujāhidīn was not an easy job as the country was under 
strict observation by the Italian forces, especially the borders. In addition, the 
British supported Italy in their observations, particularly after Britain’s recogni-
tion of the Italian ambitions in Libya in the Secret Treaty of London (April 26, 
1915) and the British-Italian agreement of July 31, 1916.236 Following these agree-
ments, Britain intensified its efforts to prevent German interference in Libya.237 
It was obvious that Germany was working to strengthen its position as a poli-
tical force in the Mediterranean, despite the Turco-Italian signing of the Treaty 
of Ouchy in October 1912, which confirmed the influence of these two countries 
over the region and implied that other countries should refrain from interfering 
in the situation. Despite this, Germany continued to support the Libyans in their 
armed struggle against Italy.238 Although the social history of Tripoli is not the 
main focus of this study, it is worth noting that the population of this region suffe-
red badly as a result of the political and military conflicts. The Italian leadership 
imposed a blockade on Tripoli to prevent weapons and other forms of support for 
the mujāhidīn from entering the city. At the same time, surveillance of the borders 
234 Ramaḍān, Bashīr, al-Qīyādā wa al-ʾimdād fī ḥarakat al-jihād al-lībī, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-
dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1999, p. 396; Rāthmān, “Niḍāl al-shaʿb al-lībī ḍid al-istiʿmār”, p. 214.
235 Wathīqā 371, 16 September 1914, wathāʾiq al-kharijīyyā al-injīlīzīyya, shuʿbat al-wathāʾiq 
al-ajnabīyya, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis. 
236 J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics. A Documentary Record, vol. 
2, “British-French Supremacy, 1914–1945”, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1979, p. 146.
237 Rāthmān, “Niḍāl al-shaʿb al-lībī ḍid al-istiʿmār”, p. 241.
238 Wathīqā bidūn Tarqīm, al-ʾarshif al-ʿūthmānī, Mursala min waẓarat al-ḥrbīyya al-
ʿūthmānīyyā ilā al-safārā al-ʿūthmānīyyā fī Lundun, shuʿbat al-wathāʾiq al-ajnabīyya, al-markaz 
al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis.
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led to a decrease in the amount of food supplies that could enter the country. This 
created a rise in food prices and a decrease in the market availability of basic 
foodstuffs. The situation was complicated further by a drought in the same year, 
which also caused a sharp drop in the agricultural output of the country. A report 
in the German political archives describing the general situation in west Tripoli in 
1911 refers to the poor yield of this year, linking it to a rise in poverty and an incre-
ase in the number of beggars in the streets. The author of the report notes that the 
situation was not limited to Tripoli, but that other regions of Libya were affected 
by the same degree of poverty, with the same results. The same document notes 
that the military conflict between the mujāhidīn and the Italians had a negative 
effect on the agricultural yield of the region and that the orange trees, olive trees 
and date trees were particularly badly affected.239
Despite the orders issued from Istanbul on October 4, 1911 to the Ottoman 
troops to withdraw from Libya and the subsequent withdrawal from al-Khums, 
Derna and Benghazi in the same month, some Turkish officers decided to stay 
in the country and help the Libyans to resist Italian colonialism.240 Even if they 
were few in number, they still managed to influence the jihad process. They were 
divided into two sections: the first remained in the areas surrounding the city of 
Tripoli, with the other directed toward Cyrenaica in the east, where they received 
commands from ʿAzīz al-Māṣrī in Benghazi, while in Derna the leadership was 
en trusted to Muṣṭafa Kemal Atatürk.241 The chief of command for the region of Cyre-
naica was Enver Pasha, who was able to organize the mujāhidīn there, while being 
the field commander in several attacks against Italian soldiers. For instance, he 
commanded the attack on the Italian fortifications in Lombardia and Calabria,242 
but Enver Pasha was forced to leave Libya in 1912. The commander in the eastern 
region was then ʿ Azīz al-Māṣrī.243 Then he was transferred to the area of al-Jaghbūb, 
where Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf al-Sanūsī lived and informed him of the latest devel-
op ments and what Turkey had decided concerning Libya, and that Sayyid Aḥmed 
al-Sharīf al-Sanūsī was now in charge. Enver Pasha then left to Turkey. 
The resistance was united in eastern Libya under the leadership of Sayyid 
Aḥmed al-Sharīf al-Sanūsī, who moved to the east of the country and took 
239 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Tripolis, vom Januar 1910 bis Dezember 1912, 
R141612, Nr. 691, Mai 1912.
240 See Falls, Ewald J.C., Drei Jahre in der libyschen Wüste. Reisen, Entdeckungen und Aus-
grabungen der Frankfurter Menasexpedition (Kaufmannsche Expedition), Herder, 1911. 
241 Ziyāda, Lībiyā fī al-ʾuṣūr al-ḥadīthā, p. 82; Mannāʿ, Judhūr al-niḍāl alʿarabī, p. 26.
242 Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, pp. 138, 140.
243 Rāshid, Tārīkh ʾaqṭār al-maghrib al-ʿarabī, p. 38.  
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over.244 The political and military developments led the Libyans to regroup and 
take a stand to defend their land. They entered into fierce battles against the Ita-
lians from the beginning of the invasion along the Libyan coast. The most impor-
tant battles were al-Hani, (called Sharaʿ al-Shat), the coastal route in October 
1911, when the militants managed to repel the Italian attack, despite the dispa-
rities in equipment and numbers of soldiers.245 The battle of Sydī Abd al-Jālīl in 
the west of the city of Tripoli on June 8, 1912 was recognized by the Italians them-
selves as one of the most effective battles. The Italians wanted to extend their 
control over the entire west coast of the country.246 At this stage, the mujāhidīn 
led by Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, Moḥammad ʿAbd al-llāh al-Būsayfī, and Moḥammad 
Sūwf al-Maḥmūdi were able to resist the Italians for a period of time. During that 
time, many battles took place, such as the battle of Jendouba on March 23, 1913, 
which was one of the most important battles in the history of the Libyan jihad. 
Despite the courageous resistance of the mujāhidīn, they were unable to stand 
for long against the Italian forces, which were well equipped. The result of this 
battle was the defeat of the mujāhidīn and the success of the Italians in control-
ling the mountainous area in the western part of the country. Later on, they were 
able to control the entire western region of South Libya, including Swanee bn 
Adam, and Sidi Kraim Alqrba in eastern Libya. This was the first battle under the 
command of Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, member of the al-Sanūsīyya movement.247 
The battle took place on May 16, 1913. The mujāhidīn were able to defeat the Ita-
lians and forced them to reorganize their forces and to recognize the entry of the 
al-Sanūsīyya movement as a new factor in the war. The Italian forces in Libya 
experienced repeated defeats at the hands of the Libyan mujāhidīn despite the 
differences in disarmament and number of troops. The famous battle of Gasr Bu 
Hadi took place on April 28, 1915. It represented a painful defeat to the Italians, 
and is considered one of the most important battles in the history of the Libyan 
jihad. It showed clearly the development of the military capability enjoyed by the 
mujāhidīn and their ability to take advantage of the prevailing conditions. The 
Italian defeat forced the Italian commander Colonel Miani to flee the battlefield 
with the rest of the soldiers.248 This defeat concurred with their defeat in Europe 
at the hands of the German and Austrian troops and the awful defeat in the battle 
244 Maḥmūd, Lībiyā baina al-māḍi wa al-ḥāḍir, pp. 224-225; Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, 
pp. 138,146.
245 Ismāʿīl, Tārīkh Afrīqiyā al-ḥadīth, p. 273; Rāshid, Tārīkh ʾaqṭār al-maghrib al-ʿarabī , p. 41.
246 al-Tilīsī, Maʿarik al-jihād al-lībī, p. 30.
247 Evans-Pritchard, Edward E., “The Senusi of Cyrenaica”, Journal of International Africa, 15-2, 
1945, p. 61; see also Slousch, N., “Les Senoussiya en Tripolitaine”, Revue du monde musulman, 1907.
248 Ḥasan, Ṣafaḥāt min jihādanā al-waṭanī, p. 23.
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of Kaporta. The position of the Italians became critical, especially in view of the 
resistance of the Libyan mujāhidīn to the sophisticated Italian weapons at that time. 
This played a major role in weakening the power of the Italians and forcing them to 
retreat toward the coastal cities.249 In order to maintain its survival in Libya, Italy 
had withdrawn its military garrisons scattered around the city of Tripoli, Zuwarah 
and al-Khums in the west and center of the country. The situation of the Italian 
troops was critical until 1917.250 They were pushed to take refuge in the French mili-
tary post deployed on the Libyan-Tunisian border and on the Algerian border.251
The Ottoman – al-Sanūsīyya 
The al-Sanūsīyya movement began as a religious movement. The leader, Sayyid 
Moḥammad Ibn Ali al-Sanūsī (1787–1859), was born and grew up in the Ottoman 
province of Algeria but settled in Libya after years of travel. The beginning of 
the movement was in the area of the Green Mountain in eastern Libya.252 The 
founder of the movement first settled in Cyrenaica, but in 1854 decided to move 
the headquarters of the movement to the south of the country to be isolated from 
direct contact with the power of the the Ottoman rulers at the time. He decided 
on the al-Jaghbub Oasis and used it as a base for his operations and home for the 
al-Sanūsīyya family and their followers from 1856.253 It seems that the choice of al-
Jaghbub was influenced by several factors. Al-Jaghbub was far from the centers of 
political power in the North Africa region: the French, who were stationed on the 
western border, specifically in Tunisia and Algeria, the Ottoman Empire in Libya, 
and the British in Egypt on the eastern borders of the country. Al-Jaghbub was 
also situated on the caravan traderoute, which was helpful for the al-Sanūsīyya 
movement in terms of the financial returns that this could bring, which would be 
249 Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 189; Qāsim,“Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-
ṭarābulisiyya”, p. 340.
250 al-Tilīsī, Khalīfa Moḥammad, Baʿd al-qurḍabīyya dirāsa fī tārīkh al-istiʿmār al-iṭālī bi Lībiyā 
(1922–1930), al-Dār al-ʿarabiyya li-l-kitāb, Lībiyā-Tūnis, 1978, pp. 5, 11.
251 al-Turkī, ʿArūsīyya, Fuṣūl fī tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya al-tūnīsīyya al-muʿāṣira, maktabat 
ʿalāʾ al-dīn, Ṣafāqis, 2005, p. 52. 
252 See Brūkilmān, Tārīkh al-shuʿūb al-islāmīyya, p. 651; al-Sayyid, Yūsuf, Fajr al-ḥaraka al-
islāmīyya al-muʿāṣira al-Wahābiyya – al-Sanūsīyya – al-Mahdiyya, Miṣr al-ʿarabiyya li-l-nashir 
wa al-tawzīʿ, al-Qāhira, 2000, p. 60. 
253 Marx, Geschichte Afrikas, p. 90; ʾAmīsh, al-Tārīkh al-sīyāsī, p. 87; al-Sayyid, Fajr al-ḥaraka 
al-islāmīyya, al-muʿāṣira, p. 60; Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, p. 65; Yāghī, al-Dawlā al-
ʿūthmānīyyā fī al-tārīkh al-islāmī, p. 29.
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important in providing a livelihood for the followers living there.254 The protec-
tion that this location allowed the followers to exercise over the caravan traders 
also enabled them to expand their sovereignty in the region. Given the numbers 
adhering to the al-Sanūsīyya movement and the popularity and authority that 
its followers enjoyed in the region, the Ottoman Empire treated it with a certain 
wariness. Relations between the Ottomans and al-Sanūsīyya movement had been 
characterized by mutual caution since the settlement of the movement in Libya. 
The Ottomans avoided direct confrontation, preferring instead a policy of cooper-
ation when possible. Their relations tended to be characterized by the principle 
of mutual interests. For example, a decree was issued from Istanbul exempting 
the al-Sanūsīyya movement from paying taxes. This came as a proactive step 
to bridge the gap and enhance relations.255 The movement had the task of pro-
tecting and securing the interior affairs in the region in which they lived. Thus, 
al-Sanūsīyya began to play a significant political and social role in Libya. The 
al-Sanūsīyya movement performed its power in territories stretching from Ben-
ghazi to the frontiers of sub-Saharan Africa.256 The movement’s leaders led the 
Islamic jihad in eastern Libya during World War I, which increased pressure on 
the Ottoman Empire to maintain cordial relations with them. Accordingly, the 
two parties signed an agreement on their united struggle against European colo-
nialism.257 The same interest brought the al-Sanūsīyya movement closer to the 
Ottoman rulers to confront the British in Egypt, as both parties considered it to 
serve their interests.258 The goal that brought them together at this time was figh-
ting the British and the Italians during World War I.259
254 On the al-Sanūsīyya see Triaud, Jean Louis, Tchad 1901–1902. Une guerre franco-libyenne 
oubliée? Une confrérie musulmane, la Sanûsiyya, face à la France, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1988, 208, 
32 p., and Triaud, Jean-Louis, La légende noire de la Sanûsiyya. Une confrérie musulmane sahari-
enne sous le regard français (1840–1930), Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris 
and Aix-en-Provence, 2 vols., Institut de Recherche et d’Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman 
(IREMAM), 1995, 1151p.
255 al-Sharīf, Miftāḥ al-Sayyid, Masīrat al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya al-lībiyyā al-Sanūsīyya, makta-
bat dār al-istiqlāl, al-Qāhira, 2008, pp. 84, 88.
256 Minawi, The Ottoman Scramble for Africa, p. 29.
257 Marx, Geschichte Afrikas, p. 149.
258 al-Sharīf, Masīrat al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya al-lībiyyā, p. 178; for the roots of these confronta-
tions see Boahen, A. Abu, Britain, The Sahara and the Western Sudan, 1788–1861, Oxford: Cla-
rendon Press 1964.
259 Wathīqā 47, al-Wathāʾiq al-iṭālīyya, al-majmūʿā al-ʾūlā, translated by Shamis al-Dīn ʿUrābī, 
iʿdād al-Furjānī Sālim al-Sharīf, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1989, p. 
166.; Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 51.
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4.3  German Declaration of Neutrality toward Libya and German 
Health Missions
The German government’s position was explicitly stated following the announce-
ment of Italy’s war on Turkey in Libya. Germany tried to stop the war, especially 
when the Ottoman Sultan submitted a request to some European countries. 
Germany then took the initiative despite the fact that it was not confident that 
it would be a success. The resolutions stated by Germany were thought to be 
moderate and included proposing a truce to end the military conflict, giving Italy 
some areas in Libya and the necessity of negotiation and reconciliation between 
the two parties.260 The direct order from the German emperor was to conduct 
the mediation in favor of the Ottoman Empire with Italy, stressing that the effort 
should be undertaken as a long-term project, rather than a one-off attempt. This 
position was very different from that of the rest of the European countries, which 
took a neutral stance on the whole issue.261 However, they practically applied the 
terms of the conventions signed with the Italian government. This was obvious in 
the response of King George of Britain to the request submitted by the Ottoman 
sultan to stop the Italian invasion in the province. The British monarch then apo-
logized, citing the inability of Britain to perform this role, and that the country 
would remain neutral.262 The position of Germany could be also classified as 
neutral, but with a note on what Germany was trying to achieve on the ground. 
Germany took the initiative at this stage, especially at the expense of Britain, in 
addition to trying to attract the largest number of countries to pursue a policy of 
peace. However, they were seeking to attain the maximum advantages in doing 
so. In sum, the German approach was new in modern European politics. It can 
be considered as a kind of political maneuvering that had been pioneered by 
Germany, which excelled in implementing it as the country succeeded in leading 
the situations during the dispute between the Italian and the Ottoman govern-
ments until the outbreak of war between them in Libya. Germany continued to 
assume these responsibilities toward the issue of Libya, and its neutrality led to 
it being asked by Italy to protect Italian interests against the Ottoman side. The 
same request was also made by the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Germany took 
over the evacuation of the Ottoman from Tripoli using German ships. They eva-
260 Mīkhāʾīl, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-injīlīzīyya al-lībiyyā, p. 32.
261 Ibid.
262 Baghnī, ʿAmr Sāʿīd, Wathīqā 376, “Mukhtārāt min maḥfūḍāt shuʿbat al-wathāʾiq wa 
al-makhṭūṭāt bi markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī”, Majallat al-wathāʾiq wa al-
makhṭūṭāt, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, p. 156. 
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cuated people including soldiers, doctors and pharmacists who had decided to 
leave the country. The German consul Alfred Tilger was in charge of their evac-
uation.263 He also mediated the transfer of the belongings and property of the 
Ottoman soldiers in Libya to Istanbul in 1913, with the German ship Olos securing 
the transfer of this baggage.264 The position of German public opinion did not 
differ from the position of the government; thus, when the Italian fleet visited the 
ports of the province of Tripoli, the German newspapers took a unified stance. 
They made clear their reservations about the move.265
Tripoli was a station for many German doctors who arrived there during 
varying periods of time, many of them having provided their services to the local 
residents. It is to be noted that during the Italian invasion of Libya, Germany sent 
a health mission there, in 1912. The German health mission in the province of 
Tripoli could be divided into two phases: The first deals with the German doctors 
who worked individually, with most of them having been travelers. The second 
phase included the mission sent by the German Red Cross to Libya in 1912. The 
doctors came to Tripoli individually and on an unofficial basis. They were also 
included in the category of travellers and geographic explorers. One of those was 
Gerhard Rohlfs, who did not have a medical degree because he had not comple-
ted his university education in Germany. Instead, he stopped his studies of medi-
cine and decided to travel to a new country. Gerhard Rohlfs studied the health 
situation in the province of Tripoli and visited a number of hospitals in the east 
and south of the province in 1865. He provided a lot of information in his wri-
tings in terms of organization and methods of treatment used in the country. The 
historical information indicates the presence of another German doctor who was 
responsible for the hospital in the city of Benghazi in the east of the province 
during the second half of the 19th century.266 The doctor Gustav Nachtigal diffe-
red from his predecessors in that he had extensive experience in the region in 
general. He also studied the health situations in the province of Tripoli in terms 
of the spread of diseases, particularly those coming from central Africa carried 
by trade caravans. Moreover, he studied the customs, traditions and ways of 
indigenous medicine.267 Nachtigal had an opportunity to practice his profession 
and also wrote a book in which he addressed communicable diseases in the 
263 Ghānim, al-Biʿthā al-ʿalmānīyya ilā Lībiyā, p. 25.
264 al-Sāḥilī, Khālīl, “Wamaḍāt min al-wathāʾiq al-ʿūthmānīyyā ḥawl al-fatra al-ʾūlā min al-jihād 
al-lībī”, Majallat al-shahīd, 3, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1982, p. 295.
265 Yaḥya, al-Maghrib al-kabīr, p. 713.
266 Ghānim, al-Biʿthā al-ʿalmānīyya ilā Lībiyā, p. 16.
267 al-Fandarī, Munīr (translator), Ṭabīb al-maḥalla al-bilād al-tūnīsīyya fī mabayn 1863–1868 min 
khilāl rasāʾil al-ṭabīb al-ʿalmānī Ghūstāf Nākhtīgāl, markaz al-nashir al-jāmiʿi, Tūnis, 2003, pp. 47–48.
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region.268 He pointed out which areas had a good climate and were suitable for 
a better quality of life. The book focused on the south of the province and refer-
red to diseases including typhus, malaria, fever, and cholera, which were the 
main causes of death of many residents, in addition to smallpox and other disea-
ses.269 Nachtigal referred to tuberculosis as the most serious common disease.270 
He also described local methods of treatment, which tended to be unsuccessful, 
and referred to the belief of the local people that some diseases originated from 
al-Jinn (supernatural creatures) and could be prevented using amulets or hanging 
parts of animals to expel al-Jinn.271 Nachtigal provided his medical services to 
the local people. Here he was helped by his experience gained in both Algeria 
and Tunisia. He also benefited from the local healers who were not only men, 
but there were a number of older women who practiced the profession of indi-
genous treatment according to their experience. Nachtigal had noted that the 
modern medical knowledge has not yet reached these parts of the country.272  His 
work intended to first help the local people to combat epidemic diseases and the 
second intention was to give a clear picture to the government in Germany about 
the existing epidemic diseases in the north and center of Africa.273 They benefited 
a lot from this information in establishing their colonies there. 
In 1911, the first year of the Italian war in Libya, the German doctor Felix 
Tlhaber volunteered to work in Libya with the Turkish Red Crescent and he remai-
ned in Libya from November 1911 to January 1912.274 Tlhaber arrived in Libya and 
headed to al-Aziziyah, used by the mujāhidīn as a gathering point and a military 
center for their leadership. He referred to one lady, the widow of a German captain 
in the army who made Tlhaber an offer to establish a hospital in Libya. Tlhaber 
found the health situation to be very bad in the country, and this prompted him 
to send a telegram to Berlin urging them to prepare a German medical clinic to 
268 Nachtigal, Gustav, Sahara und Sudan, 3 vols., Berlin, Leipzig, Weltgeist-Bücher Verlags-
Gesellschaft m.b.h., 1879–1889.
269 See on the cholera disease in Tripoli, Tripoli, cadavres de cholériques [Image fixe]: [pho-
tographie de presse] [Agence Rol], Gallica, BNF Paris, [Novembre 1911], Reference 17336. And 
see also Tripoli, cadavres de cholériques [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse], [Agence Rol] 
Publication: [Novembre 1911], Refererence 17321. See as well on the same issue, Tripoli, cadavres 
de cholériques [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol] Publication: [Novembre 1911] 
Idem, Reference 17314.
270 Ghānim, al-Biʿthā al-ʿalmānīyya ilā Lībiyā, pp. 19–20.
271 Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan, pp. 144, 147, 158.
272 Ghānim, al-Biʿthā al-ʿalmānīyya ilā Lībiyā, p. 22.
273 Nākhtīgāl, al-Saḥrāʾ wa bilād al-Sūdān, p. 213, 215.
274 Ghānim (translator), Taqārīr biʿthat al-ṣalīb al-aḥmar al-ʿalmānī, p. 9.
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provide emergency aid to the people in Libya. He made great efforts to win the 
approval of the German authorities. This stage came within the framework of 
efforts by the German government to provide medical assistance specifically to 
the Libyan victims of the Italian war, as well as to provide treatment for the many 
common diseases in the country. The Italian attack on Tripoli had reverberated 
strongly in Germany and there was great sympathy with the people of the country, 
as the news presented the inhumane behavior of the Italian forces in Libya, which 
found stiff opposition from the German public opinion. The German authorities 
submitted a request to the Italians to provide such assistance, but the offer was 
rejected.275 At the same time, another request was submitted to the Ottoman 
authorities, who welcomed the idea and the Ottoman Red Crescent started to be 
involved in providing help to the local people in Libya at this critical time.276 The 
timing of the proposal to provide financial aid was at Christmas in Germany, a 
period of celebrations, and therefore it was not possible to collect the amount 
of money necessary to prepare the medical mission and send it to Libya. On the 
other hand, the German Red Cross was unable to provide this amount of money. 
Thus, an appeal was announced to collect donations from the people; however, 
they were not sufficient to cover the expenses of the mission. German officials 
tried to overcome this financial problem.277 The idea of  sending a health mission 
prompted a number of Germans working in the field of trade and industry, in 
addition to bankers, to form a special committee taking upon itself the responsi-
bility of financing and supporting the health mission to Libya.278 Due to the con-
certed efforts of many Germans, they succeeded in equipping, the mission, which 
included three doctors, including Dr. Goebel, who was the chef of the mission, 
Dr. Fritz, and Dr. Schütze, three medical students, twelve nurses,279 a chemical 
doctor, electricity technician and a mechanical worker, and it was noted that they 




278 Central-Komitee der Deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz (eds.), Beiträge zur Kriegsheilkunde. 
Aus den Hilfsunternehmungen der Deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz während des Italienisch-
Türkischen Feldzuges 1912 und des Balkankrieges 1912/13, p. 1.; Kimmle, “Die Hilfsexpeditionen 
des Deutschen Roten Kreuzes nach Tripolitanien (1912) und nach dem Balkan (1912 und 1913)”, 
in Beiträge zur Kriegsheilkunde.
279 al-Barīkī, ʿAbd al-RaḥmānʿUmar, “al-Ṭib al-shaʿbi wa daūr al-baʿthāt khilāl fatrat al-jihād”, 
Majallat al-shahīd, 10, markaz jihād al-lībīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1989, p. 140.
280 Central-Komitee der Deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz (eds.), Beiträge zur Kriegsheilkunde, 
p. 1.
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started their journey on a ship called Pera from Hamburg on January 11th, 1912281 
toward the port of Ben Guerdane, which was located on the Libyan-Tunisian 
border. 300 camels and twelve wagons were rented to transport the luggage and 
materials to Gharyan, where they decided to establishthe medical center of the 
mission; the mission had been fully equipped with equipment, medical devices, 
food, medicines and other items. The mission and the establishment of the hos-
pital were directed mainly to provide the necessary services for people in the war 
zones and equipped according to the pattern of military missions. The hospital’s 
function was not limited to this, but also took care of Libyan patients suffering 
from chronic diseases like typhoid, malaria, lung diseases and other diseases pre-
valent in the country at that time. The German doctors spared no effort in helping 
the local people, according to reports from those involved in the hospital, about 
1.000 patients were treated,282 the diseases were also mentioned as follows: 43 
patients with skin diseases, about 122 suffering from esoteric diseases, and 750 
suffering from injuries or different diseases.283 Despite the seriousness of these 
diseases, they were treated by the German doctors, some of whom also became 
infected. Dr. Schütze and two of his assistants died. All were buried in Ghary-
an.284 It could be argued that the German mission provided great services to the 
Libyans in spite of the period of time they spent in the country, which was rela-
tively short. Moreover, the results of their scientific research were very important 
in terms of assessing the situation and identifying the communicable diseases 
and indigenous treatments methods and medicine. Most important of all was the 
moral support provided by the Germans to the people of the country in a critical 
period. This positive German position was acknowledged by the international 




283 Ghānim, (Translator), Taqārīr biʿthat al-ṣalīb al-aḥmar al-ʿalmānī, pp. 19, 22, 25
284 al-Barīkī, “al-Ṭib al-shaʿbi”, p. 140.
285 Ghānim, al-Biʿthā al-ʿalmānīyya ilā Lībiyā, p. 22.
5   German-Ottoman Rapprochement Policy and its 
Impact in Libya during World War I (1914–1918)
The German-Ottoman policy of rapprochement and its impact on the situation 
in Tripoli during World War I (1914–1918) starts with a different approach of the 
German and Ottoman policy toward Britain and France and their ambitions in 
the Mediterranean. This is a significant turning point in international politics. 
Therefore, it is important to examine the German position toward the Libyan 
jihad, with special emphasis on German motives and goals in supporting the 
Ottoman Empire, and the presence of Germany in Libya. This was after an expli-
cit announcement by Germany that it would play a more active role in the politi-
cal developments of the country by supporting the Libyan national movements. 
Here, they concentrated their support on two main currents of nationalism; the 
movement headed by Ramaḍān al-Swīḥlī (1879–1920) and Sulaymān al-Bārūnī in 
the west, and the al-Sanūsīyya in the east.1 Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, who came from 
a relatively distinguished family and represented the area of the Western Moun-
tains, tried to organize a force to oppose the Italian landings, but did not receive 
the support of the Ottoman government.2 Germany supported the Ottoman Empire 
in the revival of its influence in Libya. This development led to the declaration of 
war against the British in Egypt in 1915 according to the German-Ottoman geo-
strategic project that aimed to weaken the power of the British in the Mediterra-
nean, maining battles of the Ottoman war against the British in Egypt. An exa-
mination of the German policy toward Libya at the end of the First World War in 
1918, and an analysis of how this was reflected in international developments 
on the orientation of the policy in Libya is to be understood in the light on what 
was going on in this part of Africa. How the defeat of Germany and the Ottoman 
Empire in World War I led them to abandon their project in Libya and the region?
World War I
World War I is seen as an influential event in the history of the world as it inclu-
ded the major powers and took place on different continents. The beginning of 
1 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, R16106 
Nr. A33454, 9/12/1916; on Ramaḍān al-Swīḥlī see St. John, Ronald B., Historical Dictionary of 
Libya, Toronto, 2014, p. 316. 
2 Childs, Timothy W., Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya 1911–1912, Brill, Leiden, 
1990, p. 89. 
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World War I was when the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne was assassinated 
on June 28, 1914, and the government in Austria declared Serbia to have been 
involved, starting hostilities after refusing any sort of negotiation.3 The major 
powers, mainly Russia, Germany, France, and Britain, joined the war, which 
developed into a world war.4  It is argued in the literature that the major causes of 
World War I were economic imperialism, in terms of extending colonies outside 
Europe and driven by the Industrial Revolution. Other factors included the nati-
onalism movements and the system of secret alliances and agreements that 
divided Europe into two main blocs.5 One was the Triple Alliance of Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, until May 1915.6 The other alliance was France, Russia and 
Great Britain; later, Italy announced that it would join the Allies. In 1914, with 
the outbreak of the First World War, the world was divided into two camps. The 
Ottoman Empire later joined the alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In 
addition to these two alliances, there were many other alliances and agree-
ments signed secretly or publicly between the major powers, and included other 
countries.7 Moreover, one of the main causes of World War I was the desire of 
the major powers to expand their navies and military forces and control more 
territories. As the war continued, the smaller countries and states joined these 
two main powers in accordance with their political and economic interests. As 
Koller states, the fighting extended rapidly to several other countries including 
Japan, Belgium, New Zealand, and South Africa, which joined the German colo-
nies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific.8 The Ottomans decided to enter the war on 
the side of Germany on October 29, 19149 after signing a military contract with 
Germany on October 27, 1913. The contract stipulated that Germany would take 
over the reform of the Ottoman military forces.10 This was a step taken by Grand 
Vizier and Minister of War Mahmud Shevket Pasha (1856–1913), who was trying 
3 Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig (eds.), The Origins of World War I, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 10.
4 Ibid., p. 12.
5 Ibid., p. 16.
6 Straub, Eberhard, Weltgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. Daten, Fakten, Dokumente in chronologi-
schem Überblick, Drömer Knaur, Munich, 1985, p. 58
7 Hamilton and Herwig, The Origins of World War I, p. 10.
8 Koller, Christian, “The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their Deploy-
ment in Europeduring the First World War”, Immigrants & Minorities, vol. 26, no. 1-2, March/July 
2008, pp. 111–133.
9 Uyar, Mesut and Edward J. Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Ata-
türk, Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, California, 2009, p. 243.
10 Ibid., p. 237.
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to restore the Ottoman Empire, which was collapsing due to the loss of several 
territories and much power in the Ottoman-Italian War of 1911 and the Balkan 
Wars of 1912–1913.11 Part of the efforts of the Germans and the Ottomans was to 
mobilize as much support for their en trance into the war as possible. To this end, 
the policy-makers in the Ottoman Empire promoted the idea of Islamic holy jihad 
and asked the Islamic countries, especially those under their control, to join them 
on this basis. It seems likely that this strategy was developed in response to a sug-
gestion by an official at the German Embassy in Cairo, von Oppenheim.12 By invo-
king the concept of jihad, the Germans hoped to mobilize more Muslim support 
for their efforts against the Russian,13 British and French forces in the region.14 
Thus, the propaganda of the German and Ottoman Empire began to be directed 
toward Libya per German-Ottoman plans that had been prepared earlier. The first 
step was the declaration of jihad against Britain, France and Russia issued by 
the Ottoman Sultan Moḥammad V (1844–1918).15 He then used a fatwa16 provi-
ded by the Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul supporting the necessity of jihad to the 
path of God against the enemies of religion, particularly when these had taken 
control of Islamic countries.17 Thus, a set of messages and letters was prepared 
and addressed to the leaders of jihad in those countries, including Libya, which 
occupied an important place in German-Ottoman military plans at that time due 
to its strategic location.18
The Turkish authorities worked hard on this project and presented it to the 
Arab politicians residing in Turkey. These included the Libyan Bashīr al-Saʿadāwī, 
and the Shaykh Ṣaleḥ al-Tūnisī, Moḥammad Farīd and ʿAlī Pash Ḥāmbah, and 
others. These individuals, who made up a committee called Lajnat Tashkilāt 
11 Ibid., p. 236.
12 Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 13.
13 Lüdke, Tilman, “(Not) Using Political Islam: The German Empire and its Failed Propaganda 
Campaign in the Near and Middle East 1914-1918 and Beyond”, in Zürcher, Erik-Jan, Jihad and 
Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje’s “Holy 
War Made in Germany”, Leiden University Press, Leiden, 2016, p. 83.
14 Lüdke, Tilman, Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence 
Operations in the First World War, Lit, Münster, 2005, p. 45.
15 Wathīqā 46, al-Wathāʾiq al-iṭālīyya, p. 163; for an overview see Stoddard, Philip Hendrick, “The 
Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918”, PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1963.
16 A legal opinion or learned interpretation by a qualified jurist or mufti given on issues per-
taining to Islamic law; Hallaq, Wael B. “Fatwa”, in Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and 
North Africa, Encyclopedia.com
17 Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 190.
18 See Micheleta, Luca and Andrea Ungari, L’Italia e la guerra nella Libya, Storia Studium, 
Roma, 1974, 490p.
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Makhṣūṣa, headed by Sulaymān al-ʿAskarī, were amongst the most prominent 
political personalities of the period and were considered essential to supporting 
the propagation of the idea of jihad. Moḥammad Farīd was the head of the Egyp-
tian Nationalist Party (al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-Miṣrī), while ʿAlī Pash Ḥāmbah and 
Ṣaleḥ al-Tūnisī were leaders in a Tunisian movement calling for the removal of 
the French occupation there.19 The idea was approved by the majority, except 
for Bashīr al-Saʿadāwī, who justified his reservations on the grounds that the 
mujāhidīn in Libya were not in a position to confront the British and the Italians at 
the same time, and that it would be better to expel the Italians before approaching 
the British. However, the enthusiasm of the others for the idea, and the support 
of Enver Pasha who in 1914 showed great confidence in the successful outcome 
of the idea, led them to send a message to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf urging him 
to stand by the Ottoman Empire and to declare war on its enemies. A number of 
letters were sent for this purpose, particularly to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, who 
led the war in eastern Libya against the Italians. The letters encouraged him 
to support the plans to weaken the British military presence in Egypt from the 
Libyan side of the border. At the same time, they requested Enver Pasha from 
Bashīr al-Saʿadāwī to accompany the Ottoman officers to Tripoli, but he apolo-
gized because the duty did not precisely conform to his political stances toward 
this work.20 The Germans and the Ottomans tried to support jihad movements in 
many Arabic countries where the allies ruled, including Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, 
and Libya. In the next part of the chapter, their support for the al-Sanūsīyya 
movement to fight the British in Egypt, instead of fighting the Italians in Libya, 
is illustrated. 
5.1  German-Ottoman Support to the al-Sanūsīyya Movement
The Ottoman Empire decided to revive its influence in Libya in 1914. The Libyan 
population responded positively to the renewed interest of the Ottoman Empire.21 
This gave Germany, as an Ottoman ally, more opportunity to develop its own pre-
sence in the region. The decision of the Ottomans to revive their influence in 
Libya was supported by the German government, which wanted to reduce the 
control of the allied nations everywhere. The methods they chose to achieve this 
19 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 52; Shukrī, Mīlād dawlāt Lībiyā al-ḥadīthā, 
p. 245.
20 Shukrī, Mīlād dawlāt Lībiyā al-ḥadīthā, pp. 460–461.
21 Ibid.
German-Ottoman Support to al-SanūsĪyya Movement   167
goal included spreading unrest and military skirmishes and supporting revolts 
against the European powers, particularly in the Arab countries, e.g., the British 
in Egypt, and to increase the level of resistance against the Italian occupation in 
Libya.22 Meanwhile, there were two main factions within the Libyan jihad move-
ment. The first of these was the Western Independent Libyan Movement, which 
was led by Ramaḍān al-Swīḥlī and Sulaymān al-Bārūnī and was based in Misu-
rata. The second was al-Sanūsīyya movement led by Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf 
al-Sanūsī in the eastern region of the country.23 The debate within the German 
political field was about which of two factions Germany should support and 
which would be more beneficial to German-Ottoman interests.24 The decision was 
finally taken to support the al-Sanūsīyya movement, by supplying them with 
ammunition and weapons in 1915.25 Al-Sharīf had been recognized by the Ottoman 
Empire and was even granted the title of deputy sultan in the region by the 
Ottoman sultan26. He was also visited by Enver Pasha at the movement’s head-
quarters in the southern part of the country, in al-Jaghbub, andwas handed the 
decision issued by the sultan appointing him as his deputy and conferred the 
leadership of the region in Libya.27 The same period also witnessed the arrival of 
Nuri Bey, an emissary of his brother, Enver Pasha, and Jāʾfar al-ʿAskarī, an 
Ottoman officer of Iraqi origin,28 who arrived on board a German submarine that 
docked in the port of Bardia (al-Burdi/Burdija) on the east coast of Libya in 
December 1914.29 The Ottoman authorities sent with them the higher ranked 
medals as well as a senior medal to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf and other members 
of the al-Sanūsīyya movement.30 They held a meeting attended by these parties as 
well as some al-Sanūsīyya chieftains and advisers of Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf at 
the end of 1914. The discussion was about the establishment of a Muslim state in 
North Africa supported by Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman 
22 Yāghī, al-Dawlā al-ʿūthmānīyyā fī al-tārīkh al-islāmī, p. 317.
23 On the Sanūsīyya movement see Vandewalle, Dirk, A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge, 
2012, pp. 17–25; On the Sanūsīyya see Triaud, Jean-Louis, La légende noire de la Sanûsiyya, op.cit.; 
and also Triaud, Jean-Louis, Tchad 1901–1902. Une guerre franco-libyenne oubliée?, op.cit. 
24 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 17, 
R16122, Nr. A33454, 9/12/1916.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Osmanli Belgelerinde: Trablusgarb, 2013, p. 577.
27 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 17, 
R16122, Nr. A33454, 9/12/1916.  
28 Wathīqā 47, al-Wathāʾiq al-iṭālīyya, p. 166.
29 Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, p. 247.
30 Wathīqā 49, al-Wathāʾiq al-iṭālīyya, p. 179.
168   German-Ottoman Rapprochement Policy and its Impact (1914–1918)
Sultan addressed an appeal to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf to support the declaration 
of holy war against the British, Italians, French and Russians, alluding to the 
serious situation that might result from the control of these countries over the 
Islamic world, and added that this would weaken the power of Islam.31 Therefore, 
religion obliged him to fight these enemies. Sultan Moḥammad V (ruled 1909–
1918) also tried to influence Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf by sending him a letter prai-
sing the founder of the al-Sanūsīyya movement, and mentioned his efforts to 
protect Islam and the respect that the al-Sanūsīyya movement enjoyed in Libya 
and the Muslim world.32 The Sultan did not fail to mention Germany in this letter 
in which he confirmed the country as a friend to the Muslims and a God-given 
means to reform the situations of their countries. He added that this was a real 
opportunity to get rid of the occupation of the Italian, French and British alike. 
The sultan had pointed out that their declaration of jihad would lead the rest of 
the peoples in North Africa to follow them, enabling them to obtain freedom and 
all their rights.33 Most people supported the idea of Muslim jihad against the infi-
dels, especially in light of the assistance promised by Germany.34 Germany was 
able to send a group of German and Turkish officers to the mujāhidīn camps in 
eastern Libya in November 1914 to train the mujāhidīn on the use of weapons. 
Moreover, the Germans provided them with submarines, which were the most 
effective weapon during this stage of the war, due to their ability to move more 
freely and in accordance with a schedule and well-studied plans. Germany relied 
heavily upon the use of submarines during World War I, both in military opera-
tions and as a safe means of communication between them and their allies. The 
subma rines were also used to transfer arms and military equipment, and for the 
transport of soldiers to and from the shores of Libya.35 Some submarines were 
well known, such as the submarines UC20, UC73, and UC12, which was rebuilt in 
August 19, 1912 and began its activity toward the Libyan coast in early December 
1915. The German submarines started their journey from Cattaro (Adriatic Sea) to 
the port of al-Burdi (Burdia/Burdija) and then returned to transfer materials and 
equipment to be used by the Libyans and Ottomans.36 In addition, Germany pro-
31 Mannāʿ, Moḥammad ʿAbd al-Razāq, Aḥmed al-Sharīf ḥayātahu wa jihādahu, muʾassasat 
nāṣir li-l-thaqāfa, Dār al-Waḥda, n.d., p. 70.
32 Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 200; Osmanli Belgelerinde: Trablusgarb, p. 577.
33 On the jihad and Germany see the work of Tilman, Jihad made in Germany, 251p; Hagen, Die 
Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, pp. 200, 203.
34 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, pp. 52–53.
35 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, pp. 1-5; see Microfiche 
Copex HDP13, LOS 4, Asw A-+, Politisches Archiv WK Nr. 11u, 134277 (73), 14. November 1915.
36 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 1.
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vided financial aid and other assistance to the Ottomans and the Libyan mujāhidīn 
in that area. They created the impression that the aid was sent by the Ottoman 
Empire 37 to provide the appropriate environment for the Ottomans to work and to 
gain respect from the mujāhidīn.38 In this context, the German and Ottoman 
efforts were focused more on fighting the British in Egypt. Otto Mannesmann was 
selected by the German political leadership to support their goals in Libya.39 
Mannesmann was one of the intelligence officers of the German army and became 
the German consul in Libya in October 1914, arriving there in December 1914.40 It 
is worth mentioning that Otto Mannesmann was fully aware of the situation in 
North Africa because he was living in Morocco, where he oversaw the manage-
ment of Mannesmann industrial businesses, of which he was an owner. He also 
owned large farms in the area of Sus in the south of Morocco and had strong rela-
tions with the tribal leaders.41 Thus, he had extensive experience in dealing with 
the Arabs and their leaders. Mannesmann had proposed to the German Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to send a special delegation consisting of Ottoman and German 
representatives to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf.42 Permission was given by the German 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the preparations described in the report of the mili-
tary command in Tripoli.43 Upon receiving the approval of the ministry, prepara-
tions for the delegation began, with a focus on selecting people with high capabi-
lities and skills in persuasion to strengthen the idea of the struggle against the 
British in Egypt, but not the Italians in Libya. The Germans took this action 
because they were aware of the rapprochement between Sayyid Idris al-Sanūsī 
and the British. Thus, careful preparation was taken to ensure the success of this 
delegation. This also required extensive communication with all the parties invol-
ved, which was the reason for the reconstruction of a telegraph station in Misu-
rata. The construction was undertaken by German experts under the supervision 
of Oberleutnant von Todenwarth.44 In 1914, Otto Mannesmann arrived in the 
eastern part of Libya to support the al-Sanūsīyya movement and the Ottoman pre-
37 Wathīqā 48, al-Wathāʾiq al-iṭālīyya, pp. 175–176.
38 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 72.
39 Ibid.
40 Ghānim, ʿAmalīyyat al-ghūwaṣāt al-ʿalmānīyya fī al-miyāh al-lībiyyā, pp. 41, 45.
41 Ghānim, wa Shlūtir, “al-Qunṣuliyya al-ʿalmānīyya fī Ṭarābulis”, p. 10.
42 Sayyid Idris al-Sanūsī was also present in the region, Idris al-Sanūsī was supposed to be the 
leader of the al-Sanūsīyya movement but, because he was young, the position had been assigned 
to his cousin Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf until Sayyid Idris became eligible. 
43 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 17, 
R16122, Nr A33454, 9/12/1916.
44 Ibid.
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sence in the region and to serve the strategic interests of Germany.45 He had been 
sent as part of German-Ottoman plans to fight the British in Egypt. Mannesmann 
was sending his reports to the German military leaders.46 He was accompanied by 
the Turkish commander Nuri Bey. The political significance of their presence in 
the eastern part of Libya led to discussions about German intervention in Libya 
within the German Foreign Ministry.47 The leadership team of the military and 
political department there was given the responsibility of studying the situation 
in Libya, in general, and the military situation, in particular. The study was based 
on information and reports from Libya, especially those derived from the reports 
of Mannesmann, Oberleutnant von Todenwarth and a third person who was an 
informant working as an interpreter, referred to as Salama. Salama, who receives 
no further identification in the reports, appears to have been an Arab and evi-
dently had a great deal of knowledge of the region. The German policy was cen-
tered on the Libyan jihad movement and how to use it to German strategic benefit. 
Mannesmann contacted Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf personally, and mentioned that 
they were going to award him with a senior medal from the German emperor and 
a book selected by him.48 The Italians were present in Libya during this time, but 
had withdrawn their troops to the coastal areas, where they were mainly concen-
trated in the cities of Tripoli, al-Khums and Benghazi. The Italians placed weak 
control over some ports like al-Burdi (Burdia/Burdija), Sirte, which provided 
important docking points for German submarines.49 The Italians also worked to 
strengthen their relations with Britain in Egypt to put more pressure on the 
mujāhidīn in the eastern part of the country.50 In April 1916, the Ottoman Empire 
sent Sulaymān al-Bārūnī to Libya as a governor on behalf of the Ottoman sultan.51 
al-Bārūnī traveled from Istanbul to Vienna and then to Libya. His journey took 
place under the auspices of the German government, which provided al-Bārūnī 
with a German submarine for the last stages of the journey, until his arrival in the 
city of Misurata.52 al-Bārūnī was carrying with him the decision of his appoint-
45 This finding is supported by a document in the German Political Archive containing informa-
tion for which Mannesmann is described as the source. See Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen 




49 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, p. 303.
50 Ibid.
51 al-Turkī, Fuṣūl fī tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya al-tūnīsīyya, p. 69.
52 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 17, 
R16122, Tripolis, Nr. A27104.
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ment as a deputy of the sultan in the west, as well as money and weapons that 
had been provided by the Ottoman Empire.53 Sulaymān al-Bārūnī was able to 
reorganize the mujāhidīn, and led a movement of struggle against the Italians, 
which continued through 1917.54
5.2   Attack on the British Army in Egypt and Battles with the 
Libyan Mujāhidīn in 1915
Meanwhile, the German-Ottoman propaganda to declare jihad had begun to 
spread worldwide. However, a decision could not be taken by Sayyid Aḥmed 
al-Sharīf, who wanted to wait to make an appropriate decision. He wanted to con-
tinue the war against the Italians and wished at the same time to secure the help 
of the Ottomans and the German for his own goals.55 His relations with the British 
were not hostile but were characterized more as being cautious. The two sides did 
not share the same aims or political direction but, in some cases, the British did 
permit aid coming from Egyptian sources to pass over the border to the mujāhidīn 
in Libya.56 Apart from Tunisia, this had become the only means by which they 
could gain access to any form of assistance.57 In addition, Britain had also begun to 
improve their contact with Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, as they recognized the danger 
constituted by the German-Ottoman presence on the eastern borders of Libya. 
The British tried to persuade him to join their side to ensure that there would 
be no more disturbances in the western border region of Egypt.58 Sayyid Aḥmed 
al-Sharīf was frequently visited by messengers of the British offering their friend-
ship and, at times, alliances. The messages sent by Lord Kitchener, the commissi-
oner of the British in Egypt addressed to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf carried expressi-
ons of respect and appreciation of the British and indicated at the same time the 
importance of his position for them, as well as the British desire for friendship 
and mutual support. It was a clear attempt to induce him to their side.59 This was 
after they had learned about the presence of Turkish envoys sent to sign an agree-
53 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, p. 303.
54 Ismāʿīl, Tārīkh Afrīqiyā al-ḥadīth, p. 453.
55 De Candole, E.A.V, The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya, Ben Ghalbon, Manchester, 1990, 
p. 27.
56 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 72.
57 Ibid.
58 Wathīqā 48, al-Wathāʾiq al-iṭālīyya,p. 174.
59 Mannāʿ, Aḥmed al-Sharīf, p. 53.
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ment with Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf and ally with him against Britain and Italy.60 
They tried to gain time and to keep Aḥmed Al-Sharīf out of Ottoman-German 
influence so as not to offer strategic support.61 Therefore, Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf 
was hesitant to help Germany and the Ottomans at the beginning; in addition, he 
was aware of the extensive preparations that attacking the British in Egypt would 
require, including large quantities of equipment and military assistance. Given 
that the mujāhidīn were constantly involved in smaller conflicts with the Italians, 
it was a matter of concern as to whether this degree of preparation was possible. 
Meanwhile the British imposed a tight control on the Libyan-Egyptian border and 
the Libyan-Sudanese border. This hampered the progress of convoys loaded with 
ammunition and weapons coming to Libya. There was then a crippling blockade 
on the country.62 The situation was further complicated by the British prevention 
of many Egyptian volunteers (mutaṭawiʿūn) leaving to Libya. These volunteers 
tended to come from the regions of Egypt close to the Libyan border and many of 
them originated from tribes with Libyan origins.63 They were inspired by the idea 
of jihad against European occupation and decided on this basis to make their 
way to the camps of the Libyan mujāhidīn and to join their battle against the Bri-
tish.64 This was particularly prominent following the Ottoman Empire’s entry into 
the war in 1914 on the side of Germany, and its declaration of jihad against the 
allied forces. Given the religious and Islamic principles with which Sayyid Aḥmed 
al-Sharīf had been educated, it would have been difficult for him to relinquish his 
support of the Ottoman Empire, especially when it had raised the banner of Islam 
and jihad. There was a religious and moral obligation to respond to this appeal, 
despite the risks that this would entail. 
Aḥmed al-Sharīf was advised by some not to support the German and Ottoman 
plans. These people included Sultan Ḥussein Kamel, the Sultan of Egypt, Henry 
McMahon, the viceroy of the British king in Egypt, and the commander of the 
British army in Egypt, General Maxwell. Maxwell also offered British help in 
obtaining Libyan independence; therefore, Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf refused the 
German-Ottoman offer. The Ottomans reacted using their diplomatic relations to 
ignite fighting on the eastern front of Libya. They realized that Sayyid Aḥmed 
al-Sharīf did not want to commit his men to a war that would not help the Otto-
60 Wathīqā 289 /56219, Wathāʾiq al-arshīf al-injīlīzī shuʿbat al-wathāʾiq al-ajnabīyya, al-markaz 
al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis. 
61 Ibid.
62 Mannāʿ, Aḥmed al-Sharīf, p. 52.
63 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 72.
64 Mīkhāʾīl, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-injīlīzīyya al-lībiyyā, p. 54.
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mans in their fight against the Italians. It was obvious that Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf 
failed to determine his position once and for all. The difficulty increased for him 
when he realized that the German Ottoman plans included temporarily stopping 
the jihad against the Italians in Libya.  At that time, the idea of a truce between 
the mujāhidīn and Italy was raised to concentrate all the forces on the war against 
the British in Egypt.65 Nuri Bey sent a letter to his brother Enver Pasha, referring 
slightingly to al-Sharīf’s lack of commitment to his own country and to his close 
relationships with the British.66 Al-Sharīf’s rejection did not prevent Nuri Bey 
and Jāʾfar al-ʿAskarī from mobilizing and training fighters and volunteers in far 
eastern Libya. These fighters were from the area of Cyrenaica. They were joined 
by many from the ʿAūwlad ʿAlī tribe, who inhabited the Egyptian desert and who 
traced their origins to the region of eastern Libya. The Ottoman officers wanted to 
guarantee the success of this project, which is why they began to receive German 
arms via German submarines in the Mediterranean Sea (see Appendix 5 and 
6).67 All these pressures led Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf to decide for war against the 
British in Egypt;68 especially after the intensive Turkish propaganda led by Jāʾfar 
al-ʿAskarī, who used all the human and financial resources available to improve 
conditions on the Libyan-Egyptian border. He also worked to win the support of 
many Libyan mujāhidīn who were under the influence of this idea. This prompted 
some of them to attack effectively on Egyptian territory without the knowledge 
of the al-Sanūsīyya military leadership in Libya, which did not leave any other 
choices to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf but to accept the Ottoman-German proposal.69 
Consequently, Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf decided to wage war against the British 
within British-controlled Egyptian territory with the support of the Ottoman 
Empire and Germany. The attack took place in 1915.70
The Libyan leadership of the mujāhidīn was well aware of the seriousness of 
the situation, especially with the presence of the Italians. The German-Ottoman 
project aimed to encircle the British; the movement of troops from Libya would 
have a significant role in the defeat of the British in Egypt, especially as the inter-
nal situation allowed them to do so after the victories they had achieved against 
the Italians. At the same time, the Ottoman army move coincided with the Libyan 
attack to control the Suez Canal.71
65 Kāmil, al-Dawlā al-ʿarabiyya al-kubra, p. 336.
66 Mīkhāʾīl, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-injīlīzīyya al-lībiyyā, p. 54
67 De Candole, The Life and Times, p. 26. 
68 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 66.
69 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, p. 256.
70 Ismāʿīl, Tārīkh Afrīqiyā al-ḥadīth, p. 453. 
71 Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 19.
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Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf and Nuri Bey led the mujāhidīn forces in this war. 
All were motivated by the main aim of ending the Italian occupation in their 
land using the aid of the Germans and the Ottomans, who promised to declare 
the independence of Libya if they won the war against the Italians. Moreover, 
the mujāhidīn believed in the idea of jihad and its success in fighting the occup-
iers.72 The choice of battle location depended on the strategy of the site and was 
sometimes determined by the mujāhidīn because they knew the country well.73 
The first attack was on Sallum, a village on the Egyptian-Libyan border at the 
beginning of November 1915,74 where the militants managed to achieve a victory 
over the British forces. In conjunction with the start of the ground attack, the 
German submarine U35 made some military movements that led to the destruc-
tion of the British aid ship Tara in the Mediterranean Sea.75 The German support 
to the mujāhidīn was highly effective, confirmed by the success of the German 
submarine in sinking that ship in the Gulf of Sallum on November 5, 1915. This 
resulted in the capture of the captain of the ship, one officer, and 79 soldiers who 
were on board and taken to Libyan territory, specifically to the Gulf of Bardia, 
where they were handed over to the Ottomans as war prisoners (see Appendix 7).76 
The maneuvers of the German submarines did not stop; the same submarine was 
able to destroy two other boats in the port of Sallum carrying guns to support 
the land army.77 Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf did not play a real role in the attack. 
The mujāhidīn themselves planned and implemented the attack after hearing the 
news that their leaders had agreed to this project. The presence of Nuri Bey in the 
region also supported their situation.78
Umalrakham Battle in 1915
The German submarine U38, led by Captain Valentiner, reached the eastern 
shores of Libya on December 12, 1915. The German Consul and a Turkish officer 
named Jamal were on board, accompanied by two Arab leaders; the ship was 
72 Ahmida, Ali Abdellatif, Forgotten Voices, Routledge, London, 2005, 108p.
73 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, pp. 74, 76.
74 Brūkilmān, Tārīkh al-shuʿūb al-islāmīyya, p. 652; Lūtiskī, Tārīkh al-aqṭār al-ʿarabiyya al-
ḥadīth, p. 372; Ziyāda, Lībiyā fī al-ʾuṣūr al-ḥadīthā, p. 87.
75 ʿAzzām,“Kifāḥ al-shaʿb al-lībī fī sabīl al-ḥurrīyya”, p. 432; al-Sāḥlī, “Wamaḍāt min al-wathāʾiq 
al-ʿūthmānīyyā”, p. 323.
76 De Candole, The Life and Times, p. 27.
77 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 1.
78 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 66.
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also carrying 6 tons of munitions destined to the mujāhidīn to support them in 
continuing the fight against the British.79 The area of Umalrakham, located near 
Matrouh in Egypt, was where the first clash between the forces of the Libyan 
mujāhidīn and a number of volunteers from the tribe of ʿAūwlad ʿAlī on the one 
side, and the British on the other, took place. The battle lasted from morning 
until evening, but the mujāhidīn persevered and suffered minor losses, while the 
British lost many soldiers.80 After the end of the battle, the British retreated and 
the mujāhidīn withdrew to the area of Wadi Majid.
Wadi Majid Battle in 1915
A second battle between the two sides took place at the end of December 1915, in 
the area of Wadi Majid in Egypt.81 The British army received reinforcements and 
military support represented by the arrival of 15.000 troops to the battlefield. In 
contrast, the Turkish commander Jāʾfar al-ʿAskarī arrived as the head of a group 
of troops to rescue the mujāhidīn, while Nuri Bey led the battle. Nuri defeated 
the British, forcing them to withdraw toward Matruh in Egypt after they suffered 
extensive losses.82
Bir Tunis Battle in 1916
Bir Tunis was located near Bir Majid in Egypt, where the Libyan mujāhidīn got 
their supply of water. The British wanted to end the war quickly and to eliminate 
the Libyan forces. So, they decided to mount a surprise attack, but natural factors 
had a role in delaying it. There was heavy rainfall that impeded the movement of 
the British army and thus delayed the start of the battle between the two parties 
in Botons to late January 1916. Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf participated in this battle, 
in addition to Nuri Bey and some German officers who took part in the fighting. 
The losses of the two parties were large.83 Despite the small number of mujāhidīn, 
the result was in their favor. The fact that a German officer was among the dead 
led the British to assert that the senior leadership and management of the battle 
79 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 1.
80 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 73.
81 De Candole, The Life and Times, p. 28.
82 See Microfiche Copex HDP13, LOS 4, Asw A-+, Politisches Archiv WK Nr. 38, 1. Februar 1916.
83 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, pp. 77–78.
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had been performed by the German. Rather, this was because of the nature of the 
battle and the stead fastness of the mujāhidīn. However, there was no question that 
most participants were Libyan mujāhidīn who were motivated by the ideology of 
jihad and the goal of expelling the Italian occupation from their country. After this 
battle, more officers and soldiers were sent by the Ottoman Empire to eastern Libya. 
Although the document does not specify numbers, it does record that submarine 
U38 brought 6 officers and a load estimated at 10 tons of weapons to the of King 
Idris on February 10–11, 1916. The submarine was unloaded at the port of Bardia.84
Controlling Siwa Oasis in 1916
Following these clashes near the coast, Aḥmed al-Sharīf commanded the 
mujāhidīn to distribute their forces and not to be concentrated on one front. This 
was why he sent the Egyptian Captain Moḥammad Ṣaleḥ Ḥarb to Siwa Oasis.85 
He succeeded in controlling the oasis and dominated the neighboring area. In 
addition, he controlled the area of Farafra Aldakhila. After this success deep in 
Egyptian territory, a military contingent was led by ʿAbd al-llāh Tamaskat to the 
Bahriyya oasis, where he defeated the British garrison and controlled the provin-
ces of Fayoum and Minya.86 The intensification of fighting between the Libyan 
mujāhidīn and the British and the losses on both sides prompted Germany to 
intensify its financial and military support. This was reflected by the arrival of 
the German officer Paul Freiherr Wolff von Todenwarth87 with his companions, 
in addition to four Turkish officers along with ammunition and weapons on April 
20, 1916 on board submarine U21.88
84 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 2.
85 Mīkhāʾīl, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-injīlīzīyya al-lībiyyā, p. 61.
86 ʿAzzām, “Kifāḥ al-shaʿb al-lībī”, pp. 434–435.
87 Halpem, Paul G., The Naval War in the Mediterranean: 1914–1918, Routledge, London, 2016, 
630, p. 246.
88 U–Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 2.
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Map 9: Battle to control Siwa Oasis in 1916, Libyan-Egyptian border provinces and places of 
battles during World War I
The Second Battle of Majid in 1916
After the arrival of more military reinforcements, the Libyan mujāhidīn con-
tinued their war against the British. The next clash between the two sides was 
at the second battle of Majid. Jāʾfar al-ʿAskarī led the forces in this battle, while 
General Wallace led the British. The British suffered losses again in spite of the 
small number of mujāhidīn who forced them to withdraw from the battlefield. 
The advance of the northern unit of the Senusi-army through the coastline 
stretch, which was cleared by the English east of Sellum up to east of Nedjaila, 
was coming to a stop near Majid. Small skirmishes had been taking place close 
to Umm-er-Rham and Majid. Afterwards, the English attacked on December 26th 
with superior forces; they were very well equipped both in terms of weapons 
and men. Jāʾfar held position with only 40 men. Given the superior forces of the 
English, they would have hardly changed much in the outcome of the skirmish.89
89 Ibid.
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Agagia Battle in 1916
Agagia (also Agagiya or Aqqaqiya) was located near the coast of the Mediterranean 
and the battle ensued between the two sides there. The mujāhidīn, in particular 
the forces under the command of Nuri Bey, were suffering of a severe shortage of 
supplies and ammunition. In contrast, the British army had received reinforce-
ments and supplies, which is why they won the battle. It should be noted that 
ʿAbd al-RaḥmānʿAzzām was involved in this battle.90 It led to great losses for the 
mujāhidīn and they were forced to withdraw from the battlefield. Moreover, most 
of the forces that participated in the fighting withdrew from Egyptian territory 
toward Cyrenaica, within Libyan territory.91 This gave the British a chance to move 
forward. They succeeded in taking control of the region of Sidi Barrani on February 
28, 191692 and then occupying Sallum on March 24, 1916.93 Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, 
along with Moḥammad Ṣaleḥ Ḥarb, was able to seize most of the Egyptian oases, 
i.e. Farafra, Dakhla, al-Kharija and the Bahria.94 They succeed ed in tightening their 
grip on the road to the oases, implementing the agreement between the Germans 
and the Ottomans, which also required the sparking of a revolution in Egypt led by 
Ahmed Jamal against the British. This was supposed to be synchronized with the 
arrival of Ottoman forces coming from Syria to the Suez Canal to encircle the British; 
however, this plan failed.95 The British managed to control the interior territories of 
Egypt and thoroughly repressed the revolution. Thus, Ahmed Jamal could not carry 
out his task of enabling Ottoman penetration via the Suez Canal by diverting British 
attention toward the eastern border and internal unrest.96 This was despite careful 
preparation and the assistance by German officers,97 in addition to the approxi-
mately 3.500 troops who were supposed to perform this task. Britain succeeded in 
repelling the attack of the Ottoman Empire after the success of the Ottoman army in 
moving overland across the Sinai Desert toward Ismailia. The Ottomans began to 
withdraw. That was how the German-Ottoman plans to control that front failed.98
90 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, pp. 82–83; ʿAzzām, “Kifāḥ ʿal-shaʿb al-lībī”, 
pp. 438, 441, 443.
91 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, pp. 82–83.
92 Ibid., p. 86.
93 Kāmil, al-Dawlā al-ʿarabiyya al-kubra, p. 338.
94 Mīkhāʾīl, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-injīlīzīyya al-lībiyyā, p. 62.
95 Brūkilmān, Tārīkh al-shuʿūb al-islāmīyya, p. 604; Mannāʿ, Aḥmed al-Sharīf, p. 70.
96 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 95.
97 al-ʿAqād, Lībiyā al-muʿāṣira, p. 19. 
98 ʿAtīq, Wajīh ʿAbd al-Ṣādiq, Muḥāḍarāt fī tārīkh al-ʿarab al-muʿāṣir, Dār al-thaqāfā al-ʿarabiyya, 
al-Qāhira, 1994/1955, p. 20.
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5.3   Libyan Defeat in Egypt and German Policy 
Following these dangerous developments, Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf and his army 
in the Egyptian oases became isolated from any contact with the rest of the front. 
This became worse with a cholera outbreak among the soldiers. Sayyid Aḥmed 
al-Sharīf was forced to withdraw his troops toward Siwa, Farafra and Bahria,99 
where he was attacked by the British in a battle on February 28, 1917. This forced 
him to retreat toward Libyan territory,100 where he arrived with his forces in the 
areas near al-Jaghbub. They were pursued by the British forces, which wanted 
to eliminate the troops of Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, which resulted in a battle 
between the two sides in the region of Guba. However, the British failed to defeat 
the mujāhidīn, who were helped by natural factors to avoid more deaths and 
losses. This battle was the last between the two parties.101 However, the British 
were not satisfied, and sent a warning to Sayyid Idris al-Sanūsī, who was in al-
Jaghbub, to leave the area as soon as possible. They informed him that if he did 
not, the British forces would fully destroy the city of al-Jaghbub in addition to the 
burial place of Sayyid Moḥammad bin Ali al-Sanūsī. This place was of central 
emotional and religious significance to the al-Sanūsīyya movement and its loss 
or destruction would be a great blow.102 Upon hearing this threat, Sayyid Aḥmed 
al-Sharīf decided to leave the area. He went toward the al-Agalia area.103
Military operations around the desert oases continued between 1916 and 
early 1917. The fighting coincided with the arrival of German submarines. In July 
1916, submarine U39 arrived, carrying two military missions from the Turkish 
army with ammunition and equipment. It had first docked in the port of Barqa 
on July 8th, 1916 and then went to the city of Misurata on July 10, 1916. The subma-
rine itself returned in October carrying Turkish officers and weapons to support 
the combat capability of the Libyans.104 The submarine was carrying orders for 
General Todesfarth to return to Germany.105 Ottomans suffered in this campaign. 
Officers and soldiers who took part in the fighting did not leave Libya. They ini-
99 al-Tilīsī, Baʿd al-qurḍabīyya, p. 456.
100 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, p. 257.
101 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 94.
102 Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, p. 288.
103 Kāmil, al-Dawlā al-ʿarabiyya al-kubra, p. 338.
104 The Germans did not focus on the support of the Libyan mujāhidīn in war only, but they also 
provided them with food to fight against the widespread hunger in Cyrenaica at the time. For 
more information, see Microfiche Copex HDP13 in IA – Weltkrieg WK Nr. 114, R21284-2, Bd. 2, 31. 
Dezember 1916, held in the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts.
105 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 2.
180   German-Ottoman Rapprochement Policy and its Impact (1914–1918)
tially remained in the city of Ajdabiya, and then moved to the city of Misurata.106 
The reason behind their stay was the insistence on the importance of their pre-
sence in the country and that the war was not yet over. Second, Turkey was deter-
mined to maintain its control over Libya for as long as possible, and they did 
not want to lose this geographically important part of the region. That was the 
reason behind Nuri Bey continuing to work to serve the interests of the Ottoman 
Empire. His work was focused on the restoration of confidence in Turkey and the 
revival of Turkish influence, in addition to control over the Turkish military. Nuri 
Bey tried to be closer to the new political leadership in Cyrenaica led by Idris 
al-Sanūsī, who ruled from 1917 and did his best to influence them to continue 
the war against the British in Egypt. He offered great promises to provide aid via 
German submarines. But the new commander of the Sanūsīyya movement had a 
different point of view to that of the Ottomans.107 Especially after the Sanūsīyya 
movement’s failed attack on Egypt, he believed that the interests of the country 
required them to enter negotiations with the British and the Italians alike and to 
not engage with them in an unequal war. From this point, Idris al-Sanūsī decided 
not to listen to the appeals of the Ottomans and even ended his connection with 
them. This led to a changed attitude on the part of the Ottomans, who began to 
regard him and the al-Sanūsīyya movement as opposition.
The new Turkish policy was thus to attack the al-Sanūsīyya movement. 
Nuri Bey then sent three Turkish officers with their troops to the south of Libya, 
where Moḥammad Abed al-Sanūsī, the brother of Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, was 
manag ing the affairs of the region. The soldiers brought gifts to Moḥammad Abed 
al-Sanūsī to hide their movements and intentions and to reassure the latter that 
their presence did not hold any other purpose. They then made the sudden move 
of seizing the city of Murzuq. Moḥammad Abed al-Sanūsī tried but failed to recap-
ture the city. In addition, the Ottomans also seized the city of Zwila and continued 
to hold it, despite the repeated attempts to recover it by the al-Sanūsīyya move-
ment, until July 10, 1917 when the Ottomans withdrew from Murzuq and Zwila. 
They turned toward the city of Sebha and regrouped there, especially with the 
arrival of supplies from Nuri Bey in the city of Misurata. This led them to intensify 
their control over Fezzan to force Moḥammad Abed al-Sanūsī to leave it and go 
to the city of al-Kufra.108 The Ottomans controlled Fezzan until the end of World 
War I.109 During this time, the Italian presence was concentrated in the coastal 
106 Khishīm, Ṣafaḥāt min jihādanā al-waṭanī, p. 73.
107 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 116.
108 Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, pp. 189–190.
109 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 116.
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regions only. Due to their involvement in the war in Europe around this time, they 
did not undertake large scale military activity in Libya. They did, however, make 
a few smaller attacks on the mujāhidīn when this did not present a great risk to 
their own side. Within the framework of jihad, the Ottomans not only started the 
war in Egypt, but also sought to declare war on the French in Tunisia by mobili-
zing the mujāhidīn in the western region. To achieve this goal the Turkish envoy 
Hassan al-Sharīf traveled to the city of Misurata and met Ramaḍān al-Swīḥlī 
and Saif al-Dīn al-Sanūsī, one of al-Sanūsīyya movement leaders, and offered 
them the project of attacking the French in Tunis, but they did not agree. Saif 
al-Dīn al-Sanūsī refused the plan while Ramaḍān al-Swīḥlī accepted it. This led 
the al-Sanūsī leader to leave the city of Misurata.110 Saif al-Dīn al-Sanūsī’s point 
of view was that the country could not bear the burden of fighting three major 
European countries (Italian, British and French) at one time, especially at this 
particular time. He was particularly concerned by the financial and economic 
problems and deteriorating military forces. Despite this, some Ottoman officers 
attacked the Ben Guerdane area in September 1915 and succeeded in capturing 
40 French soldiers. France then moved quickly and decisively addressed the lea-
dership of the al-Sanūsīyya movement to discuss the necessary measures. Saif 
al-Dīn al-Sanūsī quickly directed a stern warning: The Ottoman officer who was 
in charge was forced to stop the attack on the French and return to Fezzan.111 
Germany’s role in these events became clear when it commissioned the consul 
Mannesmann to join the Ottomans in their attack on the western border. However, 
Saif al-Dīn issued orders banning him from reaching his destination so as not to 
complicate matters even more. Mannesmann had moved with the Turkish leaders 
to Misurata after they left Cyrenaica.112 The position of the Ottomans at this stage 
was sensitive, especially given the lack of united rule over Libya. The eastern and 
southern parts were under the control of the al-Sanūsīyya movement, the center of 
the country was subjected to the tribal leaders, while the west was disputed. That 
was the reason behind the attempts by the Ottomans to renew their relationship 
with Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf. To show their good intentions, they sent two convoys 
loaded with food and other supplies that the al-Sanūsīyya movement needed. The 
convoy should have departed from Misurata, but the leader of Misurata, Ramaḍān 
al-Swīḥlī, refused to permit the passage of these goods to al-Sanūsīyya, due to his 
own hostile relations with the movement. He took control of the convoy and pre-
110 al-ʿAqād, Lībiyā al-muʿāṣira, p. 21.
111 Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, p. 201; see also Martel, André, “La Libye, 1835–1990. 
Essai de géopolitique historique”, R.E.M.M.M. 59-60, 1991, p. 291.
112 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, p. 290.
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vented it from reaching its target. Following these developments and the refusal 
of Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf to cooperate politically with the Ottomans, the Turkish 
commander Nuri Bey distanced himself from the Turkish promises113 and decided 
to leave the territories under al-Sanūsīyya movement influence despite the difficult 
economic conditions. He retired from the political sphere and refused to enter an 
armed conflict with his cousin Sayyid Idris al-Sanūsī, who became the leader of the 
movement and the holder of actual political power in the region of Cyrenaica. 
An analysis of the events that occurred reveals that the failure of the war 
against the British in Egypt was due to a combination of factors. These included 
the imbalance of power in addition to the fact that the mujāhidīn had been figh-
ting for more than three years against the Italians and the al-Sanūsīyya move-
ment was internally divided. As a result of this war, the al-Sanūsīyya move-
ment divided into two groups: the first, a group of supporters that followed 
its religious and national senses, and led by Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, and the 
second, which took into account the internally difficult situation and led by 
Sayyid Idris al-Sanūsī, each governed by their own beliefs, opinions and poli-
tical orientations. In sum, the military campaign against the British in Egypt 
led to the failure of the Libyan side. They did not make any significant gains 
on the ground or even political gains, and suffered different types of human 
and material losses. In spite of all these failures that hit the German-Ottoman 
plans in eastern Libya, their determination was not weakened in their action 
in the north of the country. Libya became the focus of the Ottoman-German 
interests again, which led them to take further practical steps. The first was the 
arrival of an Ottoman envoy in May 1918 to monitor the situation closely. Then 
a mission was appointed to Prince Osman Fouad who was appointed comman-
der of the African military forces in Libya by the Ottoman authority. He was to 
report about everything happening on the ground to the Ottoman authorities 
to be able to take the necessary measures. He went to Istanbul to present the 
results of his tour to the powers there and kept in contact with the leaders of 
jihad in Libya. He wrote to Aḥmed Bik al-Marīḍ, one of the jihad leaders in the 
city of Terhona, and briefed him on the latest developments, promising him 
that he worked for the benefit of Libya and would secure all the needed assis-
tance before returning to Libya.114 The German submarines took over the transfer 
of messages between the two sides. The results were very encouraging for the 
113 Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, pp. 224–225.
114 Wathīqā 11, Risālā min al-ʾamīr ʿUthmān Fūʾād ilā Aḥmed Bik al-Marīḍ, 2-2-1918, al-Wathāʾiq 
al-ijtimāʿīyya, shuʿbat al-wathāʾiq wa al-makhṭūṭāt, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-wathāʾiq wa al-
māḥafūḍāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis. 
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Ottomans, as they had Misurata as a field of their activity. That was the reason 
for the return of Prince Osman Fouad to Libya, representing the Turkish side.115 
The German Paul Freiherr Wolff von Todenwarth was commissioned to resume 
representation of the German side and to implement the German policy in 1918.116 
Both leaders arrived and worked on the implementation of the task. The German 
baron assumed the task of managing the telegraph in Misurata, and therefore 
was responsible for communication, coordination and command operations, 
which was a delicate task at that particular stage. It was decided by the Ottomans 
that Libya was to be the main base of their operations in North Africa. The two 
sides decided to make a major change in the process of moving the front of Libya. 
This time, the main emphasis was laid on the extension of the mujāhidīn in the 
west, with better arms and financial support. This decision was issued by German 
military staff in Berlin,117 which sent a letter to the German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs on January 4, 1917 to inform them of the plans.118 The military leadership 
sought to implement this plan in Libya, supported by weapons and equipment 
transported by German submarines from Germany.119 The starting point was to 
be from the west heading east and thus involving the largest possible number 
of Libyan people. This time, the primary aim of the mujāhidīn was to expel the 
Italian presence from Libya. The Ottomans received assistance from Germany in 
the delivery of military support to the Libyan jihad in Misurata (see Appendix 4). 
The Italians tried hard to prevent the arrival of those supplies. For example, the 
German submarine UC73, led by Commander Schebeler, reached the city of Misu-
rata carrying three Ottoman officers, 1.000 rifles, 200.000 bullets in addition to 
18 boxes filled with gold. Bad weather forced the submarine to dock in the Gulf 
of Sirte, where its cargo was unloaded on May 26, 1917.120 The Italian forces tried 
to take possession of the submarine and even continued in their efforts when 
it reached the port, but the counter-attack of the mujāhidīn forced them to ret-
reat.121 This Italian attack came as a reaction against the German forces attacking 
Italian targets in April 1917. Examples include the German submarine U20 missile 





119 Wathīqā 12617, Wathāʾiq al-ʾarshif al-siyāsī al-ʿalmānī, wathāʾiq muṣawarā bi-shuʿbat al-
wathāʾiq al-ajnabīyya, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis.
120 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 2.
121 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, p. 291.
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also attacked another frigate off the coast of Tripoli and detonated it.122 The poli-
tical action was moving toward reviving the idea (begun in 1914) of establishing 
the Republic of North Africa. This idea received strong support from Germany, 
Austria and the Ottoman Empire in 1915. A number of jihad movements estab-
lished by youth from Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco aimed at jihad against the 
European occupation participated in these activities. Their aim was also to esta-
blish one united republic in North Africa. They aimed to build the republic with 
political borders starting from the Red Sea in Egypt in the east, to the Atlantic 
Ocean in the west. They took the Tunisian-Libyan border as the starting point for 
their activities. Their activities were supported by the German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which received representatives of this entity and promised them support 
and assistance. The German ambassador in Istanbul was one of the strongest 
supporters to this movement. Germany and Austria committed to this movement. 
Germany provided equipment and weapons.123 The internal situation in Libya 
was very suitable for the development of this scheme because Italian control over 
the country during this stage was weak and limited to a few coastal cities. Despite 
this, the Italian administration in Tripoli discovered the scheme.124 Despite all 
these events, German-Ottoman aid to the Libyan mujāhidīn did not stop. The reli-
ance on German submarines made the port city of Misurata a vital area for the 
movement and landing of cargo.125 The Germans intensified their activity during 
1917, particularly between May and December. In May, a mission from the German 
army reached the submarine U20, led by Rittmeister Freiherr (baron) v. Toden-
warth. The other submarine, UC20, was doing the same during the month of July 
1917 and had succeeded in its mission. On July 30, it bombed important Italian 
military targets in the city of al-Khums near Misurata, the Italians bombed back, 
which forced the submarine to dive and stay away from the coast.126 In October 
1917, the submarines attacked Italian targets while at the same time continuing 
to transfer military support for the Libyan mujāhidīn. On October 4, the subma-
rine UC73 transported an estimated 25 tons of military equipment to the city of 
Misurata and on October 6 attack ed the Italian vessel and an Italian protection 
boat which had been docked in Tripoli with two missiles. On the next day, Italian 
fortifications in the city of Tripoli were attacked. 
122 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 2.
123 ʾAmīsh, al-Tārīkh al-sīyāsī, p. 101.
124 Wathīqā 322/371, al-wathāʾiq al-injīlīzīyya, shuʿbat al-wathāʾiq al-ajnabīyya, al-markaz al-
waṭanī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis.
125 al-Tilīsī, Baʿd al-qurḍabīyya, p. 12.
126 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 3.
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The Ottoman Empire tried in 1918 to reinforce its influence in Libya after the 
loss suffered in Egypt and the failure of all the Turkish activities inside Libya. 
Evidence of this is provided by the fact that the Germans were behind the selec-
tion of Prince Osman Fouad as a general governor in Libya in 1918 (see Appen-
dix 7) because Germany wanted him to mobilize the mujāhidīn to reignite war 
in Libya.127 Germany had offered to provide Turkey with two German leaders 
to accompany him on his mission. But Enver Pasha rejected the German offer. 
However, he arrived in Libya accompanied by a number of German experts on 
board a German submarine. Their field of operation was telecommunications 
and advisers to Prince Osman Fouad.128 In addition, he was assigned the task of 
reconciling the views of the Ottomans and Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf. During the 
negotiation between Germany and Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, he sent Moḥammad 
Ṣadiq as his delegate to reach an agreement with the German party.129 The fact 
that Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf sent a representative to the meeting on his behalf 
reflected his support for the German project. ʿAbd al-RaḥmānʿAzzām had 
fought against the British in Egypt and then returned with Nuri Bey to Libya and 
remain ed with him until they left together in early 1918 to Turkey. From there he 
was sent to Berlin to enter negotiations with Germany to send military equipment 
to Libya. Therefore, he was well known to the military and political powers in 
Germany, who approved him to be the companion of Prince Osman on his new 
mission in Libya.130 Despite the departure of Nuri Bey from Libya, the Ottoman 
government sent a number of leaders to take over and complete the task that he 
had begun. Ishaq Pasha, an officer in the Ottoman army, was selected as Nuri 
Bey’s replacement as the commander of Ottoman forces on the western front in 
early 1918. However, unlike Nuri Bey, he did not take Misurata as a center for his 
leadership, but headed west and settled in the city of Zawiya. A conflict deve-
loped between Ishaq Pasha and Ramaḍān al-Swīḥlī over leadership tasks, and 
Ramaḍān al-Swīḥlī maintained that he was the higher commander. The conflicts 
intensified over the issue of who should receive the military and financial aid 
sent by German submarines to Libya. Whilst Ramaḍān al-Swīḥlī argued that this 
aid and ammunition should be kept within the area of influence, the Ottoman 
commander Ishaq Pasha recommended the transfer of all arms and ammuni-
tion to the headquarters at Zawiya, arguing that the western region was the most 
important field of fighting against the Italians and experienced the most battles 
127 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 170. 
128 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 4.
129 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 168.
130 Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, pp. 229, 231.
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and clashes at this time. The conflicts intensified to the extent that the Turkish 
commander set up a military campaign to force Ramaḍān al-Swīḥlī to execute 
his orders. However, the intervention of Prince Osman Fouad came with positive 
results and prevented further losses on the side of the mujāhidīn.131 At the begin-
ning of 1918, the German submarine continued to assault Italian targets in Libya. 
For example, submarine UC73 attack ed the Italian ships on the coast of the city 
of Tripoli on January 2, 1918. At the beginning of November 1918, some of these 
submarines were attacked in Tripoli, making it difficult for them to continue their 
activities. They had also received orders that the coast where they operated was 
unsafe.132
This period was the end of World War I, when the defeat of Germany had 
become clear. Accordingly, the field of the military operations developed nega-
tively for the Ottoman Empire and Germany alike. They were defeated by the 
allies. This was the background to the signing of the Treaty of Modros at the end of 
October, 1918.133 One of the terms of this treaty was that the Ottoman state had to 
withdraw all armies from all the Arab countries. Based on that, they issued orders 
to their officers in Libya to abandon military operations against Italy and even 
surrender to the Italians. They were also obliged to hand over all the ports under 
their control to the allied armies.134 This was the beginning of the end of Ottoman-
German relations in Libya, as it was also the start of breaking the link between 
the Ottomans and Libya, in spite of which Prince Osman Fouad continued to be 
present in Misurata.135 Von Todenwarth was present in Misurata at this time and 
received the news of the defeat over the radio in October 1918. He received orders 
to leave Libya, along with Prince Osman Fouad and all the Turkish officers as well 
as the German who were working with him. He received these orders, but did not 
carry them out directly. He thought it was wise to postpone the execution of these 
orders somewhat so they could arrange the political situation in Libya.136
During this time, von Todenwarth learned that Germany intended to conti-
nue the war until the end, and that they were committed to helping the Libyans 
with money and weapons. In return, the leaders of jihad in Libya announced their 
willingness to form a local government to ensure the continuity of the war against 
the Italians in a united manner.  In the meantime, there was a German submarine 
131 Hūwīdī, al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Lībiyā, p. 167.
132 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 4.
133 Brūkilmān, Tārīkh al-shuʿūb al-islāmīyya, p. 605; ʿAmīsh, al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī, p. 63.
134 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, pp. 304–305.
135 Wathīqā 54, al-wathāʾiq al-iṭālīyya, p. 207.
136 ʿAmīsh, al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī, p. 63.
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docked off the coast of Misurata.137 This submarine arrived to take Prince Osman 
and the German Baron and their officers and soldiers. But they decided to stay 
and were supported by the commander of the submarine in their decision, who 
told them that the route was not safe and it was not the right time to travel. Thus, 
the submarine turned back. The jihad leaders in Libya, Prince Osman, and ʿAbd 
al-RaḥmānʿAzzām held an emergency meeting to take the appropriate decision in 
line with the dangerous developments. 
Prince Osman sent an invitation to all tribal leaders to come to Mislata for a 
meeting, which took place in the city of Mislata in 1918 and concluded with the 
declaration of the Republic of Tripoli.138 The republic included all tribal leaders 
and dignitaries in the western region of the country. This stage was particularly 
critical because Germany and the Ottoman Empire had withdrawn from the con-
flict, which meant the end of military supplies and equipment for the mujāhidīn139 
essential for their struggle against the Italians. This made the role of local fighters 
even more crucial. The local leaders had a prominent role in the events that occur-
red during the final phase of World War I, particularly in the central and western 
regions of Libya. They included Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, who took leadership in the 
western region, Ramaḍān al-Swīḥilī, who had an alliance with the Italians and 
fought against the al-Sanūsīyya movement, and ʿAbdul Nabī Bilkhīr, who was the 
leader of the Warfalla tribe in the area of Bani Walid in the north-west of Libya, 
who had also collaborated with the Italians, and Aḥmed Bik al-Marīḍ, the leader 
of the Tarhuna tribe in the southeast. The idea of proclaiming the Republic of 
Tripoli was an extension of the idea of the Republic of North Africa, which had 
been adopted and supported by Germany during the early years of World War I. At 
this stage, Germany also supported this idea, but on a small scale. It was seeking 
to achieve political gains after its defeat in the war. The leaders of the Republic of 
Tripoli wanted to obtain international recognition. They sent messages to Britain, 
France, Italy and the United States to this end but their efforts did not achieve 
the desired results.140 However, they kept their contact with Italy independently 
and succeeded in signing an agreement with it in 1919. The direct result was the 
immediate issuance of a basic law for Tripoli, by which the Libyans could form a 
parliament in the presence of a governor to be appointed by the king of Italy.141 
With the defeat of Germany and the Ottoman Empire and the actual withdrawal 
137 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 4.
138 al-Zāwī, Jihād al-abṭāl, pp. 310–311.
139 ʿAmīsh, al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī, p. 63.
140 al-Ḥasan, al-Anẓima al-sīyāsiyya wa al-distūriyya, p. 390.
141 Ibid., pp. 390–391.
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of all officers from Libya in 1919, the Ottomans were subjected to strong pressu-
res by the allied powers and forced to sign a number of treaties that led to the 
end of their influence and the despoiling of large territories that were under their 
control. This deteriorating situation led Muṣṭafa Kemal Atatürk (ruled 1881–1938) 
to declare a Turkish secular state when he separated the sultanate and caliphate. 
He then canceled the sultanate and announced the republic in October 1923.142 At 
that time, Germany had elected a new government called the Weimar Republic.
These international events greatly affected German policy toward the Medi-
terranean countries in general and Libya in particular, as the latter had been at 
the heart of German policy in this area during World War I.
142 Waḥīd, al-Qawl al-mufīd fī ḥukum al-sulṭān ʿAbdul-Ḥamīd, p. 307.
Conclusion
This book explored the nature of German interests in the province of Tripoli 
between 1884 and 1918, and Tripoli’s role in German politics during the scramble 
for Africa. This was undertaken through an analysis of the general situation in 
Tripoli during the period in question to understand the nature of the relationship 
between Germany and Tripoli. An important aspect in understanding German 
policies of the time is the role of German travelers, who lobbied hard to attract 
German politicians to the province, and, along with a number of businesspeople, 
pushed for the opening of a German consulate there. Furthermore, the period of 
the Ottoman Empire reforms (Tanẓīmāt), which led to changes in policies towards 
the province and in a way allowed the Italian occupation mainly in the North. 
It allows in a way as well, the main international events and agreements in the 
context of the imperial and colonial competition. The German role during the 
World War I and its impact on the Libyan jihad movement against the occupation 
and colonization beginning from the year 1915. Germany was trying to emulate 
the major European powers, notably Britain and France, by extending its control 
beyond Europe. Germany had political, strategic and economic interests in North 
Africa, especially in the province of Tripoli, but did not pursued colonial inten-
tions like the other European countries. To realize these goals, Germany started 
to strengthen its relations with the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 19th
century. It supported the development and training of the Ottoman military forces 
via the transfer of German military personnel and equipment to Turkey.1 In this 
way, Germany provided the Ottoman army forces with weapons specifically for 
the artillery and infantry, different types of German-designed and manufactured 
field guns, rifles and carbines.2 It also established large-scale economic projects, 
most prominently the Baghdad railway.  Germany already had a political and 
military presence in parts of central Africa, and Germany viewed the province 
of Tripoli as the gate to reach the German colonies in Africa in the context of 
European colonization of different parts of Africa. World War I ended with the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire.  The Political Archive and the Federal Archives in 
Berlin (Politisches Archiv and Bundesarchiv), and the National Center for Docu-
mentation and Archives in Libya, and the Casbah) Qaṣba (archive in Tunis bring 
new information on the economic exchange between Germany and the province 
1 Trumpener, Ulrich, German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914: An Historical Re-Evaluation, The 
Journal of Modern History, vol. 32-2, June, 1960, pp. 145–149. 
2 “The Ottoman Empire”, New Zealand History, Ministry for Culture and Heritage, http://www.
nzhistory.net.nz/war/ottoman-empire, updated 2-Sep-2014-2014, p. 12.
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of Tripoli. It shows that the military aid provided by Germany to the mujāhidīn in 
Libya was important. It shows as well how the German involvement in Libya at 
that time was important for the reconstruction of a telegraph station like in Misu-
rata in 1914. German expansion beyond Europe primarily aimed at strengthening 
its own position in Europe. Thus, this book shows that Germany employed the 
province of Tripoli to serve its growing international influence and competitive-
ness in Europe, particularly with Britain and France. Conrad and Osterhammel 
portray German activity in the province of Tripoli (then Libya) as falling within 
the informal colonial expansion of the German empire. In other words, the pro-
vince of Tripoli was included in the informal colonial German Empire. To make 
this point clearer, Germany used trade as well as political penetration to gain 
control over territories that were not colonized in a military sense. Only in some 
territories, where the political and economic influence could not be guaranteed 
otherwise, Germany employed military means to secure its position. Tripoli 
was within the informal colonial sphere of Germany and was used not only as 
a gateway to its colonies in central Africa, but also as a market for its products. 
Most of all, however, Germany considered it as a means to jockey for a better posi-
tion in Europe. Even if Germany did not colonize the province of Tripoli using any 
military means of occupation, it was able to penetrate the province economically 
and used it in a way that helped its international policy (Weltpolitik), described 
by Baumgart as an expression of its striving for world power (Weltmacht).3 The 
term “Weltpolitik” obtained its popularity after its use by the German Emperor 
Wilhelm III in his speech on January 18, 1896, as he celebrated the 25th anni-
versary of the establishment of the German Reich.4 German colonization in Africa 
was begun by the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1884–1885. This was 
later in comparaison with Britain and France which had begun their expansionist 
policies in the 16th century. As the German chancellor had explained to Eugen 
Wolf, an explorer, much to the colonial enthusiasts’ regret in 1888:
Your map of Africa looks nice, but my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia, and here 
is France, and we are here at the very center; that is my map of Africa.5
This anecdote illustrates well the theoretical argumentation and the distinction 
between colonialism and imperialism suggested by Jürgen Osterhammel. Impe-
3 Baumgart, Winfried, “German Imperialism in Historical Perspective”, in Germans in the Tro-
pics. Essays in German Colonial History, ed. by Arthur J. Knoll, Lewis H. Gonn, Greenwood Press, 




rialism as a relationship of domination between two culturally different powers 
in which one party controls the decisions of the other, who is forced to deal with 
these external pressures and serve the interests of the dominant party.6 Tripoli fell 
within German informal colonial expansion and penetration. 
Firstly, Tripoli was a focus, not only for Germany, but for many European inte-
rests, because its ports were located in the middle of the Mediterranean and any 
power seeking to dominate the eastern, western, or internal parts of Africa would 
take this province as starting point. Thus, Tripoli’s strategic importance lay in the 
fact that it made access to different parts of Africa easier. In addition, Tripoli was 
ruled by an Empire which had started to lose territories at an increasing rate. It 
started in a way in 1820s with the creation of Greece, this Ottoman province which 
began to campaign for its independence from the Ottoman Empire, and the crea-
tion of its own state. Since the Treaty of Berlin in 1878,7 the Ottoman Empire had 
lost 52 % of its territories and 51 % of its population.8
Secondly, the increasing number of German travelers who visited the pro-
vince of Tripoli and the information they provided to their government reveal the 
imperial intentions of Germany toward the province. A number of these travelers 
were supported by the King of Prussia and then by Otto von Bismarck such as 
Friedrich Gerhard Rohlfs and Gustav Nachtigal, or Heinrich Barth amongst others. 
In addition to the support that the travelers received from their own government, 
they were also supported by the Ottoman Empire, which was focusing on buil-
ding strong relations with Germany and strengthening its positions through 
the implementation of wide-reaching reforms. Consequently, the German trave-
lers were more successful than others in their missions. The traveler Friedrich 
Gerhard Rohlfs (who traveled to the province of Tripoli several times in the 1860s) 
reported on the geography, the nature and the agriculture in these regions.9 He 
also wrote important notes regarding customs and traditions, health, and trade 
in Tripoli. He also wrote a number of documents that were sent to and used by the 
German chancelleries, who used them in making decisions and convincing the 
politicians.10 This information contributed substantially to the development of 
German policy on the province of Tripoli, especially in view of the good relations 
between the Prussian king and the chancellor. Rohlfs submitted a request to the 
6 Osterhammel, Kolonialismus: Geschichte – Formen – Folgen, p. 21.
7 al-Jamīl, al-ʿArab wa al-ʿatrāk, pp. 63–64.
8 Yorulmaz, Naci, Arming the Sultan. German Arms, Trade and Personal Diplomacy in the Otto-
man Empire before World War I, I.B. Tauris, London, 2014, pp. 2, 256.
9 Rohlfs, Von Tripolis nach Alexandrien, pp. 63, 78.
10 Rulfis, Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā, pp. 228, 245, 249, 253, 265.
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King to send a German consul to the province of Tripoli. The information that he 
supplied and his own views about the province of Tripoli were formative in awar-
ding this province a particular status in the development of the German policy in 
Africa. He mentioned that Tripoli is “the key to Africa”.11 Germany succeeded in 
reaching the southern desert in Africa by German travelers who used the province 
of Tripoli as a starting point. From here they were able to travel to many African 
kingdoms, such as Zanzibar. Germany also built strong relationships with the 
peoples of these kingdoms on the basis of cooperation and economic exchange 
without resorting to military occupation.
Thirdly, the entry of Germany into the scramble for Africa and the overlap-
ping interests of the European powers and their ambitions in Africa resulted in 
conflicts between them. These conflicts were the main reason behind Otto von 
Bismarck’s organization of the Second Berlin Conference in 1878. This conference 
sought to settle the conflicts and to mark the borders of influence of each of the 
countries participating. The decisions and agreements signed during this con-
ference had a significant impact on the region of North Africa and it has been 
argued that this conference was the beginning of European colonization of 
parts of Africa.12 By calling this conference, Bismarck called himself the “honest 
broker” willing to solve the conflicts of the European powers without benefiting 
personally. Bismarck wanted Germany’s role in this conference to reflect its dis-
tinguished position among the other European countries and to highlight the 
German role in conflict mediation and resolution in Europe at that time. At the 
same time, however, his reference to the role of the disinterested “honest broker” 
denied any German ambitions to benefit from their hosting of the conference. His 
denial has been questioned in some studies, particularly given the threat that any 
rapprochement between Russia and France would constitute for Germany. For 
example, Carlson observes that 
[t]he ‘Honest Broker’ worked to save the peace of Europe and to secure the interests of 
Austria at Russia’s expense for the benefit of Germany.13 
11 Rulfis, Riḥla ʿabar Afrīqiyā mushāhadāt al-raḥḥāla al-ʿalmānī Rulfis, p. 29.
12 Conrad, German Colonialism.
13 Carlson, M. Dale, “Bismarck the Dishonest Broker?”, Masters thesis submitted to the Depart-
ment of History, Political Science and Philosophy. Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas 
(http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/25771), 1964, pp. 100–102.
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Bismarck aimed at isolating France and was hostile to Russia, even if he was not 
averse to supporting their position in cases where this coincided with his own 
aims. 
Bismarck was willing to come to a close understanding with Russia and to support them 
in an aggressive policy in the Balkans. However, Bismarck made his price high. German 
support of Russia in the best would be given only in return for support of German policy 
against France.14
European powers used the conference to realize their goals that enabled them 
in the scramble for Africa.  Germany used the province of Tripoli as a bargaining 
chip at this conference. This is reflected in Bismarck’s offering of Tripoli to Italy 
in exchange for Italy’s desisting from military conflict. This bargain happened 
without the knowledge of the Ottoman Empire. The offer made was that Italy could 
exercise influence over the province of Tripoli, in return for permitting France 
full control over Tunisia. Germany’s interest in strengthening its own position 
in Europe led it to enter into a number of agreements and treaties that enabled it 
to play an important international political reconciliation role. Thus, Bismarck’s 
policy of rapprochement with France can be seen as limiting the primacy of 
Britain in the power constellation, while also constituting an obstacle to any 
attempt of a French attack on Germany.15 Tripoli was a point of conflict between 
Britain and France, especially when the two countries obtain ed contiguous colo-
nies in Africa.16 Britain began to regard Germany as a threat due to its increasing 
political power, especially after the victory over France’s traditional ally Britain. 
It therefore began trying to draw a new policy aimed at maintaining its strength 
within Europe and protecting its colonies abroad, particularly its strategic inte-
rests in the Mediterranean, Egypt, and India.17 Britain was primarily interested 
in the eastern part of the province of Tripoli, specifically Cyrenaica. By contrast, 
the French focused their attention on the south, specifically the city of Ghadames 
and its environs. This was due to the location of Ghadames on the colonial border 
with the Algerian territory, which had been under French occupation since 1830.18 
Ghadames was also close to the colonial Tunisian territory, which had been sub-
jected to the French protectorate since 1882. From these two regions, the French 
14 Ibid., p. 103.
15 Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 21.
16 al-Dijānī, Lībiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī, p. 312.
17 Mommsen, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus, p. 72.
18 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 77–78.
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tried to extend their influence and control to Ghadames.19 Soon, Italy entered the 
conflict, as the Italian politicians realized the seriousness and effectiveness of 
their expansion policy and correspondingly used it to achieve their goals. Thus, 
Italy entered into an agreement with Germany and Austria-Hungary to obtain 
colonies in Africa. This agreement is known as the Triple Alliance, which was 
signed in 1882.20 The same agreement was used by Italy as a defense mechanism 
against France, to stop France from expanding in the province of Tripoli as it 
had done previously in Tunisia.21 This alliance was restored several times. Italy 
also signed an agreement with Britain in 1887. In the same year, Chancellor Otto 
von Bismarck signed a bilateral agreement with Italy confirming Italy’s right to 
occupy the province of Tripoli.22 Germany’s stance was unambiguously hostile 
to French interests. Most of the European powers tried to isolate France or form 
coalitions against the French. This was also Germany’s motivation for supporting 
the limitation of French control and influence in the provinces of Tripoli and 
Morocco. This was followed by the Anglo-French Agreement in 1899, the British-
French-Italian Agreement in 1890, the Italian French Agreement in 1900, and the 
Franco-British Entente Cordiale in 1904. There were many results, but the most 
significant one in relation to the province of Tripoli was Italy’s ability to acquire a 
political victory by taking advantage of the conflicting interests of the European 
countries and successfully exploiting these conflicting interests to occupy the 
province of Tripoli in 1911.
Fourthly, this book supported the argument of J.A. Hobson (1858–1940) that 
the economic gains were crucial for many colonial powers during the Industrial 
Revolution, when the European powers were competing for new markets and 
sources of raw materials. This book argues that Germany had economic inte-
rests in Tripoli and that there is evidence for an unequal trade balance between 
Germany and the province. Importing raw materials from the province of Tripoli 
was not as significant for Germany as using the province of Tripoli as a market 
for German products and as a means of transporting German exports further 
into Africa. Many trade centers and networks of routes were used by convoys 
were long established in the province of Tripoli, with significant economic uses 
for Germany. Examples of these routes are the Tripoli-Kano (Nigeria) road and 
19 al-Ḥarīr, “al-Tamhīd li-l-ghazū al-iṭālī wa mauqif al-lībīyyīn minhu”, p. 21.
20 al-Dijānī, Lībiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī, p. 329; Shukrī, al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā, p. 109; 
Weltgeschichte der Neuzeit, p. 125.
21 Muḥāfaẓa, Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya, p. 26.
22 Ismāʿīl, Tārīkh Afrīqiyā al-ḥadīth, p. 263.
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Tripoli-Borno23 road that lead to central Africa. Cities and ports like Tripoli, Ben-
ghazi, Sawkanh and Ghadames constituted important centers for German trade 
as the report24 of the Political Archive (Politisches Archiv) in Berlin (July 1869 and 
October 1888) demonstrate. The report shows as well that Germany was collec-
ting detailed information about raw materials available in the province, but did 
not import large amounts of these raw materials itself. In addition, the maritime 
commercial activity between the province of Tripoli and Germany was evidenced 
in the establishment of the German line (Deutsche Levante–Linie), which was 
one of the most important shipping companies. The main task of this company 
was the transportation of materials and products coming from or going to both 
Germany and Belgium.25 However, not many goods were transported from Tripoli 
to Germany. Rather, goods exported from Tripoli tended to be destined for ports 
such as Egypt and Beirut. It is therefore defensible to argue that German imports 
into the province of Tripoli were more significant than the goods exported from 
the province. Goods imported by Germany into the province of Tripoli included 
haberdashery items, blankets, tea, sugar, iron, glass, perfumes, chemicals and 
medical materials, textile yarns, ropes, cotton, wool textiles, porcelain, gold and 
silver ornaments, and alcohol.26 The export of German goods to the province of 
Tripoli continued during the year.27 According to reports by Alfred Tilger, the 
German consul in the province of Tripoli it included the exchange of products 
like tea, beer, flour, steel products, machinery, and enamel.
Fifthly, the establishment of the German consulate in the province of Tripoli 
was a clear sign of growing German imperial intentions, as well as the country’s 
desire to compete with other European powers. That was mainly because many 
European powers such as Britain, France, Spain and Italy had consulates in the 
province of Tripoli long before Germany, which decided only in 1884 to open not 
a consulate but a consular agency (al-Wikāla al-Qunṣuliyya) . This was due to 
the insufficient number of German inhabitants in the province. However, this 
was changed in 1909, and the consulate was opened at a very critical point in 
time when the Ottoman Empire had started to change its policy towards the pro-
vince of Tripoli. This was obvious as the Ottoman Empire started to introduce 
23 ʿĀmir, Tārīkh al-maghrb al-ʿarabī, p. 157.
24 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis,  Das Kai-
serliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 1, vom Juli 1869 bis Oktober 1888, R901/52506.
25 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 76.
26 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 
bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936; Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 77; Nājī, Tārīkh 
Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 55–56.
27 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, Nr. IIº58016.
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reforms and change the Ottoman governors when the province of Tripoli became 
the scene of the hidden conflict between the Ottomans (the Germans’ friends) 
and Italy (with which Germany had entered into different agreements). At the 
same time, Italy was conducting many projects in the province of Tripoli that 
were more economic in nature, but with political intentions.28 Moreover, the 
German consul Alfred Tilger provided very important information in his reports 
to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs containing not only economic but also 
political information. For example, one of his reports dating from 1912 contains 
detailed information on the new customs procedures implemented by the new 
authorities in Libya and the current economic activities in Libyan ports such as 
al-Khums, Misurata and Zuwarah. He states that all these ports had implemented 
the new customs system with reference to the continued flow of Libyan exports to 
Germany.29 This was a critical time because Italy had occupied Libya (province of 
Tripoli) in 1911. During and after the Italian occupation of Libya, the German posi-
tion was limited by two main factors. The first of these was its signing of the Triple 
Alliance and the second was its good relations with the Ottoman Empire. Despite 
these good relations, when Italy started the war against the Ottoman Empire in 
the province of Tripoli, Germany did not oppose Italy as Germany was part of 
the Triple Alliance. However, it did support the Ottomans in their war against 
Italy. In the meanwhile, World War I began in 1914 between Germany, Austria-
Hungary and Italy (the Triple Alliance), and on the other side France, Russia and 
Great Britain. The Ottomans entered World War I in support of their ally Germany 
on October 29, 191430 after signing a military contract with them on October 27, 
1913. This contract stipulated that Germany would take over the reform of the 
Ottoman military forces.31 Germany and the Triple Alliance tried to mobilize as 
much support as possible for their entry into the war. Thus, the policy makers 
in the Ottoman Empire promoted the idea of Islamic holy jihad, and asked the 
Islamic countries, especially those under their political control, to join them on 
this basis.  It seems likely that this strategy was developed in response to a sug-
gestion by an official at the German Embassy in Cairo, Max von Oppenheim.32 By 
invoking the concept of jihad, the Germans hoped to mobilize a larger degree of 
Muslim support for their efforts against the Russian, British and French forces 
28 Marx, Geschichte Afrikas, p. 150.
29 Bundesarchiv, Die Jahres-Handelsberichte des Ksl. Vizekonsulats in Tripolis (Tripolitanien), 
R901/4443, vom August 1907 bis Juni 1916, Nr. IIº1526.
30 Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, p. 243.
31 Ibid., p. 237.
32 Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 13.
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in the region.33 However, because Libya was under Italian occupation, Germany 
tried to redirect the Islamic jihad in Libya toward fighting the British in Egypt 
rather than the Italians in Libya. Germany provided significant military support 
to the mujāhidīn in the form of military equipment, weapons and German sub-
marines that helped in the transportation of military forces and equipment. Once 
again, Germany was successful in using Libya to serve its own goals and policies 
and could convince the Libyans to engage in many battles against the British in 
Egypt between 1915 and 1917. 
1918 was considered the end of the scramble for Africa because of the defeat 
of the Triple Alliance in World War I and the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire 
from different provinces in North Africa, including Libya. In this year, the Repub-
lic of Tripoli was declared, during which time the Weimar Republic was founded 
in Germany. To conclude, this book argues that the province of Tripoli fell within 
the sphere of informal German colonial expansion, where it was used to serve its 
imperial interests and polices. This was the case even if Germany did not occupy 
Libya militarily, but in a more informal sense, through its relationship with the 
Ottoman Empire. 
33 Lüdke, Jihad Made in Germany, p. 45.

Glossary of Arabic Words
ʿAuyūn (sing. ‘ayn): water sources or springs1
Aqḍīya (sing. qaḍāʾ): administrative divisions of the provinces ruled by the Ottoman Empire2
Bey: Ottoman title given to some governors in the Ottoman Empire3
Eyālet: largest administrative divisions in the Ottoman Empire4
Fatwa: legal opinion or learned interpretation by a qualified jurist or mufti given on issues 
pertaining to Islamic law5
Ḥāra: neighborhood.
al-Ḥalfa (sparto or Cortaderia selloana): species of palms, grows in poor and very dry 
soil and very high temperatures in North Africa, among other places, leaves are thin 
(one-millimeter width) and can be one meter long, used in handicrafts like producing 
mats6
Ḥaṣīr (mats): made of the sparto (ḥalfa), made manually or with looms and used domestically 
to sit on7
Ḥenna: plant,which leaves are dried and used to dye hair, skin or fingernails as body art8
al-Ḥizb: political party.
Eid al-Aḍḥa: Islamic festival two months after the fasting month of Ramaḍān, celebrated after 
Ḥaj9
Eid al-Fiṭr: Islamic festival, celebrated immediately after the fasting month of Ramaḍān, there 
are special prayers at this festival that gathers all Muslims together10
Jihad: armed struggle to defend Islam, whether in a territorial or ideological sense11
al-Jihādiyya: tax imposed by the Ottoman Empire used to cover the expenses of jihad, at the 
beginning temporary, later continued to be permanently taken from local people in all 
Ottoman provinces and territories12
al-Jinn: supernatural creatures
Kalīm (mats): thicker than ḥaṣīr because they are made of wool and used to cover the walls or 
the ground to be protected from humidity13
1 Majmaʾ al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya, al-Muʿjam al-wajīz, wizārat  al-tarbiya wa  al-taʿlīm, al-Qāhira, 
1994, p. 443.
2 al-Wībā, al-Idārā al-ʿūthmānīyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 63.
3 Ṣabān, al-Muʿjam al-mausuʿi li-l-mṣṭalahat al-ʿūthmānīyyā al-tārīkhiyya, p. 63.
4 Ibid., p. 45.
5 Hallaq, Wael B.,“Fatwa”, Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa; Encyclope-
dia.com, McAuliffe, Encyclopaedia of the Quran, pp. 35–42.
6 Nājī, Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 35.
7 Ibid., p. 51.
8 Majmaʾ al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya, al-Muʿjam al-wajīz, p. 174.
9 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 36.
10 Ibid., p.35.
11 McAuliffe, Encyclopaedia of the Quran, pp. 35–42.
12 al-Wībā, al-Idārā al-ʿūthmānīyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 160.
13 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, pp. 151–152.
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al-Kuwārighliyya: sons of Ottoman officers of diverse origins who married women from Tripoli14
Liwāʾ: one of the largest administrative divisions in the Ottoman Empire and its provinces, 
headed by a mutaṣarrīf, who was responsible to the governor15
Majlis al-baladiyya: municipal Council16
Mujāhidīn: persons involved in fighting in jihad17
Mutaṣarrīfīyya: administrative divisions of Ottoman provinces, also called sanjak18
Mutaṭawiʿūn: persons who were voluntarily enlisted in the conscription or any military actions 
to defend their country19
Nawāḥī (sing. nāḥiya): smallest administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire and its 
provinces, and many of them were under the supervision of qaḍāʾ,20 established in Tripoli 
after the reforms in 1869 that eliminated the position of Shaykh al-balad, while the 
Ottomans instead established localities with an elected board of elites of the city or town21
Öşür (ʿushr): Ottoman tax paid on agricultural products, farmers had to pay one tenth of their 
agriculture production such as wheat, barley and olives to the government22
Pasha: Ottoman title given to honor some governors with military ranks in the Ottoman Empire, 
also given to the governors of the Ottoman provinces23
Qāʾim maqām: officer appointed by the Ottoman at the head of any district
Qirsh: silver currency used in the Ottoman Empire24
Qunṣuliyya (consulate): highest diplomatic representatives of a state in the territories of 
another state25
Raʿīs al-Baladiyya: head of each municipality (baladiyya) and municipal council who was 
elected by local municipal notables with active suffrage (censitary suffrage)26
Ṣaḥrā: Great Desert at the beginning of south Libya, known by the main trade routes linking 
Tripoli with other trade centers in the south of the Sahara in Africa27
Sayyid: Traditional title of descendants of the prophet and a religious position and title given to 
the leaders of the al-Sanūsīyya movement in Libya28
Shaykh al-balad: mayor of the city. 
14 Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī māʾat ʿām 1286/1391H, p. 412.
15 al-Wībā, al-Idārā al-ʿūthmānīyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 60.
16 Ibid., pp. 73–77.
17 Majmaʾ al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya, al-Muʿjam al-wasīṭ, Dār al-shrūq, al-Qāhira, 2004, p. 124.
18 Masūwd, Jūbran, al-Raʿad muʿjam laghawī aʿṣrī, Dār al-ʿilim li-l-malāyīn, Bayrūt, 1992, p. 709.
19 Ibid.
20 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 26; Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, 
p. 19.
21 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 30.
22 al-Wībā, al-Idārā al-ʿūthmānīyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, pp. 135–136.
23 Ṣabān, al-Muʿjam al-mausuʿi li-l-mṣṭalahat, p. 52
24 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, pp. 205–205.
25 Majmaʾ al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya, al-Muʿjam al-wasīṭ, p. 762.
26 Ibn Mūsā, al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-lībī, p. 30.
27 Brūshīn, Tārīkh Lībiyā min nihāyāt al-qarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashar, p. 43.
28 Morimoto, Kazuo (ed.), Sayyids and Sharifs in Muslim Societies, pp. 2, 11.
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Shaykh al-Islām: It was the highest Islamic position in the Ottoman Empire, also called a mufti 
with not only a religious role, but also political and legal roles29
Shaykh al-maḥalla: Head of a tribe, responsible in his area in front of the governor.30
Sunna: deeds and sayings of the Islamic prophet Moḥammad
Sūq: market31
Tanẓīmāt: political reforms betweeem 1839 and 1876
Tarīqa Ṣūfiyya: mystical/spiritual schools or orders followed by some Muslims, Sufism 
emphasize the implementation of the orders of God and to avoid his prohibitions32
Waqf (endowment): property withheld from market circulation to be dedicated to philanthropic 
or religious purposes33
Werko: Ottoman annual tax also known as mīrī.34
al-Wikāla al-Qunṣuliyya (consular agency): diplomatic representation of a lower grade than 
a consulate, provide help and support to national citizens and strengthen political, 
economic and cultural relations, sometimes the responsibility of such consular agency 
was given to a consulate of another state35
Wilāyāt (province):36 see Eyālet
Wukalāʾ (sing. wakīl): middleman or broker working for a person or company to represent them 
in commercial transactions37
al-Yahūd: The Jews
29 Ḥalāq, Ḥasan wa ʿAbās Ṣabbāgh, al-Muʿjam al-jamiʾ fī al-muṣṭalāḥāt al-ayūbīyya wa al-
mamlūkiyya wa al-ʿūthmānīyyā dhāt aluṣūl al-ʿarabiyyaa wa al-fārisīyya wa al-turkīyya: al-
muṣṭalāḥāt al-idārīyyā wa al-ʿaskarīyya wa al-sīyāsiyya wa al-iqtiṣādīyyā wa al-ijtimāʿīyya wa 
al-ʿailīyya, Dār al-ʿilim li-l-malāyīn, Bayrūt, 1999, p. 133.
30 Kūrū, Lībiyā athnāʾ al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī, p. 27.
31 ʿAmara, Moḥammad, Muʿjam al-muṣṭalāḥāt al-iqtiṣādīyyā, Dār al-shrūq, al-Qāhira, 1993, p. 
299. 
32 Majmaʾ al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya, al-Muʿjam al-wajīz, p. 374.
33 Extracted from http://journal.mufad.org/attachments/article/452/7.pdf, March 2016.
34 al-Wībā, al-Idārā al-ʿūthmānīyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, p. 141-142.
35 al-Naṣar, ʿAbd al-Waḥid, al-Muʾassāt al-dawalīyya, Dār ḥaṭīyn, al-Rabāṭ, 1994, p. 135; Farḥat, 
Ibn Ṣaf, al-ʿᾹlāqāt al-qunṣuliyya, Risālāt mājistīr, Jamiʿāt Qsanṭīna, 2013–2014, p. 88.
36 For this point see Isiksel, Günes, La diplomatie ottomane sous le règne de Selim II.
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